

FRIEDRICH HÖLDERLIN

AND

THE GERMAN IDEALIST

PHILOSOPHY

OF HIS DAY

by

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Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1983.



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I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis was composed by me, and that the work is my own.

D.L. Simpson

I should like to express my thanks to my supervisors, Dr. P.H. Gaskill, Prof. W.H. Walsh and Mr. J. Llewelyn, for their invaluable assistance in my work; also to my friends and constant partners in ^ή *διαλεκτική τέχνη*, Messrs. R. Calder and N. Waszek, for their stimulation and support; finally, to my parents, without whom nothing would have been possible.

"Gut ist es, an andern sich
Zu halten. Denn keiner trägt das Leben
allein."

- "Die Titanen".

ABSTRACT of THESIS

The present thesis takes its original impetus from the author's conviction that the German philosophy of the "Goethezeit" represents a peak of metaphysical insight and achievement comparable with the original flowering of European philosophical thought in the age of Plato and Aristotle. Until recently, it was fashionable to regard Kant and Hegel as the two 'giants' of this second flowering and to consign other philosophers, such as Fichte and Schelling, to the rôle of supporting figures. However, in recent years, the pioneer efforts of such scholars as Walter Schulz, plus the interest shown by modern philosophers such as Martin Heidegger, have drawn attention to depths in the philosophy of Schelling which had been ignored by the leading exponents of Idealist philosophy, due to their sympathy for the ideas of Kant and/or Hegel. In addition, again due partly to the insights of Heidegger, there has developed a realisation among ever widening circles that Friedrich Hölderlin was also one of these 'giants' of metaphysics. His strictly philosophical works are limited in number and in length. However, his contribution cannot be measured in terms of quantity: I would maintain, and have tried to show in the present work, that it was his original insight and inspiration which formed the basis for all of Schelling's work as of the late 1790's. In the process, I have followed Hölderlin's thought back to what I see as its roots: the ideas of the Presocratics, early Plato and Kant's third "Kritik!"

CHAPTER ONE : "PINDAR"

It might seem at first puzzling that the philosophically minded Hölderlin should have such a profound interest in the Greek poet Pindar's songs in praise of various athletes at the ancient games of his day. However, his interest in and enthusiasm for Pindar's work cannot be denied or ignored. Not only did he translate some of Pindar's Odes and other fragments, but Pindar's style can be seen to have influenced the tone, general atmosphere and strophic structure of the longer poems Hölderlin composed in the latter part of his active career, although this influence may have been partly mediated through the neo-Pindaric odes of Goethe, Klopstock and Schiller. Our analysis in this chapter will be confined to Hölderlin's direct interest in and pronouncements on Pindar's work and to an attempt to elucidate the philosophical basis for this interest.

The subject matter of Pindar's work, the celebration of the achievements and qualities of the various winners of the games, does not at first sight appear to be of the sort that might excite the philosophical interest of Hölderlin, as opposed to his purely aesthetic concerns as a poet. However, if we look closely at Hölderlin's Pindar Fragments, small sections translated with comments appended - Beißner thinks in 1803, some three years after the main body of Hölderlin's Pindar translations - we find that Hölderlin's interest would indeed appear to be largely philosophical.

Firstly, there is the reference to Centaurs in general, and Cheiron (or "Chiron" in Hölderlin's transliteration) in particular. Hölderlin elects to translate the following section of Jason's speech in Pythian IV (11. 102 ff.): -

Φαμί Σιδεοκαλίας Χείρωνος οἶσιν.
ἔντροθε γὰρ νέομαι
πᾶρ Χαρικλοῦς καὶ Φιλύρας, ἵνα Κενταυροὶ
με κοῦραι θρέψαν ἔγχαί.

εἴκοσι δ' ἐκτελέσας ἐνιαυτούς οὔτε ἔργον
οὔτ' ἔπος ἐντράπελον κείνοισιν εἰπὼν ἰκόμαν
οἴκαδ', ἔρχαίαν κομίζων πατὸς ἐμοῦ βασιλευμέναν.

Hölderlin's second version runs as follows:-

ich glaube, die Lehre
Chirons zu haben. Aus der Grotte nämlich komm' ich
Bei Charikli und Philyra, wo des
Centauren Mädchen mich ernähret,
Die heiligen; zwanzig Jahre aber hab'
Ich zugebracht und nicht ein Werk
Noch Wort, ein schmutziges, jenen
Gesagt, und bin gekommen nach Haus,
Die Herrschaft wiederzubringen meines Vaters.¹

[Gr.St.A. 5, p.281.]

Hölderlin has translated the Greek quite accurately, although "haben" seems a strange translation for οἶσεν, the Future Infinitive of φέρω. "I claim that I shall present/bring forth proof of/for" would bring out the force of φάμι οἶσεν more fully and adequately.

As regards the intellectual content of the passage, Hölderlin offers the following interpretation and comments:

Fähigkeit der einsamen Schule für die Welt. Das Unschuldige des reinen Wissens als die Seele der Klugheit. Denn Klugheit ist die Kunst, unter verschiedenen Umständen getreu zu bleiben, das Wissen die Kunst, bei positiven Irrtümern im Verstande sicher zu sein. Ist intensiv der Verstand geübt, so erhält er seine Kraft auch im Zerstreuten; sofern er an der eigenen geschliffenen Schärfe das Fremde leicht erkennt, deswegen nicht leicht irre wird in ungewissen Situationen.

[Gr.St.A. 5. p.281.]

This, then, is Hölderlin's definition of "die Lehre des Chirons", Pindar's διδασκαλία Χείρωνος. He would seem to be describing a state of heightened consciousness which makes one "fähig... für die Welt". This is not simple "Lebensweisheit" which is intended to teach one how to succeed in earthly affairs and avoid making "faux pas" which might have an adverse effect on one's standing in the world. Hölderlin speaks of "das Unschuldige des reinen Wissens": ... οὔτε ἔργον οὔτ' ἔπος ἐντράπελον κείνοισιν εἰπὼν ... This διδασκαλία teaches one how to

avoid being put to shame (ἐντρέπομαι = "I feel shame") by saying or doing something disgraceful. This might be connected with the concepts of "shame societies" and "guilt societies" much discussed by modern anthropologists - E.R. Dodds has shown how relevant these concepts are to ancient Greek society in his stimulating work "the Greeks and the Irrational". The general distinction can be defined briefly in the following terms: a "shame society" is one (such as Homeric Greece) where a man's actions are guided not by any abstract moral code, nor by the inner voice of conscience, but by the consideration how these actions will affect the man's standing in the world and the respect in which he is held by his peers. The operation of this code is seen in an extreme form in the episode of the death of Ajax, who commits suicide when he is not awarded the dead Achilles' armour, which he felt he deserved as the greatest surviving Greek warrior. If we follow the details of this case, we may perhaps attain some degree of enlightenment as regards Hölderlin's attitude towards and theory regarding this general theme.

The earliest source for the story of Ajax's suicide is Homer's "Odyssey", Book XI, ll. 541-567. Here Odysseus meets the shade of Ajax in the Underworld. Even at this stage, Ajax is not reconciled:

οἷη δ' Αἴαντος ψυχὴ Τελαμωνιάδαο
νόσφιν ἄφροσθήκει κεχολωμένη
εἵνεκα νίκης... (ll. 543-44).

This translates:-

Only the soul of Telamonian Ajax.
Remained aloof, embittered by the victory...

The victory concerned is, of course, Odysseus' victory over him in the matter of Achilles' armour. Odysseus feels to some extent responsible for the matter, and regrets having received and accepted the armour:

ὥς δὲ μὴ ὄφελον νικᾶν τοιῷδ' ἐγὼ ἀέθλω!

τοίγηρ γὰρ κεφαλὴν ἔνεκ' αὐτῶν γαῖα κατέσχευ,
 Αἴανθ', ὅς περὶ μὲν εἶδος, περὶ δ' ἔργα τέτυκτο
 τῶν ἄλλων Δαναῶν μετ' ἄμυμονα Πηλεΐωνα.

(11. 548-51).

In translation this runs:

Would that I had not won such a prize!
For on their account the earth possesses such a
 head (man),
Ajax, who as regards both appearance and works
 had become superior
To the other Greeks excepting the blameless son
 of Peleus.

Odysseus then addresses Ajax's shade directly, urging him to be reconciled and speak to him. His flattery is cleverly applied, as one might expect with Odysseus:

τοῖος γάρ σφιν πύργος ἐπέσχεο· σείο δ' Ἀχαιοὶ
ἔσσαν Ἀχιλλῆος κεφαλῇ Πηληϊΐδῃ
ἐκνύμεθα φθιμένοι διαμπερές·

(11. 556-58).

This translates:

For such a bulwark was lost to them [=the Greeks];
the Greeks mourn your death
Just as they do that of Achilles son of Peleus
Without ceasing;...

Ajax preserves a dignified silence, and retires.

This scene is a prime example of the early Greek pre-occupation with the twin concepts of τιμή ('honour') and αἰδώς ('shame'). Ajax has been put to shame, his honour blemished. This he can never forgive. His actual worth as a warrior and as a man remain, in real terms, precisely the same as they were before the armour incident. He himself has not said or done anything to affect this either way. However, the esteem in which he is held by others, by his society, is the overriding factor. When he sees this apparently reduced, he has no resources of his own upon which to fall back.

We can turn now to Pindar's handling of and comments on the matter. These appear in Nemean VII, 11.20-30:

...ἐγὼ δὲ πλεον' ἔλπομαι

λόγον Ὀδυσσεός ἢ πάθαν διὰ τον ἔδυεπῇ
γενέσθ' "Ὅμηρον"

ἐπεὶ ψεύδεσιν οἱ ποτανά τε μάχαν ἔ
σεμνὸν ἔπεστί τι σοφία δὲ κλέπτει παρ-
άγοισα μύθοις τυφλὸν δ' ἔχει
ἦτορ ὅμιλος ἀνδρῶν ὁ πλεῖστος. εἰ γὰρ ἦν
ἔ τὰν ἀλάθειαν ἰδέμεν, οὐ κεν ὅσων χολωθείς
ὁ καρτερὸς Αἴας ἔπαξεν διὰ φρενῶν
λευρὸν ξίφος ὅν κράτιστον Ἀχιλῆος ἄτερ μάχης
ξανθῷ Μενελάῳ δάμαρτα κομίσαι θοαῖς
ἐν γαυροῖς πόρευσαν εὐθυπνόου Ζεφύροιο πομπῇ
πρὸς Ἴλου πόλιν.

In translation:

I hope/expect/believe that
Odysseus received more fame than he had suffering,
through the sweet lays of Homer;

Since in the falsehoods and winged artifices
There lies something solemn/holy/majestic; the skill
beguiles, leading astray with fables;
blind indeed is
The heart of the greatest mass of men. For if it were
the case
That they could see the truth, then never, angered
by the matter of the armour,
Would the strong/valiant Ajax have thrust through
his breast
The smooth/polished sword; he, the strongest in
battle but for Achilles,
Whom, to get back his wife for golden-haired
Menelaus, in fast ships
The guidance of the straight-blowing Zephyr conveyed
To the city of Ilus.

Thus, Pindar would seem to reproach Homer for glorifying Odysseus, whom he blames for the death of Ajax. We can conclude that he had a low opinion of Odysseus and felt that he did not deserve the armour. Ajax was correct in thinking that he should have received it.

Pindar's low opinion of the crafty Odysseus is shared by Hölderlin. In his first short essay "Über Achill", he describes Odysseus as "ein Sack voll Scheidemünze, wo man lange zu zählen hat, mit dem Gold ist man viel baldier fertig". [Gr.St.A.4/1, p.224]. The "Gold" is, of course,

Achilles, whom Hölderlin sees as Homer's noblest character. It is an interesting point that, whereas most commentators, including Pindar, tend to connect the two heroes Achilles and Ajax closely with one another, seeing Ajax as being, if not quite as great as Achilles, very nearly so, Hölderlin on the other hand seems not to respect him greatly at all. In the second essay "Über Achill" he describes him as "den blindtobenden Ajax" [Gr.St.A.4/1,p.224], although it has to be pointed out that he mentions Ajax in a more approving tone in the poem "Mnemosyne":

Am Feigenbaum ist mein
Achilles mir gestorben,
Und Ajax liegt
An den Grotten der See...
[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.194.]

Here, the poet does seem to rank Ajax somewhere near Achilles, although the latter is uniquely "mein Achilles".

Why this comparative lack of respect for Ajax when Achilles is praised so highly? Why does Hölderlin apparently disagree with Pindar in his estimate of the hero? There is no way of telling with certainty, as Hölderlin did not clarify the point in specific terms. However, one possible explanation might lie in the very different manner in which the two heroes faced and reacted to similar adverse circumstances. Both Achilles and Ajax were presented with situations which involved a diminution of their honour or public esteem - a loss of face. Whereas Achilles retires into dignified seclusion, retaining unimpaired his awareness of his own worth, Ajax resorts to the extreme measure of self-destruction, being unable or unwilling to live with the shame. Ajax' action might be regarded as a good example of the shortcomings of the νήπιοι ('foolish men') described by Pindar in Pythian III, 11.80-3:

εἰ δὲ λόγων συνέμεν κορυφάν, ἱέρων, ὀρθὰν
ἐκίστα, μανθάνων οἶσθα προτέρων.
" ἔν παρ' ἐσλὸν πῆματα σύνδυνω δαίονται βροτοῖς
ἁθάνατοι." τὰ μὲν ὦν οὐ δύνανται νήπιοι
κόσμῳ φέρειν,

ἄλλ' ἄναθοί, τὰ καλὰ τρέψαντες ἔξω.

In translation:

If you, Hieron, know how to perceive/understand/
know the true/right/just summit/acme, you know
what our ancestors learned:

'For one piece of good luck the immortal gods ap-
portion to us mortals a pair of misfortunes.'

Now, these things foolish men cannot bear with
decency,

But the noble/virtuous can do so, by turning the
fair part outwards.

One would have thought that Pindar would see Ajax as one of the *νῆπιοι*, as Hölderlin evidently did. However, it is clear from Nemean VII, 11.20-30, that he did not do so. If one wished to express Hölderlin's view of Ajax in the terminology of twentieth-century anthropology, one would describe him as an example of a man conditioned by and accepting the ethos of a 'shame society'.

If we turn now from Ajax to Achilles, we find a different ethos, a different attitude towards suffering, injustice, loss of face. Achilles' independence and self-assurance mark him out as a forerunner of a new type of ethical order, the 'guilt society': in the representatives of this new society or moral code, ethical conduct and its criteria are internalised and the individual's personal conscience or independently acquired moral code is the ultimate arbiter, not the general consensus of opinion in his society or among his peers. Achilles' conscience is clear, so he does not succumb to any feeling of shame or inadequacy when faced with an insult to his honour. He reacts with extreme sensitivity to this insult, but only out of pride - not, as in the case of Ajax, because his self-esteem and moral being are entirely dependent upon what others think of him. His state of mind might be taken as an example of the "Fähigkeit für die Welt" mentioned above by Hölderlin. That Achilles showed signs of this "Fähigkeit" while Ajax did not would be of particular interest to Hölderlin in view of the manner in which Achilles was reputed to have been educated. Pindar

relates the story in Nemean. III, 11.53-63:

Βαθυμήτα Χείρων τραφε λιθίνῳ
 Ἴλσον' ἔνδον τέχει, καὶ ἔπειτεν Ἀσκληπίον,
 τὸν φαρμάκων δίδασκε μαλακόχειρα νόμον·
 νυμφευσε δ' αὖτις Ἀγλαόκολπον
 Νηρέος θύγατρα, γόνον τέ οἱ φέρτατον
 ἀτιτάλλαν, ἐν ἁρμένεοισι πᾶσι θυμὸν αὖξων.
 ὄφρα θαλασσίαις ἀνέμων ῥιπαῖσι πεμφθεὶς
 ὑπὸ Τρωϊᾶν, δορίκτυπον ἀλαλάν Λυκίων τε προσμένοι καὶ
 Δαρδάνων τε, καὶ ἐγχεσφόροις ἐπιμίξαις Ἰφρυῶν
 Αἰθιοέεσσι χεῖρας, ἐν φρεσὶ πάξαιθ', ὅπως σφίσι
 μὴ κοίρανος ὀπίσω
 πάλιν οἴκαδ' ἀνεψιὸς Σαμενῆς Ἑλένοιο Μέννων
 μόλοι.

This translates:

The sage Cheiron reared Jason
 Under a stony roof, and then Asclepius,
 Whom he taught the soft-handed/soothing usage/cus-
 tom(-s) of the apothecaries;
 Moreover/another time he arranged the marriage of
 the bright-bosomed
 Daughter of Nereus, and her most mighty child
 He reared/cherished, in all things fitting promoting/
 exalting his soul/heart/spirit/courage/mind/will;

So that, when sent by the maritime forces/blasts of
 the winds
 Towards Troy, he might stand his ground against the
 spear-clashing war-cry (-cries) of the Lykians
 and the Phrygians
 And the Dardanians, and, having joined battle with
 the spear-bearing
 Ethiopians, might fix/set in his heart/mind/reason
 (the idea) that their leader should not again
 Go back home - he, Memnon, the mighty/raging/violent
 cousin of Helenos.

Nereus' "bright-bosomed" daughter is, of course, The-
 tis, her γόνος φέρτατος ("most mighty child") the great
 Achilles. He, as well as Jason, was brought up by Βαθυμήτα
 Χείρων (literally "deep-counselling Cheiron").
 Cheiron's methods are alluded to briefly: he would seem
 to have provided instruction in specific technical
 skills, such as pharmacy (line 55), but the main benefit
 he seems to have bestowed on his pupils (at least, on
 Achilles) is described in the phrase in line 58:

... ἐν ἀρμέροισι παῶσι θυμὸν αὖξων.

Pindar's use of the verb αὖξων in this context is interesting, in that its basic meaning is "to increase/make grow". Hence, by implication, Cheiron's purpose is to add to or nurture a quality or capacity which is already present in the pupil, from birth. One can compare this with our modern English term "educate", with its original Latin meaning "to lead out". In both cases, the word implies a process of nurturing an in-born capacity or talent, rather than imposing anything from without. In the present context, the capacity or element which is to be increased or nurtured "in all things fitting" (ἐν ἀρμέροισι παῶσι) is the pupil's θυμός. This is one of a group of very important semantically related terms in Greek - terms which are often difficult to distinguish one from the other. These terms are: ὁ θυμός, ἡ φρήν

and ἡ ψυχή. We shall have to take care to differentiate as clearly as possible between θυμός and ψυχή in our chapter on Empedokles. Within the present context, the following brief summary will have to suffice¹:-

- a) ὁ θυμός: used frequently with emotional connotations: 'heart', 'courage', 'wrath', 'desire'. Perhaps most aptly and succinctly described as 'the dynamic life force and its various manifestations'.
- b) ἡ φρήν: frequently used in the plural, with singular meaning. The distinction between φρήν and θυμός is perhaps best brought out in the set phrase κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν, which is often glossed 'mente animoque'. Although, like θυμός, it is often used to apply to emotions, one feels justified in putting forward the generalisation that ἡ φρήν, in its figurative sense (it also has a biological meaning), connotes something more cerebral: 'mind', 'understanding', 'reason', 'consciousness'. In Homer, φρένες (in the Plural) is

used to refer to 'life', which is seen as juxtaposed to our third term:

- c) ἡ ψυχή : frequently used by Homer to refer to the 'souls' of the departed. Its nearest Latin equivalent (if we accept the analogy: θυμός = animus; φρήν = mens) would be 'anima'. In Homer, the ψυχή is the element in the human being which escapes (through the mouth) at the moment of death, when it is separated from the φρένες. In Attic Greek, ψυχή came to have a slightly different meaning, more akin to the Christian concept of the immortal soul, the container of all the noblest attributes of man. In Homer, the latter meaning is more liable to be encompassed by ὁ θυμός. The immortal part of man was a far poorer thing for Homer than it was to become for the Christian.

If we turn back to Pindar, we find that we can conclude that the poet saw Cheiron's basic task not as a sharpening of the intellect of his pupils, but rather as a nurturing and extension of a more instinctive or unconscious element in their make-up. The myriad possible translations of θυμός indicated above demonstrate the ultimately non-intellectual nature of "die Lehre Chirons". The great teacher is concerned with the spirit rather than the mind. He promotes a type of "Klugheit", in Hölderlin's terminology, but this "Klugheit" is not the sly cunning or intellectual brilliance of an Odysseus, but rather the deeper wisdom and adherence to noble moral principles of an Achilles. It is due to having been taught the principles of "die Klugheit" and "das Wissen" that Achilles, "dieses 'enfant gâté' der Natur", is able to act with self-assurance in "ungewisse Situationen". It is not simply in his reaction to Agamemnon's boorishness that we see this: it will be remembered that Achilles was given the choice whether to live gloriously and die young, or live in quiet obscurity and have a long life.

When Hölderlin talks of "das Unschuldige des reinen Wissens", this might be taken as added support for the

idea that the great advantage, in Hölderlin's eyes, that Cheiron's pupils enjoyed over less fortunate mortals lay in the fact that through his teaching they had been raised beyond the ethos of the shame society to the level of consciousness of the guilt society, where the individual (ideally) has a firm grasp of the principles of moral conduct and is ruled only by these principles and by his conscience. The concept of "Schuld" per se has no place in the shame society. Such and such an action does not make one guilty. It merely calls down upon one the disapproval or ridicule of society: one has come up against a taboo, set up artificially by that society, with no basis in theology or philosophy. The greatest Greek heroes - Achilles, Oedipus - are men who have within themselves the capacity to differentiate between good and evil. They accept and recognise a moral responsibility which overrides conventional rules of behaviour and self-interest - they set the standards for their own behaviour higher than any outsider - or any god! - would set them for them. Long before Sokrates or Plato made their misgivings known concerning the a-moral behaviour of the gods of Greek mythology, the great warrior Achilles had set himself and proudly maintained standards of behaviour which would put Zeus himself to shame.

It is this level of consciousness which is referred to by Sokrates in the following passage from the central section of Plato's "Apology":

"Ἴσως ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις· "Εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις κυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν;" ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον ἀντεῖποιμι, ὅτι "Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἷε δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῶ λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν οἳ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός..." (28 b-c).

In English:

But perhaps someone will say: 'Is it not a matter for shame/a disgrace, Sokrates, to have pursued a course of action whereby you run the risk now of losing your life?' I would reply to him with the just statement that 'You do not speak well, man/ my friend/sir, if you mean/ suppose that it is proper for a man who is of any worth at all to take into account any considerations of life or death, rather than paying regard to one thing alone: that, whenever he acts, he acts in a just rather than an unjust manner, that he performs the works of a good man rather than those of a bad man. For, by your account, those demigods who died at Troy, both Thetis' son and the others, would be worthless/ of no account...'

Sokrates goes on to cite the example of Achilles' being warned of the fatal consequences for himself if he avenges his friend Patroklos' death by killing Hektor. Achilles, like Sokrates himself, was able to face death with equanimity, in the knowledge that he had lived his life according to the highest principles - the principles taught by his tutor Cheiron.

Once again, in this passage from Plato, we have Achilles brought forward as the perfect example of an ἀνὴρ ἡθικός, a man who acts according to his conscience and moral principles rather than self-interest or the opinion of others. This ideal was kept alive after Plato by the Stoic philosophers, with their idea of virtue as the "summum bonum":

Quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans conficitur persona sapientis! qui, cum ratio docuerit quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus vereque omnia ista nomina possideat quae irrideri ab imperitis solent.

[Cicero, De Finibus, III, 75.]

In English:

How dignified/serious indeed, how magnificent, how resolute/firm/constant is the character of the sage/philosopher/wise man represented [scilicet: by the Stoics]! Since their philosophical system taught that what whatever was honourable/proper/virtuous was the only good, he must necessarily always be happy and truly possess all those names/titles which are usually laughed at by the ignorant.

Cicero's account of the Stoic philosophy, although not uncritical, is generally admiring in its tone. The motto 'quod honestum est, id est solum bonum' is Cicero's translation of the first Stoic Paradox, as it is known: ὅτι μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἢ ἀθρόν. 'Honestus' is Cicero's Latin translation for καλός in its moral sense of 'virtuous'. The 'nomina' which the ignorant find so comical is a reference to the Stoics' habit of referring to the wise man as a king, a dictator, a free man, etc.. It is true, as Cicero suggests, that the Stoics - or some Stoics - carried their ideals to absurd lengths at times. Cicero, in 'Pro Murena', 61-4, particularly criticises M. Porcius Cato, a convinced Stoic, for a lack of generosity and a hardness of character, which he puts down to the Stoic doctrine, and for an adherence to abstract principles which cannot be applied to real situations. These were the inherent dangers in this strand of Greek thought, a strand which was opposed dialectically by the Epicurean school, which was more interested in man's other faculties, those neglected by the Stoics: the senses and the passions.

The older Greek ideal of the Homeric hero, in particular Achilles, differs from the Stoic ideal in being less exclusively rational in outlook - it would be difficult to apply Cicero's criticisms of Cato to Achilles. Although he was obstinate in the defence of his own rights and dignity, he evidently valued his personal friendship with Patroklos more highly than these considerations, or even than his own life. It must also be remembered that the cause of his break with Agamemnon was a woman. Altogether, Achilles was a more human figure than, for example, Cato.

However, these differences can be exaggerated, and the orthodox Stoic philosophical position was not genuinely rationalist in the sense that one might describe Plato's later works as being rationalist. For example, the Stoics had a lively interest in what we might term the Teiresias

element of divinely inspired prophecy.³ Adolf Bonhöffer stresses this characteristic in his study "die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet", in which he describes Epictetus' position in the following terms:

Epictet zeigt sich nun auch hierin wieder als echter und gerechter Stoiker: er ist von der Existenz der Wahrsagekunst völlig überzeugt, und es fällt ihm nicht ein, irgend eine der üblichen Arten der Mantik zu bezweifeln.

[p.45.]

Thus, we find that the Cheironic creed is a permanent and central element in the ancient world from Homer, through Pindar and Plato to the Stoics.⁴ In this we find the basis for Hölderlin's preoccupation in his later poetry with the mythological figure of Cheiron. This mythical figure was the originator of Pindar's *διδασκαλία Χείρωνος* - "Chiron's Lehre", the basis for all moral conduct, freeing its adherents from the unsatisfactory dependence on the opinions of others which obtained in the shame society. If Hölderlin wishes art to be the new religion or replacement for religion, the ethical element in it is of great importance. "Chiron's Lehre" gives him the basis for his moral code, comparable with and an ancestor of the "summum bonum" of the Stoics. This code is the key to all moral conduct and personal peace of mind: a man need not worry even if the whole world disapproves of his actions, if he knows and is sure of the moral principles which guide them.

But, ethics apart, the philosophical element in Pindar's poetry was, for Hölderlin, of great interest and profundity. He would, in my view, have had no compunction about agreeing with C.M. Bowra's statement in the Introduction to his volume of Pindar translations:

So far as the actual Games were concerned, Pindar seems to have been not very interested in their details; what concerned him was the significance of success in his scheme of things. For him victory in the Games raised questions of mystical and metaphysical importance.⁵

It is to these metaphysical questions that we now turn our attention.

As we can see from, for example, Plato's "Theaitetos", Epistemology was a subject much discussed and greatly in dispute among the Greek philosophers. Among other theories on the subject discussed in Plato's work, Protagoras' famous denial of the very existence of Truth receives attention:

φησὶ γάρ τοι πάντων χρημάτων
μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων,
ὥς ἐστὶ, τῷ δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὥς οὐκ ἐστίν.

In English:

(152a).

For he says that man is the measure of all things:
both of things that are, that they are, and of things
that are not, that they are not.

Like Plato, Hölderlin was in complete disagreement with this theory. He was a firm believer in the Truth. The following passage from Olympian II, translated by Hölderlin in 1800, shows clearly that Pindar held similar views:

πολλὰ μοι ὑπ' ἀγκῶνος ὠκέα βέλη
ἔνδορ ἐντὶ φάρετρας,
φωναῖα συνετοῖσιν· ἐς δὲ τὸ πᾶν ἐρμηνέων
κατίσχει. σοφὸς δὲ πολλὰ εἰδὼς φῦλ' μαθόντες δὲ
παγγλωσσίᾳ, κόρακες ὥς, ἄκραντα λάρυετον
Διὸς πρὸς ὄρνιθα θεῖον. (11. 83-98).

Hölderlin translates:

Viele mir unter dem Arme schnelle Pfeile
Innen im Köcher
Tönend beisammen sind; durchaus
Aber das Ausleger
Bedarf. Weis ist, wer vieles
Weiß von Natur.
Die Gelernten aber überfließend
Von Allberedsamkeit, Raben gleich
Unnützes zu schreien

Zu Jupiters göttlichem Vogel.

[Gr.St.A.5, pp.49-50.]

Hölderlin's translation is fairly free here: φωναῖα συνετοῖσιν means "sounding to the quick at apprehending",

he mistranslates ἐς τὸ πᾶν- "for the crowd/the masses".

This, then, is Pindar's view of the epistemological problem, at least with regard to the profoundest metaphysical truths. There are a few men who are wise and know a lot φύει, "von Natur". These would be the inspired poets, the Cheiron or Teiresias figures. There are also some συνετοί, who understand what these poets say, and are fit to be ἐρμηνεῖς, "Ausleger", of the truth(-s) revealed by the poets, to mediate between them and τὸ πᾶν, "the masses". The μαθόντες, "die Gelernten", try to enthrone cleverness and learning where only divinely revealed truth belongs, and are to be pitied.

Thus, Pindar believes in the Truth, and claims to have special access to it in his capacity as a divinely inspired poet. There remains the question as to the precise nature of this Truth which Pindar claims to have access to and to be revealing to the συνετοί. The great Greek scholar Hermann Fränkel has valuable suggestions to make in this respect in the sections on Pindar in his book "Dichtung und Philosophie des Frühen Griechentums"⁶, in which he claims:

"Durchweg ist Pindars Denken auf Werte ausgerichtet!"
[p. 539.]

I understand him to mean by this that certain symbols in Pindar's Odes (the gods in particular) represent something higher than ordinary life, an object for all man's strivings and aspirations - in fact, τὸ καλὸν, "das Absolute". As Fränkel puts it:

Die Werte der pindarischen Welt verkörpern sich unter anderm in den Gestalten der Götter im Himmel; in uns Menschen dagegen ist Wert und Unwert, Himmlisches und Irdisches, seltsam gemischt.
[ibidem.]

Again:

Das Wollen hochstrebender Menschen gleicht dem der Götter; aber das Dasein und Vollbringen ist bei den Göttern fest, gewiß und frei, bei den Menschen unsicher und von launischen Zufällen abhängig, die irgend ein Tag oder eine Nacht heraufführen kann.
[p. 540.]

This could well be a description of the plot of "Oedipus Tyrannos": Oedipus was a "hochstrebender Mensch" who came up against the "launische Zufälle" of fate. Hölderlin's ideas concerning Oedipus are dealt with in another chapter of this thesis. It is enough here to remember the fact that Hölderlin, unlike Hegel, stresses the rôle of the prophet Teiresias, who is privy to knowledge of things, through divine revelation, that are obscure to the intellectual Oedipus. We can compare this with Pindar's description of Oedipus' fate in Olympian II:

ῥοαὶ δ' ἄλλοι' ἄλλαι
εὐθυμῖαν τε μετὰ καὶ πόνων ἐς ἄνδρας ἔβαν.
οὕτω δὲ Μοῖρ', ἃ τε πατρώιον
τῶνδ' ἔχει τὸν εὐφρονα πότμον, θεόρτῳ σὺν ὀλβῳ
ἐπὶ τι καὶ κῆμ' ἄνει παλιντράπελον ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ.
ἔξ οὗπερ ἔκτεινε Λαῖον μόριμος υἱὸς
συναντόμενος, ἐν δὲ Πυθῶνι Χρησθὲν
παλαίφατον τέλεσσαν.
ἰδοῖσα δ' ὄξει' Ἑριννὺς
ἔπεφνέ οἱ σὺν ἀλλαλοφονίᾳ γένος ἀρήιον.

This translates:

(11. 33-42).

Fluten aber anderswoher andere
Mit Hoffnungen und mit
Mühen sind über Männer gekommen.

So aber Fügung, welcher das väterliche
Von diesen zugehört, das wohlgesinnete Los,
Mit gottgesendetem Reichtum
Hin auch irgend ein Leid bringt,
Das wieder sich wandelt, zu anderer Zeit,
Seitdem getötet hat den Laios der verhängnisvolle
Sohn,
Zusammentreffend, und jenes in Pytho geheiligte
Urwort vollendet.

Zuschauend aber die schnelle Erinnys
Hat ihm getötet mit Wechsel-
Mord ein kriegerisch Geschlecht....

[Gr.St.A.5, pp.46-47.]

Pindar, then, like Hölderlin, sees Oedipus' fate as justified, or at least unavoidable, having been decreed by fate. Oedipus is not a bad man - more an unlucky one. It is interesting that the adjective Pindar uses to de-

scribe him is *μόριμος*, the poetical form of *μόρσιμος*, "appointed by fate, doomed, destined, foredoomed" - the adjective from *ὁ μόρος*, "fate", which itself is a synonym for *Μοῖρα*, whose activities are stressed in this very passage. Both these nouns are connected with the verb *μείρομαι*, "to receive as one's portion or due, to have or obtain one's share of a thing". This verb contains a strong nuance or overtone of "appropriateness" - Fate (or the gods) know what it is doing, or is even acting in a just fashion, when it decrees that Oedipus shall go through these severe trials. Pindar was a man of religious sensibilities, and it would not have occurred to him to shake his fist at the heavens after the manner of Byron's Manfred.

This, then, is the crucial difference, for Pindar, between men and the gods: men, no matter how much they may aspire to the condition of the gods, are always subject to, and may be humbled by the vagaries of Fate. At first sight, this would appear to be an essentially tragic vision of the human condition: we mortals are left striving to achieve what by our very nature we cannot achieve. But this can hardly be the whole truth regarding Pindar's world view. When ^{one} reads his Odes, one feels immediately that their tone is celebratory, not melancholy. There may be no way in which humanity can secure permanently for itself the ideal status of the gods, but there are still moments, however fleeting, of splendour, joy and a sense of achievement, when a "hochstrebender Mensch" can attain godlike bliss on a temporary basis:

ἐπάμεροι· τί δέ τις; τί δ' οὐ τις; σκιᾶς ὄνταρ
ἄνθρωπος. ἄλλ' ὅταν εἴγλα Διόσδοτος ἔλθῃ,
λαμπρὸν φέγγος ἔπεσσιρ ἀνδρῶν καὶ μείλιχος
δαίμων.

This translates:

(Pythian VIII, 95-97).

Tagwesen. Was aber ist einer? was aber ist einer
nicht?
Der Schatten Traum, sind Menschen. Aber wenn der
Glanz,
Der gottgegebene, kommt,

Leuchtend Licht ist bei den Männern
Und liebliches Leben.

[Gr.St.A.5, p.101.]

Pindar admits the precarious nature of human existence - man is but a σκιᾶς ὄναρ, "the dream of a shadow", but (ἀλλ') whenever an αἰγλα δίοσδοτος, "a heaven-sent gleam", arrives, the situation and man himself are transfigured. A λαμπρὸν φέγγος, "a radiant light", descends on man, and also a μέλιχος αἰών, "a gentle period/life". This is the saving grace of human existence. C.M. Bowra describes the matter in the following terms:

Pindar's guiding and central theme is the part of experience in which human beings are exalted or illumined by a divine force, and this he commonly compares with light. At such times the consciousness is marvellously enhanced, and a man's whole being has a new spaciousness and confidence. For Pindar this was the end and the justification of life... Through song men attain immortality... What Pindar conveys in song is precisely the enhancement of consciousness which his athletes enjoy in the moment of triumph... For much of their time men lead a shadowy and unsubstantial existence, but when the gods send a divine brightness all is well with them.⁷ It is this brightness that Pindar seeks to convey...

Thus, Pindar saw it as his rôle as a poet to call down this state of grace, the equivalent of the ἑκστασις in Sophoklean tragedy. The temporary nature of this state, and the fact that it is δίοσδοτος - in other words, it cannot be forced to appear by human will - puts it on exactly the same basis as the Hölderlinian/Schellingian "Ekstase" or vision of the Absolute. Thus, Pindar's views on the poet's mission can be taken as identical with those of Hölderlin:

"Was bleibt aber, stiften die Dichter".

[Gr.St.A.2/1, p.189.]

If we now look more closely at Fränkel's idea, mentioned above, of Pindar's poetry being concerned with "Werte", we shall see that Pindar is in this sense a philosophical Idealist, a precursor of Plato. A good example is the following passage from Olympian I:

"Ἀριστον μὲν ὕδωρ, ὃ δὲ χρυσὸς αἰθόμενον πῦρ
ἅτε διαπρέπει νυκτὶ μέγ' ἄνορος ἔξοχα πλούτου."

εἰ δ' ἔθλα γάρυεν
ἔλδαι, φίλον ἦτορ,
μηκέθ' ἁλίου σκόπει
ἄλλο θαλπρότερον ἐν ἡμέρᾳ φαινὸν ἄστρον
μηδ' Ὀλυμπίας ἀγῶνα φέρτερον εὐδᾶσομεν.
ἑρήμας δὲ αἰθέρος,

(ll. 1-7).

In translation:

Most excellent is water, and gold is a blazing
fire,
So that it is conspicuous at night far more than
lordly wealth;
If to speak/sing of prizes
You wish, dear/my own heart,
Do not look for
Another star shining by day through the lonely ether
that will be more warming than the sun,
And do not let us speak of a [place of] assembly
greater than Olympia;...

Pindar is concerned here with symbols for excellence: water, gold, the sun, the Olympic Games. These symbols represent what Plato later called τὸ καλόν: the Beautiful, the Good, the Absolute. The fact that the philosopher Plato used the aesthetic term τὸ καλόν to represent the Absolute is perhaps significant. Certainly, for Pindar, the perception of the Absolute is the primary function of the poet. His poetry is largely in praise of the Absolute, or of excellence, wherever the poet finds it, and most frequently in great men and their actions. The objects of his praise gain immortality through his work.

Another good example is provided by the last few lines of the short Ode, Olympian III, which Pindar wrote for Theron of Acragas on the occasion of his victory in the year 476 B.C. - the same victory celebrated in Olympian II, which Hölderlin translated:

εἰ δ' ἀριστεύει μὲν ὕδωρ, κτεάνων δὲ χρυσὸς
αἰδοιέστατος,
νῦν δὲ πρὸς ἐσχατιᾶν Θήρων ἀρεταῖσιν
ἱκάνων ἄπτεται
οἴκοθεν Ἡρακλέος σταλῶν. τὸ πόρσω δ' ἔστι
σοφοῖς ἄβυστον

κάσόφοις. οὐ γὰρ διώξω· κεινὸς εἶην.

(ll. 42-45).

In English:

If water is excellent/best, and of [all] possessions gold the most valuable,
Then Theron, arriving by his virtues at the furthest/
outermost border/edge, grasps/reaches
From home/from his own means the Pillars of Herakles.
What lies beyond that is inaccessible to/
inviolable by the wise
And the unwise. I shall not pursue it: I would be
acting in vain.

Here, the same symbols for excellence appear, also the man striving to achieve this standard, in an abstract sense. Significantly enough, this is followed by a reminder of the limitations (ἐσχατιά) to this striving, symbolised by the pillars of Herakles. Beyond this border-line no mere mortal may venture. This ἐσχατιά is also a prominent theme in the work of Sophokles and Hölderlin, as we shall see.

Thus, we can conclude, in general terms, that Pindar's poetry involved a separating and a celebrating of the best, a celebration of the αἴψα, the sublime moment of "Ekstase" when the meaning of life is revealed. This celebration of τὸ καλὸν is also an encouragement of the audience to contemplate, recognise and strive after the same. This encouragement partly involves a promise of immortality:

Νέστορα καὶ Λύκιον Σαρπηδόν', ἀνθρώπων φάτις,
ἐξ ἐπέων κελαδενῶν, τέκτονες οἷα σοφοὶ
ἄρμωσαν, νινύσκωμεν. ἃ δ' ἄρετ' ἀκλειναῖς
χοιδαῖς
χρονία τελέθει. πᾶσι δὲ πράξασθ' εὐμαρές.

This translates:

(Pythian III, ll. 112-15).

Nestor and Lykian Sarpedon, famed among men,
From murmuring/noisy/clear-toned words/epic poetry,
which wise/skilled craftsmen
Fitted together, we know. Virtue in famous songs/
legends
Comes into being for a long time. For few is this
easily done.

Thus, poetry confers on virtue (ἡ ἀρετή = Attic ἡ ἀρετή) lasting fame, but it is only the élite few (παύροι) who find it easy to deserve the poet's praise.⁸ Like the actions of great men, poetry invokes or induces the εὐλογία. Poetry, however, has the additional advantage of permanence.

This, then, is in no sense a pessimistic philosophy: the best - the Absolute - is there to be aimed at and attained, even if it is reached by very few due to the difficulty involved. In the words of Spinoza: "omnia praeclara tam difficilia quam rara sunt".⁹ "All exceptional things are as difficult as they are rare."

Pindar's claims for poetry are perhaps less ambitious within the context of Greek society than Hölderlin's similar claims in modern Germany. Firstly, there was a far more widely held belief, reflected in the work of Plato, for example, in the "divine madness" of poets. Secondly, Pindar's works were not simply published in book form for the perusal of intellectuals and aesthetes. His Odes were intended primarily for public performance accompanied by music. J.B. Bury gives a good description of the process:

...the exposition of his hymns devolved upon the poet himself. It must not be forgotten that Pindar did not compose like a modern lyricist, who writes with regard only to the sense and sound of the words. He might rather be compared to the ideal composer of operas, who should be at once a poet and a musician, and a master of orchestric effects. In building up his elaborate odes at Thebes, he had to combine, under the guidance of a sovran rhythm, the words, the music, and the motions of the dance. His fabric of song arose, like the Theban walls themselves, stone by vocal stone, to the sound of lyres and flutes; and the verses, as he set them, vibrated to the fall of dancers' feet. And this harmony of the Arts, which was wrought out in his imagination, was to be realised under his direction.¹⁰

Thus, it would be easy for the poet to turn such a performance of one of his works into an intoxicating, semi-religious occasion. It might be difficult for the audience to follow the intricacies of the subject matter and intellectual content, but a general mood of "Erhebung" could easily be produced by the sheer musicality of the performance. Pindar was particularly well known in the ancient world for his ability to produce such effects, as is shown by the following passage from Horace:

Monte decurrens velut amnis, imbres
Quem super notas aluere ripas,
Fervet, immensusque ruit profundo
Pindarus ore;...

[Odes, Book IV, 2, 11.5-8.]

In English:

Like a stream running down a mountain, having
Been swelled by the rains beyond its known banks,
Seethes/rages and rushes along, with his deep mouth,
Immeasurable/boundless Pindar;...

The rushing fervour of Pindar's verse is far more difficult for us to appreciate today, of course, but to his Greek contemporaries at a performance stage-managed by the poet himself one can imagine that the effect might be overwhelming. The nearest equivalents to these performances in the history of European art are the tragic festivals at Athens, which were religious rites, and Richard Wagner's music drama performances at Bayreuth which, as we know from Nietzsche, were largely modelled on the Athenian festival. Indeed, in modern times, it is perhaps Wagner who has come nearest to emulating Pindar's achievement and fulfilling all the aims that Pindar and the Athenian tragedians had in mind. Anyone who has attended a performance of, let us say, Wagner's "Tristan" with an open mind will know the feeling of elevation and elation which such a work is capable of producing when performed properly, and will have some idea of the reaction of contemporary Greek audiences to performances of Pindar's works. In addition to the emotional effect of the musical performance, Pindar's and Wagner's works

provide intellectual themes to enthrall the mind. This synthesis is a good example of what Hölderlin and Schelling claimed that art was capable of achieving: taking the audience to the Absolute in an "Ekstase", by preoccupying and appealing to all man's faculties simultaneously: the senses, the emotions, the intellect.

What Pindar, Sophokles and Wagner achieved with considerable success in their respective ages and societies, Hölderlin perhaps failed to achieve, comparatively speaking, largely as a result, I would maintain, of the unsuitability of his work for public performance (with the possible exception of the two Sophokles translations and the - uncompleted - Empedokles play). In our modern age, the great musicians like Beethoven and Wagner and the great dramatists like Shakespeare have a distinct advantage over the lyric poet in this respect. Lyric poetry is largely confined to the written page (at least, outside Russia), and thereby loses some of the capacity for intoxication inherent in an art form which is suitable for public performance.

It is perhaps significant that the young Hegel showed some interest in this very problem, in his early fragments "Über einige charakteristische Unterschiede der alten Dichter [von den neueren]" and "Über einige Vorteile, welche uns die Lektüre der alten klassischen griechischen und römischen Schriftsteller gewährt" [both 1788]. He begins the first essay with the statement: "In unsern Zeiten hat der Dichter keinen so ausgebreiteten Wirkungskreis mehr."¹¹ This may be true if we define "Dichter" narrowly as a lyric poet, but the literary artist in general had not yet been isolated - or isolated himself - as completely as he is - or has - in the twentieth century. After all, Hegel was writing in the century of Goethe and Robert Burns - both of whom, let it be noted, wrote lyric poetry which gained widest popularity when set to music. However, Goethe wrote other works which gained a widespread acclaim and readership, in every way comparable with those of the Greek writers,

except possibly in one respect: the religious awe which greeted the productions of Homer, Pindar, Aeschylus and Sophokles was no longer accorded to works of art, for good or ill.

If we look, now, at Hölderlin's long poems of his last few active years, from 1800 onwards, we can perceive a distinct Pindaric influence in the structure and style of those works, quite apart from any ethical, metaphysical or mythological influence. For example, the rushing but dignified musical sonority of Pindar's Odes is very typical of Hölderlin's later work - music with a purpose, an intended effect. In another chapter of this thesis, I shall go into the musicality and dialectical construction of "der Rhein" in some detail, stressing the relationship and correspondence to Plato's *Διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη*. There, we shall see how the dialectics of "Progreß" and "Regreß" is intended to culminate in an *ἐκστάσις* of profound metaphysical significance. In the context of the present chapter, we can note the Pindaric element in this dialectical process. The strophic structure is Pindar's original version of the Platonic/Hölderlinian dialectics, if only in that the stanzas proceed by opposites: dialectical opposites within the triad (strophe/antistrophe → epode) and also the dialectics of the triads themselves balancing each other.

Fränkel¹², again, has pointed to the influence of Herakleitos on Pindar: he sees the basis for certain prominent Pindaric symbols (water, fire, gold, etc.) as being certain aspects of Herakleitean thought. Quite apart from these symbols, however, it must be remembered that one of Herakleitos' most important ideas is the necessity of Strife, ie. the dialectics:

εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ τὸν πόλεμον εἶναι ξυγόν,
καὶ δίκην ἔρην. καὶ γινόμενα πάντα κατ' ἔρην
καὶ χρεών.¹³ (Fragment 80).

It is necessary to know that war is common and right is strife, and that all things happen by strife and necessity.

πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων

δὲ Βασιλεύς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν Θεοὺς ἔδειξε
τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν δούλους
ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους.¹⁴ (Fr. 53).

War is the father of all and king of all, and
some he has shown/presented as gods and others as
men, some he has made slaves, others free men.

καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ ποιήσαντι
'Ὡς ἔρις ἔκ τε Θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀπολοιτο' οὐ
γὰρ ἂν εἴηαι ἁρμονία μὴ ὄντος ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος οὐδὲ
τὰ ζῶα ἀνευ θήλεος καὶ ἀρρενος ἐναντίων ὄντων.¹⁵

[Aristotle, "Eth.Eudem.", Book VII, 1235/25.]

Herakleitos rebukes the author of the line 'Would
that strife might be destroyed from among both
gods and men': for there would be no musical scale
unless high and low existed, nor living creatures
without female and male, which are opposites.

The author Herakleitos rebukes is Homer, the line con-
cerned being from "Iliad", Book XVIII, line 107. Plato
was not the first Greek to criticise Homer on philosoph-
ical grounds.

It is easy to see how Pindar's Odes may be based on
this Herakleitean principle: the strophic/triadic system
in form, and certain sequences of action in the content.
Fränkel¹⁶, once more, in his invaluable study, points
out the latter phenomenon in Nemean VI:

Im archaischen Pendelschlag des Gedankens von
Gegensatz zu Gegensatz werden Mensch und Gott
aus ihrer Verwandtschaft und Verschiedenheit ver-
standen.... Das Schema ist dies: 'Mensch und Gott
sind verwandt - und doch durchaus verschieden -
aber manchmal wird der Mensch gottähnlich - und
doch ist er hilflos jedem Wechsel ausgesetzt'.

This is precisely the same procedure as Hölderlin
followed in "der Rhein" - dialectics of form and content.
It is therefore of some considerable interest that Höl-
derlin, in his comments on one of the 1803 Pindar frag-
ments, mentions this very element in Pindar's thought:

Der Mensch, als Erkennendes, muß auch verschie-
dene Welten unterscheiden, weil Erkenntnis nur
durch Entgegensetzung möglich ist. [Gr.St.A.5, p.285.]

Thus, to conclude: Hölderlin took a tremendous amount from Pindar in all aspects of his work, particularly during his last six years of poetic activity. The tone and form of his odes, the celebratory character of the subject matter (Hölderlin, too, has his heroes to praise) - all these are decidedly Pindaric, although it is a legitimate subject for debate how much this was a direct influence, and how much simply a coincidental similarity of outlook and vision. It also seems clear that Hölderlin absorbed certain elements of Herakleitan thought through Pindar, although, as we shall see, this may equally well have come to him through Sophokles - and, of course, Plato. In addition, he would have been familiar with the sections on Herakleitos in the standard philosophical textbooks of the day, such as Brucker's Historia critica philosophiae.¹⁷

Even if all these elements were not taken directly from Pindar by Hölderlin - and we must remember, for example, that Goethe and Klopstock wrote Pindaric odes which Hölderlin would have read - it is most certain that he recognised in the Theban bard a kindred spirit, and that the life's work of each of them was directed on the same path towards the same goal, even if Hölderlin's journey along this path ended more tragically.

CHAPTER TWO: "SOPHOKLES"

Twentieth-century scholarship has had much to say about Sophokles, the discussion centering mainly around the topics: *μεγαλοψυχία*, *ἁμαρτία*, suffering, joy and the relationship between the human and the divine. It will be of interest, therefore, within the context of the present chapter, to examine these themes closely with particular reference to Hölderlin's understanding of Sophokles. In doing so, I shall refer to certain works of Sophokles scholarship which I have personally found most illuminating. However, this is not an appropriate setting for a detailed and comprehensive survey of twentieth-century Sophokles scholarship,¹ even if there were adequate space for such a project, and even if I felt myself to be competent to undertake the task. To conclude the chapter, I shall undertake a comparison of and contrast between the respective views of Hölderlin and Hegel on the Sophokles question.

It will be convenient to take the first two themes, *μεγαλοψυχία* ("great-souledness") and *ἁμαρτία* (the tragic "flaw"), as one subject: quite apart from the fact that they are both Aristotelian concepts, they are also closely related in their significance for the theory of tragedy.

The basic Aristotelian view² is that the tragic hero comes to a bad end through some inherent flaw in his character. Possible examples that a supporter of this theory might bring forward would include the excessive pride of Oedipus and the hesitancy of Hamlet. There has been much scepticism among prominent modern scholars as to the adequacy of Aristotle's theory of the *ἁμαρτία*, both in relation to ancient Greek tragedy and to more recent works.³ If we examine the particular case of the hero of Sophokles' play "Oedipus Tyrannos", we find a man who is obviously exceptionally intelligent - he can solve the Sphinx's riddle when no-one else has been able

to. He is righteous: he kills Laius only out of righteous anger, not knowing who he is. He is more eager than anyone else to find his predecessor's murderer (not knowing, of course, that he himself is the culprit) and to lift the curse on the city. All in all, we must concur with the Priest's description of him when he addresses him in line 46⁴ as:

ὦ βροτῶν ἀριστ'

"der Menschen Bester!" in Hölderlin's translation
[Gr.St.A.5, p.124].

The crux of the problem, as far as any excessive pride⁵ on Oedipus' part is concerned, lies in the section known as Oedipus' Curse. In Hölderlin's translation, it runs as follows:

Um dieses Mannes willen
Fluch ich (wer er auch sei im Lande hier,
Von dem die Kraft und Thronen ich verwalte),
Nicht laden soll man, noch ansprechen ihn,
Zu göttlichen Gelübden nicht, und nicht
Ihn nehmen zu den Opfern, noch die Hände waschen,
Soll überall vom Haus ihn treiben, denn es ist
Ein Schandfleck solcher uns. Es zeigt dies
Der Götterspruch, der Pythische, mir deutlich.
So bin ich nun mit diesem Dämon und
Dem toten Mann ein Waffenbruder worden.
Ich wünsche, ders getan, sei einer nur
Verborgen, seis mit mehreren, er soll
Abnützen schlimm ein schlimm unschicklich Leben;
Wünsch auch, wenn der von meinem eignen Haus
Ein Tischgenos ist und ich weiß darum,
Zu leiden, was ich diesem hier geflucht.

["Oed.Tyr.", 11.236-251; Gr.St.A.5, pp.132-3.]

Here we have Oedipus at his best, and perhaps also at his worst (if we are to accept Aristotle's theory). His determination to find the murderer, to relieve the misery of the people under his charge, in short: to do what is right and just - this is all to his credit. On the other hand, one has to note the pride and (ultimately ungrounded) self-assurance of a man (a mere mortal, after all) who can pronounce such a curse on another human being without a second thought, never dreaming that this curse might fall on his own head. Oedipus' self-assurance and consciousness of his own superiority is reminiscent of

Empedokles in Hölderlin's play: Oedipus, like Empedokles, is actually superior in many ways to other mortals; Oedipus, like Empedokles, is broken when he comes up against a limit, a barrier, something which is beyond all his mortal wisdom and superiority. Oedipus is justly proud in that he is better than other men. In this sense, he is not excessively proud, in the sense of being arrogant - he simply has a true and realistic awareness of his own worth. His ultimate downfall is not, in fact, the result of his pride or arrogance, but of the limited nature of his knowledge. This is the one respect in which Teiresias is his superior. As Walter Kaufmann puts it:

Sophocles' Oedipus emerges as a magnificent, consistent, and fascinating character who is not taken over from the myths of the past but fashioned by the poet's genius.⁶

The "magnificence" lies in his μεγαλοψυχία, his "great-souledness": his remorseless search for the Truth, his righteousness, his justified pride. We must be careful not to accuse him of "hubris", at least in the Greek sense of the word: it is generally agreed among modern Greek scholars that the Greek noun ὕβρις and the verb ὑβρίζειν, in the Attic usage, refer to acts rather than states of mind; Oedipus' ὕβρις, if any, consisted of the killing of his father and the marrying of his mother. This is the cause of his subsequent shame and disgrace, simply and purely - not any internal character defect such as excessive pride. Hölderlin himself translates the Greek term ὕβρις by the German word "Frechheit", as, for example, in line 873 of "Oedipus Tyrannos", where he translates ὕβρις φυτεύει τύραννον as "Frechheit pflanzt Tyrannen". The English equivalent of "Frechheit" would be something like "insolence", which implies an action of some description: one can only be insolent to someone, and an 'insolent person' is necessarily someone who habitually commits this act of insolence. Hölderlin avoids the use of any German noun denoting simply a state of mind, such as "Eitelkeit", which he might easily have

used.

The "consistency" which Kaufmann refers to in his description of Oedipus' character in the play lies in the fact that he takes the consequences of his own principles and his own actions - he is completely honest in his actions and in his reactions. At no stage can he be said to perform a 'volte-face' or to say or do anything inconsistent with his general high-minded character.

The "fascination" lies in the universality and profundity of the statement Sophokles is making through this character in his play: a statement about the ultimate limits of the human condition. Oedipus may have had a *Σμαρτία*, but only perhaps in the sense that he was, after all, only human. If the ultimate moral of Sophokles' play is merely that the human condition is a flaw, then we cannot hold him in high regard as a writer, one might object. However, the obsession with searching for an Aristotelian "flaw" in tragic heroes, I would suggest, is a distraction and an obstacle preventing us from attaining a true understanding of the intellectual and philosophical depths of Sophokles' thought. Walter Kaufmann makes a reasonable point in this respect:

...perhaps under the indirect influence of Aristotle's 'Poetics', Shakespeare gave some of his heroes what one could construe as tragic flaws. Sophokles had the good fortune of living before Aristotle.

Hölderlin did not, of course, share this good fortune, but his thought is, I would maintain, so completely under the imprint of Platonist and Presocratic philosophy that he totally shares Sophokles' outlook in this respect. The really central preoccupation of both writers is, as I hope to show, the borderline between the human and the divine. One might call this borderline, in Platonist terminology, τὸ καλόν, since the latter performs, in Plato's system, a mediating function between God and man: τὸ καλόν was put there by God to show men the way towards the Absolute or towards union with Himself. For Plato, true reality is a transcendent, spiritual realm

not accessible to the senses. The Forms are true reality, not the physical objects we see around us. Likewise, for Sophokles, the great problem is how man, to all external appearances a mere physical, material object among other objects, can relate to the gods, who live in the spiritual realm and who ultimately control man's destiny. That this spiritual realm exists is something Sophokles, like Plato, never doubted (at least in their works). Sophokles, in particular, was obsessed with this problem, especially in the earlier part of his career. This could be one reason why Aristotle failed to understand Sophoklean tragedy: Oedipus' "zornige Neugier" would have little meaning for a careful, methodical, encyclopaedic mentality such as Aristotle's.

However, before we examine the significance of this 'borderline' more closely, let us first discuss the topics of suffering and joy in Sophoklean tragedy.

Hölderlin's epigram "Sophokles" is well known:

Viele versuchten umsonst, das Freudigste freudig
zu sagen,
Hier spricht endlich es mir, hier in der Trauer
sich aus.

[Gr.St.A.1/1.p.305.]

This seems at first sight a strange proposition. Luckily, a more philosophical statement of it is given by Hölderlin in his "Anmerkungen zum Oedipus":

-In der äußersten Grenze des Leidens bestehet nämlich nichts mehr, als die Bedingungen der Zeit oder des Raums. In dieser vergißt sich der Mensch, weil er ganz im Moment ist; der Gott, weil er nichts als Zeit ist; und beides ist untreu, die Zeit, weil sie in solchem Momente sich kategorisch wendet, und Anfang und Ende sich in ihr schlechterdings nicht reimen läßt, der Mensch, weil er in diesem Momente der kategorischen Umkehr folgen muß, hiermit im Folgenden schlechterdings nicht dem Anfänglichen gleichen kann. So stehet Hämon in der Antigönä. So Oedipus selbst in der Mitte der Tragödie von Oedipus.

[Gr.St.A.5,p.202.]

The identification here of the god with time might be seen as supporting Heidegger's Herakleitan interpretation of Hölderlin. However, time is equated with the god - not with God in the Judaeo-Christian or theist sense. The particular god might be seen as fate, which develops in time, or as Apollo, who is Oedipus' specific opponent within the context of the play. At the culminating or ~~"ἐκστα-~~
~~σις~~, fate ceases to develop - it has arrived, been fully revealed. At such a moment, there is a break in time: both past and future disappear from view as the full revelation occurs. This meeting with the truth is also a turning-point for the hero - his search is at an end, he knows what he wanted to know.

Thus, the culminating point of a Sophoklean tragedy, the point of greatest suffering, what Hölderlin calls elsewhere⁸ the "caesura", is also a moment of joy. At the moment of "caesura", the great, proud hero is cut off from his fellow-men, alone with his torment. His pain is real, and extreme, but at the same time he retains his pride, his μεγαλοψυχία, because he has no sense of or cause for guilt in any profound sense, since, in "Oedipus Tyrannos" for example, his actions were the result merely of ignorance. He is guilty in the sense that he has committed crimes X and Y, and this guilt, such as it is, must be expiated; the tragedy and suffering are made even greater by the knowledge that Oedipus was really great, with no "flaw", and yet he still came to this horrific end. His torment and shame are truly extreme.

And yet, as Wolfgang Schadewaldt points out:

...kein sophokleisches Stück entläßt den Zuschauer mit bedrücktem Herzen, im Bewußtsein ungelöster Qual.⁹

Schadewaldt's explanation of this is that the hero's suffering, although extreme, is in no way sordid (unlike, for example, the suffering of a character in a play by Euripides,¹⁰ whose view of the human condition was altogether more cynical than that of Sophokles), but is in fact noble, in the sense that it is basically undeserved. There is no way in which Oedipus could have avoided committing the crimes he was guilty of - he was simply the victim of blind fate and ignorance. One remembers the adjective Pindar uses to describe him: μόριμος.

Schadewaldt's conclusion is closely comparable with Hölderlin's:

Das Leid aber macht, daß der Mensch ganz bei sich, in sich gegründet, daß er ernsthaft ist. Er ist in diesem Ernste dann auch wahr, und darum schön.¹¹

In fact, Hölderlin goes even further than this, claiming that the moment of "caesura" sees a joining of the human and the divine:

Die Darstellung des Tragischen beruht vorzüglich darauf, daß das Ungeheure, wie der Gott und Mensch sich paart, und grenzenlos die Naturmacht und des Menschen Innerstes im Zorn Eins wird, dadurch sich begreift, daß das grenzenlose Eineswerden durch grenzenloses Scheiden sich reinigt.

[Gr.St.A.5,p.201.]

Hölderlin saw the moment of "caesura" in tragedy as being of profound metaphysical significance, involving the joining of the human and the divine, which is, in effect, the attainment of the Absolute. The dialectical process of the reaching of this goal, the action and dialogue of the play - "Alles ist Rede gegen Rede, die sich gegenseitig aufhebt" [Gr.St.A.5,p.201.] - culminates in this moment of revelation, the "caesura":

Der tragische Transport ist nämlich eigentlich leer, und der ungebundenste.

Dadurch wird in der rhythmischen Aufeinanderfolge der Vorstellungen, worin der Transport sich darstellt, das, was man im Silbenmaße Zäsur heißt, das reine Wort, die gegenrhythmische Unterbrechung notwendig, um nämlich dem reißen den Wechsel der Vorstellungen, auf seinem Summum, so zu begegnen, daß alsdann nicht mehr der Wechsel der Vorstellung, sondern die Vorstellung selber erscheint.

[Gr.St.A.5,p.196.]

Perhaps, for Sophokles and Hölderlin, the ultimate revelation of tragedy was, indeed, simply that the human condition is a flaw, in the sense that man is, after all, merely mortal. No matter how great an individual may be, whether he be an Oedipus or an Empedokles, a Sophokles or a Hölderlin, he is nevertheless still subject to the restrictions of the human condition 'per se', to the workings of fate and "das Dämonische". A human being, by his very nature, is an agent, in the original Latin meaning of the word, and his actions do not always have predictable effects, even with the purest and noblest of intentions.

In this sense, and with these considerations in mind, Oedipus represents something similar to what Hölderlin symbolises, in his later odes, in the "Aufklärer" figures,

Herakles and Prometheus. The parallel becomes clearer and more convincing when we consider the fact that Oedipus, like these other heroes, has performed a necessary and beneficial liberating function, in destroying the Sphinx. The situation which ensues is the common one, familiar to students of Hölderlin's work, of a people alienated from Nature by the originally liberating function of the hero. The crisis can only be overcome by the agency of Teiresias, the vessel of divine revelation who alone can free the people of Thebes from this state of alienation. His crucial importance is stressed Hölderlin in his "Anmerkungen zum Oedipus":

In beiden Stücken [ie. in 'Antigone' and 'Oedipus Tyrannos'] machen die Zäsur die Reden des Teiresias aus.

Er tritt ein in den Gang des Schicksals, als Aufseher über die Naturmacht, die tragisch, den Menschen seiner Lebenssphäre, dem Mittelpunkt seines innern Lebens in eine andere Welt entrückt und in die exzentrische Sphäre der Toten reißt.

[Gr.St.A.5,p.197.]

Teiresias' significance, then, is founded on his understanding of "die Naturmacht" and its workings. This power tears man out of his "Lebenssphäre" into another world, the sphere of the dead. At first sight, this would seem to be an entirely negative occurrence. However, as we have seen, Hölderlin saw the "caesura" as being a moment of revelation. How this works is made clear by Schadewaldt in the following passage:

Das Leid des sophokleischen Menschen hat nicht bloß eine nur mittelbare Bedeutung als Durchgang, Stufe. Es ist endgültig, ist Vernichtung. Aber eben als absolutes Leid ist es sozusagen der menschliche Ort, wo die hohen Gesinnungen und das heißt: das wahre Sein des Menschen zum Vorschein kommen. Ich könnte auch sagen: hier im Leiden entscheidet der Mensch sich ganz zu dem, was Ewiges an ihm ist.¹²

This is far more than just an admission that Oedipus, as an individual, acts nobly when afflicted by the workings of fate. His noble reaction is based on deep, universally valid principles. He recognises that these

principles are eternal and inescapable, and acts accordingly. He also, in doing so, recognises the primacy of the divine law over the personal advantage or even survival of any human being, no matter how great.

Furthermore, other men (the audience, in dramatic terms; the people of Thebes, in terms of the plot of the play) learn from Oedipus' fate, and from his realisation. They become convinced, if only temporarily, of the existence of this other sphere, and of the immutable validity of its laws. In this way, the audience experiences the ἑκστασις, the Sophoklean equivalent of Pindar's αἴγλα¹³. This moment, I would maintain, is ultimately equivalent, both in the reality of the performance of Sophoklean tragedy and in Hölderlin's theoretical system, to the identity of the conscious and the unconscious (in Jungian terminology), or the synthesis of τὸ καλόν and "das Dämonische", of Christ and Dionysos (in more Hölderlinian terms) - a state of affairs which Hölderlin regarded as his life's task to achieve (consistently) in works of art. Sophokles was, in this respect, a model for him.

In "Oedipus Tyrannos", for example, the 'hero' Oedipus, who relies entirely on his own intellect and the consciousness of his own superiority as a human being, has in the end to bow before the divinely-inspired knowledge of Teiresias. Oedipus' intellect, which has been shown to be the keenest in Greece by his solving of the Sphinx's riddle, is able only after a series of painful stages to understand fully the import of Teiresias' revelations.

By the 'Hölderlinian' interpretation of Sophokles' "Oedipus Tyrannos", the answering of the Sphinx's riddle takes on a Promethean significance - it is the "Ur-Teilung". Oedipus in this play reaches and demonstrates the limits of merely human intelligence and knowledge. The nature of Oedipus' ultimate error is described in the following terms by Hölderlin:

Die Verständlichkeit des Ganzen beruht vorzüglich darauf, daß man die Szene ins Auge faßt, wo Oedipus den Orakelspruch zu unendlich deutet, zum nefas versucht wird.

Nämlich der Orakelspruch heißt:

'Geboten hat uns Phöbos klar, der König,
Man soll des Landes Schmach, auf diesem
Grund genährt,
Verfolgen, nicht Unheilbares ernähren.'

Das konnte heißen: Richtet, allgemein, ein streng und rein Gericht, haltet gute bürgerliche Ordnung. Oedipus aber spricht gleich darauf priesterlich:

'Durch welche Reinigung', etc.

Und gehet ins besondere,

'Und welchem Mann bedeutet er dies Schicksal?'

Und bringet so die Gedanken des Kreon auf das furchtbare Wort:

'Uns war, o König, Lajos vormals Herr
In diesem Land, eh du die Stadt gelenket.'

So wird der Orakelspruch und die nicht notwendig darunter gehörige Geschichte von Lajos Tode zusammengebracht. In der gleich darauf folgenden Szene spricht aber, in zorniger Ahnung, der Geist des Oedipus, alles wissend, das nefas eigentlich aus, indem er das allgemeine Gebot argwöhnisch ins Besondere deutet, und auf einen Mörder des Lajos anwendet, und dann auch die Sünde als unendlich nimmt.

[Gr.St.A.5,p.197.]

Thus, for Hölderlin, Oedipus' fault consists of a lack of awareness of his limitations, or the limitations of the human condition as such, unaided by divine inspiration. As King, he could (and should) have confined himself to the activities appropriate to the position:

"Richtet, allgemein, ein streng und rein Gericht, haltet gute bürgerliche Ordnung." He goes beyond this, however, and his excessive zeal (which may or may not be connected with a character trait such as pride, but which is, at any rate, not identical with any such trait) leads to his own ultimate downfall. In this sense, his fate is the result of what might be taken as a positive characteristic: his "great-souledness". A lesser man might have let things rest, and lived a contented, long life as King

of Thebes. The words of Teiresias might have saved him if he had heeded them:

φεῦ φεῦ, φρονεῖν ὡς δεῖνόν ἐνθα μὴ
τέλη λύη φρονοῦντι.

(ll. 316-17).

Hölderlin translates it:

"Ach! ach! wie schwer ist Wissen, wo es unnütz
Dem Wissenden."

[Gr.St.A.5,p.136.]

If, however, Oedipus had followed the safe, prudent course, the city would still have suffered under the curse and, what was perhaps the decisive factor for a man like Oedipus, he would have remained personally ignorant of the cause of all this - an impossibility for a man of his intense intellectual curiosity.

Hölderlin continues:

Daher, im nachfolgenden Gespräche mit Tiresias, die wunderbare zornige Neugier, weil das Wissen, wenn es seine Schranke durchrissen hat, wie trunken in seiner herrlichen harmonischen Form, die doch bleiben kann, vorerst, sich selbst reizt, mehr zu wissen, als es tragen oder fassen kann.

[Gr.St.A.5,p.198.]

To put it in more abstract terms, in the context of Hölderlin's work as a whole: once the "Ur-Teilung" has taken place, once man's intellect has been awakened and his curiosity aroused, he can no longer remain content in the original harmony with Nature - a harmony based on passive ignorance and which his intellectual curiosity has destroyed. He has to search without respite until he has understood everything, no matter what the consequences of this ultimate knowledge may be.

If we return now to Hölderlin's philosophical definition of the essence of Sophoklean tragedy - "daß das Ungeheure, wie der Gott und Mensch sich paart, und grenzenlos die Natur macht und des Menschen Innerstes im Zorn Eins wird, dadurch sich begreift, daß das grenzenlose Eineswerden durch grenzenloses Scheiden sich reiniget." [Gr.St.A.5,p.201.] - we can trace in it clear

echoes of Presocratic philosophy, for example in the idea of the interpenetration of the one and the whole. This, again, is pointed out by Hermann Fränkel in the work already mentioned in connection with Pindar. He sees a profound affinity between the ideas in Sophokles' plays and the thought of Herakleitos:

Der Tragiker Sophokles war Heraklits Fortsetzer und legitimer Erbe. Zwar hat er das dogmatische Lehrgebäude des Philosophen nicht übernommen, wohl aber den Geist und den Willen. Heraklitisch ist die Schroffheit der sophokleischen Tragödie, die keine andre Lösung des Konflikts kennt als die durch die Katastrophe erzwungene Besinnung der Helden auf die längste feststehende Notwendigkeit von Konflikt und Katastrophe. Heraklitisch ist der herbe Zorn der sophokleischen Gestalten, die Härte des Schicksals und der Götter, und am Ende des Spiels zerstörender Gewalten das Wort: 'Nichts von diesem ist nicht Zeus'.¹⁴

Thus, the common element that Fränkel stresses is chiefly that epitomised by, for example, the following fragment of Herakleitos:

τῷ μὲν Θεῷ καλὰ πάντα καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ
δίκαια, ἄνθρωποι δὲ ἃ μὲν ἄδικοι ὑπειλή-
φασιν ἃ δὲ δίκαια. (Fragment 102).

In English:

To a god on the one hand all things [are] beautiful and good and just; men, on the other hand, have supposed one set of things [to be] unjust, another [to be] just.

If we look more closely at Sophokles' themes, whilst bearing in mind Hölderlin's stress on the meeting of the two principles, the human and the divine, we shall find that there is a more extensive kinship between the two Greek writers than even Fränkel suggests. The following piece of Herakleitos, for instance, could easily be taken as the motto or 'fabula docet' of "Oedipus Tyrannos":

ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπειον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει γνῶμας,
θεῖον δὲ ἔχει. ¹⁶ (Fragment 78).

In English:

For human disposition, on the one hand, does not have true judgement; divine disposition, on the other hand, does have [it].

Thus, the contrast between human ἡθός and divine ἡθός, which is at the heart of the play and is the deciding factor in the Oedipus/Teiresias conflict or rivalry, is a Herakleitean theme.

The danger Oedipus exposes himself to in exercising his intellectual thirst for knowledge is neatly described by the following fragment:

Ἡλῖος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβησεται μέτρα· εἰ
δὲ μή, Ἑρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι
ἔξευρήσουσιν. ¹⁷ (Fragment 94).

In English:

For the sun will not exceed his measures; if he does, the Erinyes, [who are] the ministers of Justice, will find him out.

In this sense, Oedipus has "exceeded his measures", and brought the Erinyes down upon himself. It must be stressed, however, that this act of "exceeding" is just that: an act. It is not a matter of an Aristotelian "flaw" in his character, but rather of a flawed act on his part.

A particularly interesting fragment for our purposes is the following:

Θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπὸν· ὃ γὰρ ἔνθ' ἐλπί
ψυχῆς ὠρεῖται. ¹⁸ (Fragment 85).

In English:

It is difficult to fight against [the] θυμός; for whatever it desires it buys at the cost of [a/the] soul.

The interpretation of this fragment depends largely upon the interpretation of the word θυμός. It can, in fact, have exactly the same meaning as ψυχή, which it is here seen as sacrificing: "the soul" of a man, Latin 'anima'. However, it can also mean something nearer the Latin 'animus' - "the heart" - and then, by extension, any strong or violent emotion, such as "desire", "anger"

or "courage". It is in this sense, I would suggest, that it is to be understood here. The fragment would then bear the meaning that a man will go to any lengths, and sacrifice anything, when he is in the grip of an overwhelming passion or obsession. Thus, Oedipus' θυμός is his insatiable intellectual curiosity. Hölderlin's use of the German word "Zorn" to describe Oedipus suggests to me that he was translating this Greek term, or using the German word in a very similar manner. That Hölderlin knew and had a high opinion of the works of Herakleitos is shown clearly in the passage of his novel "Hyperion" where he discusses the essential prerequisites for philosophical thought:

Das große Wort, das ἐν διαφερὸν ἐστὶν (das Eine in sich selber unterschiedne) des Heraklit, das konnte nur ein Grieche finden, denn es ist das Wesen der Schönheit, und ehe das gefunden war, gabs keine Philosophie...¹⁹

[Gr.St.A.3, p.81.]

Also, of course, the famous motto of Hölderlin's circle of friends - the ἐν καὶ πάντων - is a thoroughly Herakleitean idea:

... ἐκ πάντων ἐν καὶ ἐξ ἐνὸς πάντα.²⁰

(from Fragment 10).

["...out of all things one and out of one all things."]

Thus, when Hölderlin writes about Sophokles' play in terms of "grenzenloses Eineswerden" and "grenzenloses Scheiden", he is echoing the doctrine expressed in this fragment of Herakleitos,²¹ a doctrine of great importance for Hölderlin's work as a whole, in which again and again we see parallels drawn between the events within and characteristics of the soul of the poet and world history, the destiny of nations, etc.. In fact, any claim to import of a profound and universal nature that Hölderlin's work (or that of any other great artist, perhaps) might have rests ultimately on this doctrine. It is not surprising, therefore, that he attempts to apply it to Sophokles' tragedies.

It is not difficult to understand how Hölderlin might have applied the Herakleitean (or Empedoklean) concept of expansion and contraction to "Oedipus Tyrannos": Oedipus himself acts in an "expanding" fashion in the first part of the play, to such an extent that he might be said to "exceed his measures", in Herakleitean terminology. The last four lines of Hölderlin's "Mnemosyne" express his dilemma:

...Himmliche nämlich sind
Unwillig, wenn einer nicht die Seele schonend sich
Zusammengenommen, aber er muß doch; dem
Gleich fehlet die Trauer.

[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.198.]

If he does not strive, he will never achieve, but, in striving, he may (and in fact does) "exceed his measures".

From the moment of the full realisation of the guilt he has incurred, he acts in a "contracting" fashion:

Ju! Ju! das Ganze kommt genau heraus!
O Licht! zum letztenmal seh ich dich nun!
Man sagt, ich sei gezeugt, wovon ich nicht
Gesollt, und wohne bei, wo ich nicht sollt, und da,
Wo ich es nicht gedurft, hab ich getötet.

["Oed.Tyr.",ll.1182-5; Gr.St.A.5,p.179.]

The idea that "das Ganze kommt genau heraus", that life, the universe, fate are bound and characterised by a fearful inevitability and logic, is a profoundly Herakleitean notion.

On his next appearance, Oedipus expresses the full tragedy of his situation, and his realisation of the vulnerability of his situation and of the human condition as such:

Weh! Weh! Weh! Weh!
Ach ich Unglücklicher! Wohin auf Erden
Werd ich getragen, ich Leidender?
Wo breitet sich um und bringt mich die Stimme?
Io! Dämon! wo reißeest du hin?

["Oed.Tyr.",ll.1307-11; Gr.St.A.5,p.184.]

Here, we see no longer the all-conquering "Ich" striving to comprehend and master all the secrets of the

universe. Previously, Oedipus had been a Fichtean; his outlook has now become more nearly Spinozan.

As we have seen, Hölderlin saw Teiresias' function as being that he "den Menschen seiner Lebenssphäre, dem Mittelpunkt seines innern Lebens in eine andere Welt entrückt und in die exzentrische Sphäre der Toten reißt". This is a good description of the ἑκστασις (literally "standing out [-side]" - modern English "ecstasy"), which was the ultimate aim of the Dionysian religious rites in Greece, of which the performances at Athens of tragic plays were prominent examples. This is also the process described by Schadewaldt in the phrase: "hier im Leiden entscheidet der Mensch sich ganz zu dem, was Ewiges an ihm ist".²² At this moment of ἑκστασις, which one can equate with the "Zäsur" (which Hölderlin, as we have seen, claimed took place in both "Oedipus Tyrannos" and "Antigone" during speeches by Teiresias) and with "der tragische Transport" which Hölderlin mentions elsewhere, the audience was given an "outside" view of the human condition, a view which gave them an occasion for joy because they could see the truth of Herakleitos' Fragment 102, quoted above - a truth expressed by Hölderlin in the letter to his brother dated 4th June 1799 in the following terms:

so gehet das Größte und Kleinste, das Beste
und Schlimmste der Menschen aus Einer Wurzel
hervor, und im Ganzen und Großen ist alles gut
und jeder erfüllt auf seine Art, der eine schöner,
der andre wilder seine Menschenbestimmung...

[Gr.St.A.6/1,p.328.]

and, more simply, in "Patmos": "Alles ist gut".

[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.167.]

Thus, it is the task of the inspired priest/seer/poet figure, be he Teiresias or Sophokles or Hölderlin, to help the rest of mankind to achieve this insight. Only he can perform this function because, in terms of Herakleitos' Fragment 78 above, mere "human disposition" unaided by divine inspiration does not have the capacity to attain "true judgement" - something Oedipus finds out

to his cost.

In his "Anmerkungen zum Oedipus", Hölderlin, again, stresses the rôle of "Zorn":

...und der treue gewisse Geist im zornigen
Unmaß leidet, das, zerstörungsfroh, der reißenden
Zeit nur folgt.

[Gr.St.A.5,p.198.]

...und grenzenlos die Naturmacht und des Menschen
Innerstes im Zorn Eins wird...

[Gr.St.A.5,p.201.]

Indeed, Oedipus' attitude in the first part of the play is a perfect example of the phenomenon described by Herakleitos in Fragment 85 above. Oedipus' θυμός comes out well in lines 337-46 of the play:

TIRESIAS: Den Zorn hast du getadelt mir. Den deinen,
Der beiwohnt, siehst du nicht, mich aber
schiltst du.

OEDIPUS : Wer sollte denn nicht solchem Worte zürnen,
Mit welchem du entehrest diese Stadt?

TIRESIAS: Es kommet doch, geh ich auch weg mit
Schweigen.

OEDIPUS : Mit nichten kommt es! ²³ sagen mußst du mir!

TIRESIAS: Nicht weiter red ich. Zürne, wenn du
willst,
Darob mit Zorn, der nur am wildsten ist.

OEDIPUS : O ja! ich werde nichts, wie auch der Zorn
sein mag,
Weglassen, was ich weiß.

[Gr.St.A.5,p.137.]

This is the "wunderbare zornige Neugier" of Hölderlin's "Anmerkungen".

As we have seen, the borderline between the divine and the human is the paramount concern for both Sophokles and Hölderlin. Their ultimate conclusions on the subject are in harmony with Herakleitos' Fragments 78 and 102 above. When the chorus in "Oedipus Tyrannos", lines 498-511, expresses its scepticism concerning Teiresias' pronouncements, its members are at what one might term the Kantian level of consciousness: they admit the possibility of the existence of the thing in itself but are not willing to concede that a mere human can have knowledge

of it, although, if any mortal is capable of attaining it, it would admittedly be someone like Teiresias:

Zeus aber und Apollon
Sind weis' und kennen die Sterblichen.
Daß aber unter Männern
Ein Seher mehr ist geachtet, denn ich,
Ist nicht ein wahres Urteil.
Mit Weisheit die Weisheit
Erwidre der Mann.
Nicht möcht ich aber jemals, eh ich sah
Ein gerades Wort, mich unter
Den Tadelnden zeigen! Denn offenbar
Kam über ihn die geflügelte Jungfrau,
Vormals, und weise erschien sie,
In der Prüfung aber freundlich der Stadt. Darum
Nach meinem Sinne niemals
Wird er es büßen, das Schlimme.
[Gr.St.A.5, p.144.]

Hölderlin's translation of the last few lines seems rather strange. He takes the "geflügelte Jungfrau" (= the Sphinx) to be the subject of ὤφθη ("erschien"), whereas it is most assuredly intended to be Oedipus himself. A more accurate translation of what follows "Vormals..." might be:

...and he was seen/appeared to be wise and genuinely dear to the people; therefore in my estimation he will never be found guilty of [any] baseness/vice/dishonour.

Thus, Oedipus' proven civic virtues weigh more heavily with the chorus, who represent the common people of Thebes or "the man in the street", than the unproven and possibly unprovable revelations of Teiresias.

The average person would be content to remain with this position, which excludes the possibility of anyone attaining to the true judgment or perfect knowledge of the gods. It is Oedipus' "Zorn" which urges him on, and, even though he does not want to accept Teiresias' revelations for his own sake, this "Zorn" forces him to investigate his claims thoroughly and honestly - in this way, his "Zorn" is a concomitant of his μεγαλοψυχία. He also completely and honestly accepts the results of his search for the truth and the responsibility for the

actions he committed unintentionally. There was no way out of his dilemma from the very beginning, even from the day of his birth. He was predestined to do what he did, and no preventive measures could possibly have changed this in any way. The only freedom he had was to keep searching for the truth or not. This, for him, was no choice - his μεγαλοψυχία forced him onwards. In other words: his situation was the result of necessity (the term much used by the Greeks: ἀνάγκη), while his gradual awareness of the situation was the result of his exercising his personal freedom, to seek or not to seek.

Thus, in Sophokles, or at least in the Hölderlinian interpretation of Sophokles, the Truth is something given, a revelation or an immutable necessity. The realisation of this Truth by an individual (Oedipus) or a community (the chorus or, in a wider sense, the audience of Sophokles' plays) is a moment of ἐκστασις, a joining of the human and the divine and a realisation of the eternal truth: "Alles ist gut".

If we turn now to Hegel's ideas on the subject, we find an entirely different emphasis. Hegel tries to put forward Sophokles' plays (in particular the "Antigone") as realisations of his own brand of dialectics. According to this interpretation, each major character in a given play is privy to a part of the truth, and the full realisation of the latter is achieved by the process of synthesis, which is a "Begriff" rather than an "Ekstase".

As early as his schooldays at the Stuttgart "Gymnasium" Hegel was giving evidence of his enthusiastic interest in Sophokles, by translating his work from the Greek. It is well known that his favourite Sophokles play was the "Antigone". Although the character that fascinated Hölderlin so much, Teiresias, appears in this play, it is significant that Hegel concentrates his attention on Antigone herself and Kreon, and on the principles which he claimed they embodied.

Hegel expressed his conclusions regarding Sophoklean tragedy in the following terms:

Das Fatum ist das Begrifflose, wo Gerechtigkeit und Ungerechtigkeit in der Abstraktion verschwinden; in der Tragödie dagegen ist das Schicksal innerhalb eines Kreises sittlicher Gerechtigkeit. Am erhabensten finden wir das in den Tragödien des Sophokles..; das Schicksal der Individuen ist als etwas Unbegreifliches dargestellt, aber die Notwendigkeit ist als die wahrhafte Gerechtigkeit erkannt.... Das blinde Schicksal ist etwas Unbefriedigendes. In diesen Tragödien wird die Gerechtigkeit begriffen; ²⁴

Thus far, Hegel is not too far from Hölderlin's theory of "tragic joy", with its joyous recognition of *ἀνδραγατία*. However, he goes on:

'Die Heroen....sind es, die sich über den sittlichen Zustand erheben, die etwas Besonderes für sich ausführen wollen, die eigentümlich wollen und handeln. Sie sind von den übrigen durch eigentümliches Wollen unterschieden... ²⁵

Thus, for Hegel, Sophokles' heroes are all Fichtean Idealists, promoting the claims of the "Ich" through action - action which ultimately challenges "den ruhigen Zustand des Waltens, der Regierung des Gottes". ²⁶ The separate claims of the individual "Ich"'s leads to friction and antagonism between them, which Hegel sees as the basis for the tragic situation:

...in weiterer Entwicklung tritt eine Entzweiung ein, und die höhere, eigentlich interessante Entzweiung für den Geist ist, daß es die sittlichen Mächte selbst sind, die als Entzweite in Kollision geratend erscheinen. ²⁷

This is hardly compatible with the Hölderlinian interpretation of Sophokles, in which the conflict between individuals exists, to be sure, but in one individual, Teiresias, the Truth is incorporated as an Absolute, rather than each individual incorporating part of the Truth, or an aspect of it, as Hegel suggests. For this reason, Hegel's solution to the Sophoklean "Entzweiung" is not possible for Hölderlin:



Die Auflösung der Kollision ist, daß die sittlichen Mächte, die nach ihrer Einseitigkeit in Kollision sind, sich der Einseitigkeit des selbständigen Geltens abtun; und die Erscheinung dieses Abtuns der Einseitigkeit ist, daß die Individuen, die sich zur Verwirklichung der einen einzelnen sittlichen Macht aufgeworfen haben, zugrunde gehen.²⁸

Hegel then gives an example of how he sees his theory working out in practice. The example he chooses is that of his favourite play, "Antigone":

In dem für mich absoluten Exempel der Tragödie, in der Antigone, kommt die Familienliebe, das Heilige, Innere, der Empfindung Angehörige, weshalb es auch das Gesetz der unteren Götter heißt, mit dem Rechte des Staats in Kollision. Kreon ist nicht ein Tyrann sondern vertritt etwas, das ebenso eine sittliche Macht ist. Kreon hat nicht unrecht; er behauptet, daß das Gesetz des Staates, die Autorität der Regierung gewahrt werden muß und Strafe aus der Verletzung folgt.²⁹

It is easy to see why Hegel takes the "Antigone" as his example. His theory would seem to have considerable direct support in that play. For example, in the scene between Antigone and the chorus, lines 780 to 882, we have the following statements from the chorus:

Mitwohnend Lebenden nicht und nicht Gestorbnen.
Forttreibend bis zur Scheide der Kühnheit,
Bis auf die Höhe des Rechts,
Bist du, o Kind, wohl tiefgefallen,
Stirbst aber väterlichen Kampf.

Zu ehren ist von Gottesfurcht
Etwas. Macht aber, wo es die gilt,
Die weicht nicht. Dich hat verderbt
Das zornige Selbsterkennen.

[Gr.St.A.5, pp.240-1.]

Thus, according to the chorus, Antigone had come up against "die Höhe des Rechts" (Δίκης βάλθρον - Hegel's "Recht des Staats") in pursuing her "väterlicher Kampf" (πατρῶον ἄθλον - Hegel's "Familienliebe"), in the process ruining herself by her own "zorniges Selbsterkennen" (ἐντόνως... ὀργή³⁰ - approximating to Hegel's "eigentümliches Wollen").³⁰ Thus, Hegel would seem to be accepting

the chorus' interpretation of the action of the play 'in toto', which seems at first sight rather strange, when one considers the somewhat condescending tone of his description of them: he characterises them as being "dem tragischen Schicksal entnommen"³¹, and claims further that "er bleibt im ruhigen Gange der sittlichen Ordnung, im gewöhnlichen Lebenskreise beschränkt und erregt nicht das Sittliche selbst zu einer feindlichen Macht gegen sich."³²

We have already seen from our discussion of "Oedipus Tyrannos" that, in that play at least, the chorus is not the voice of the author, nor is it privy to any secrets unknown to the main protagonists: it does not know any better than Oedipus whether or not Teiresias' prophecies and pronouncements are to be believed. Why, then, must we accept its statements and interpretations in the "Antigone" at face value, as expressing the moral of the tale for the author? In "Oedipus Tyrannos", it is Teiresias' statements throughout the play that are seen to be justified in the last resort. It might therefore be apposite at this point to look closely at his pronouncements in the "Antigone". His views are expressed in the following passage from his scene with Kreon, in lines 988 to 1090 of the play:

...Nach deinem Sinn erkrankt die Stadt.
Denn die Altäre sind und Feuerstellen
Voll von dem Fraß der Vögel und des Hunds,
Vom unschicklich gefallnen Sohn des Oedipus.
Und nicht mehr nehmen auf beim Opfer das Gebet
Von uns die Götter, noch der Hüften Flamme...

...Das bedenke nun, o Kind!
Denn allen Menschen ist's gemein, zu fehlen.
Wenn aber einer fehlt, der Mann ist eben
Nicht ungescheut und nicht ein Unglückselger,
Wenn er, gefallen in ein Übel, heilen
Sich lässet und nicht unbeweglich bleibt.
Denn Eigendünkel zeigt Grobheit an.
Weich du dem Toten und verfolge nicht
Den, der dahin ist. Welche Kraft ist das,
Zu töten Tote?

[Gr.St.A.5,p.248.]

Thus, we see Teiresias warning Kreon in the "Antigone" in much the same terms as he warned Oedipus in "Oedipus Tyrannos" - it is Kreon who is at fault in the situation, Teiresias claims, not Antigone. Thus, Teiresias is directly at odds with Hegel in his interpretation of the situation. The latter states clearly: "Kreon hat nicht unrecht". Teiresias disagrees: "Nach deinem Sinn erkrankt die Stadt". Hegel states clearly: "Kreon ist nicht ein Tyrann". Teiresias disagrees: "Tyrannenart liebt schändlichen Gewinn". Hegel implies that Antigone and Kreon are both guilty of "eigentümliches Wollen" in their different ways; Teiresias accuses Kreon alone of "Eigendünkel".

This is not to say, however, that Sophokles - or Hölderlin - would see Kreon as being a morally bad character, any more than they would see Oedipus as being 'bad! It simply means that, to them, Kreon and Oedipus are wrong. They are wrong in different ways, of course: Oedipus is wrong intellectually, Kreon is wrong politically. Hölderlin, in his "Anmerkungen zur Antigönä", expresses the matter thus:

Das Charakteristische dabei...ist...das, daß die in solchem Schicksal begriffenen Personen, nicht, wie im Oedipus, in Ideengestalt, als streitend um die Wahrheit, stehen, und wie eines, das sich des Verstandes wehret, auch nicht, wie eines, das sich des Lebens oder Eigentums oder der Ehre wehret, wie die Personen im Ajax, sondern daß sie als Personen im engeren Sinne, als Standespersonen gegeneinander stehen, daß sie sich formalisieren.

[Gr.St.A.5,p.271.]

Further: "Die Vernunftform, die hier tragisch sich bildet, ist politisch, und zwar republikanisch..."

[Gr.St.A.5,p.272.]

In this sense, Hölderlin goes some way towards the Hegelian interpretation of this play. He agrees that Kreon and Antigone are "Standespersonen". However, in the last sentence quoted, Hölderlin betrays his one-sided sympathy for Antigone. The play, for him, is "republikanisch". Knowing Hölderlin's political sympathies,

this can only be taken as a term of praise. Antigone is a heroine of the revolution against the tyranny of Kreon.

However, it must be admitted that, although he lacks Oedipus' intellect, Kreon shares the latter's μετάνοια: he ultimately accepts his guilt and his fate just as readily and unswervingly:

O mir! mir! das gehöret keinem andern
Der Menschen an. Mein ist die Schuld in diesem.
Ich habe dich getötet, ich.

[Gr.St.A.5,p.261.]

Hegel is quite correct in pointing out that Antigone and Kreon are originally and essentially moral equals. Hölderlin also stresses the arbitrariness of Kreon's ultimate fate:

...so daß das eine vorzüglich darum verlieret,
weil es anfängt, das andere gewinnet, weil es
nachfolgt.

[Gr.St.A.5,p.269.]

Again:

Die Gruppierung solcher Personen ist, wie in
der Antigonä, mit einem Kampfspele von Läufern
zu vergleichen, wo der, welcher zuerst schwer
Othem ³⁵holt und sich am Gegner stößt, verloren
hat...

[Gr.St.A.5,p.271.]

But when Hegel states barely: "Kreon hat nicht unrecht", he is making a categorical statement of a sweeping nature which is not supported in all its implications by the action of the play. It is true that Kreon supported the "Recht des Staats" just as Antigone followed the principle of "Familienliebe", but he made the mistake of ignoring until it was too late the universal truth that divine law is superior to all others. Antigone could just as easily have incurred the same guilt by following the principle of "Familienliebe" exclusively and fanatically. It just so happens that the guilt falls on Kreon. Hegel, in fact, fails completely to distinguish between the fates of Antigone and Kreon. He sees that they both come to a tragic end, but he

fails to take into account the fact that it is only Kreon who incurs guilt in the process, in relation to the divine law.

Hegel shows his Promethean sympathies clearly in his interpretation of Sophoklean tragedy. The original situation before Kreon and Antigone assert themselves is unsatisfactory: "Das blinde Schicksal ist etwas Unbefriedigendes." There is no hint of any "ursprüngliche Harmonie" against which the two main protagonists might be sinning. Their only ultimate fault is in their "Einseitigkeit". Their ultimate personal fates are necessary because a thesis and an antithesis have to be "aufgehoben" if a synthesis is to result:

Auf solche Weise ist der Schluß der Tragödie die Versöhnung, nicht die blinde Notwendigkeit, sondern die vernünftige, die Notwendigkeit, die hier anfängt sich zu erfüllen.... Hier ist eine rührende Notwendigkeit, die aber vollkommen sittlich ist; das erlitten Unglück ist vollkommen klar; hier ist nichts Blindes, Bewußtloses. ³⁴

Thus, to Hegel, the fates of Antigone and Kreon were necessary sacrifices in the progress of the World Spirit, in man's process of self-liberation from "das blinde Schicksal" or the unquestioned rule of the gods.

Hölderlin also had a high regard for the μέγαλο - ψυχία of Sophokles' heroes, as he shows in the "Anmerkungen zur Antigonä", for example:

Der erhabene Spott, sofern heiliger Wahnsinn höchste menschliche Erscheinung, und hier mehr Seele als Sprache ist, übertrifft alle ihre übrigen Äußerungen; und es ist auch nötig, so im Superlative von der Schönheit zu sprechen, weil die Haltung unter anderem auch auf dem Superlative von menschlichem Geist und heroischer Virtuosität beruht.

[Gr.St.A.5,p.267.]

His fundamental disagreement with the Hegelian position becomes quite clear, however, in the next paragraph:

Es ist ein großer Behelf der geheimarbeitenden Seele, daß sie auf dem höchsten Bewußtsein dem

Bewußtsein ausweicht, und ehe sie wirklich der gegenwärtige Gott ergreift, mit kühnem, oft sogar blasphemischen Worte diesem begegnet, und so die heilige lebende Möglichkeit des Geistes erhält.

[Gr.St.A.5,p.267.]

The entire concept of "der gegenwärtige Gott" as an entity separate from and opposed (or opposite) to the consciousness of the hero is alien to Hegel's thought, as is the concept of blasphemy. In Hölderlin's system, the actions of Antigone and Kreon represent the necessary "Ur-Teilung" from the "ursprüngliche Harmonie", in the same way as Oedipus' answering of the Sphinx's riddle in "Oedipus Tyrannos". In the end, they both have to submit to the divine law: in her last line in the play, Antigone pays tribute to "Gottesfurcht"; Kreon's last lines are also words of submission:

Führt Schritt vor Schritt den eiteln Mann. Der ich
Dich, Kind, doch gerne nicht, getötet, sie auch, sie;
Ich Armer weiß nicht, wen ich ansehen soll,
Und nicht, wohin ich gehe.
Denn alles Schiefe hat
Hier in den Händen und hier mir auf das Haupt
Ein wüst Schicksal gehäufet.

[Gr.St.A.5,p.262.]

Thus, to put their differences in concise terms: Hegel chooses to ignore the Teiresian element in Sophoklean tragedy (in much the same way as he ignores the rôle of Cheiron in the Prometheus/Herakles myth complex³⁵) - to him, the divine only exists in order to be overcome and superseded by the conscious will of man; to Hölderlin, man must ultimately always bow before the divine, no matter how high a degree of consciousness he may attain. It seems clear to the present writer that Hölderlin's interpretation of Sophoklean tragedy is in this respect the correct one, and that Hegel was in fact twisting Sophokles' intentions to suit his own Promethean sympathies.

Walter Kaufmann, in his discussion of Hegel's "theory of tragedy"³⁶, mentions the concept of "truly tragic suffering" in Hegel, which can be defined as suffering

brought about by the individual himself through the "Einseitigkeit" of his position. Kaufmann makes the point that "not all the suffering in Greek tragedy is 'truly tragic' in Hegel's sense, and not all the protagonists accept their guilt, as Oedipus does in the 'Tyrannos' and as Hegel may have thought - mistakenly - Antigone did. Deianeira does; but Electra and Philoctetes see themselves as suffering innocently, and their sufferings are not 'truly tragic', according to Hegel."³⁷ We have already discussed the question of Antigone's supposed guilt: Hegel is forced to ascribe guilt to her in order to equate her situation with that of Kreon, but all she can really be said to be guilty of is her "Einseitigkeit" (a necessary concomitant of the human condition for Sophokles and Hölderlin, except for the divinely inspired Teiresias figure) - it is only Kreon who sins against the divine law. Similarly, Elektra is guilty of "Einseitigkeit" in the play of the same name, but it is Aegisthus who has sinned against the divine law. Elektra is, of course, a less attractive character than Antigone, but their situations are closely comparable: they both represent the principle of "Familienliebe".

The really important difference, then, between Hegel and Hölderlin on the question of Sophoklean tragedy lies in this matter of the divine law and even of the divine as such. To Hegel, it exists only as a blind tyranny and superstition to be overcome by human will; to Hölderlin, it is the ultimate arbiter of human existence, before which even the greatest of men have eventually to bow in submission. The latter position, I would suggest, is also that of Sophokles himself. In fact, one might say that Sophokles, in religious terminology more familiar to us, was dealing with the questions: Eden, the fall, original sin and redemption. The "Ur-Teilung" of the answering of the Sphinx's riddle can also be seen in terms of Adam eating of the forbidden fruit. Subsequently he (Oedipus or Adam) and the people of Thebes or mankind have to fend for themselves, without divine assistance,

about which (in the form of Teiresias' pronouncements) they are in any case inclined to be sceptical. All this is ended, however, when Oedipus (or Adam) and the Thebans (or mankind) eventually realise that Teiresias is right, and bow before the divine will as expressed by him. This is not to say that Oedipus and the Thebans are back where they started from or that it has all been for nothing: they have made an immense gain in terms of consciousness of the divine law which had previously been obscure to them.³⁸ They have gone through the process described by Schelling in his "Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre":

Die Geschichte des menschlichen Geistes...wird nichts anderes seyn als die Geschichte der verschiedenen Zustände, durch welche hindurch er allmählich zur Anschauung seiner selbst, zum reinen Selbstbewußtseyn, gelangt.³⁹

It is true to say that Hegel had a superficially similar theory regarding the development of human consciousness. However, as we have seen, the crucial difference between his idea and that of Sophokles, Hölderlin and Schelling is in the different attitudes towards the divine, or the Teiresias element, and the return to the "Ursprung".

CHAPTER THREE: "EMPEDOKLES"

In the first two chapters, we have dealt with all the pre-Sokratic Greeks who had an obvious influence on and fascination for Hölderlin: Homer (floruit¹ c. 725 B.C.), Herakleitos (fl. c. 490 B.C.), Pindar (fl. c. 480 B.C.), Sophokles (fl.c. 455 B.C.). We have dealt with them all, as I say, except one, and that one is possibly the most important of them all: Empedokles. His 'floruit' can be placed around 444 B.C., which makes him about ten years younger than Sophokles and fifteen years older than Sokrates. At least, this is the usual assumption, following Apollodoros. John Burnet, however, suggests that he was considerably older than that, adducing as an argument Theophrastos' claim that Empedokles was born 'not long after Anaxagoras'. This would put Empedokles' 'floruit' about 460 B.C. or shortly after. If this theory is accepted, it would mean that he was in his early twenties when Pindar visited Sicily (476-5 B.C.), at the age of 46 or 42, depending on which birth date one accepts for him. The two might even have met at Akragas, and the Orphic and other philosophical elements in Pindar's poetry would lead us to expect that meeting, if it took place, to have been a fruitful one as far as intellectual discussion is concerned, however much they may have disagreed about politics. Although one normally thinks of Empedokles as being of a completely different, younger generation than Pindar, the poet of the old, archaic world which was fast breaking up, Empedokles may even have died sooner than Pindar, who is said to have reached the age of eighty, which puts his death in either 442 or 438 B.C..²

Uvo Hölscher³ has shown convincingly that Hölderlin would have had access to most of what is available to us today by way of Empedokles fragments, from such works as the biography by Diogenes Laertius, the sixteenth century work "Poesis Philosophica" by Henricus Stephanus,

the "Systema intellectuale huius mundi" by the Cambridge theologian Ralph Cudworth (1680), from which Herder quotes in his essay "Liebe und Selbstheit", and Jacob Brucker's six-volume "historia critica philosophiae" (1742). We can therefore assume in the context of the present study that Hölderlin had the opportunity to grasp the basic ideas of the Empedoklean system.⁴

A brief description of the system concerned might be apposite at this point: Empedokles' thought was contained primarily in two "Lehrgedichte", one concerned with an apparently materialistic description of Nature (Περὶ φύσεως), the other with mystical ideas regarding reincarnation and the salvation of the individual soul (οἱ Καθαρμοὶ). These two poems are in fact seen as being completely incompatible by many modern scholars: the materialism of Περὶ φύσεως is thought to exclude any possibility of the survival of the individual soul, which survival is one of the main topics of οἱ Καθαρμοὶ.⁵ We shall return to this problem later.

In Empedokles' materialist system there are four elements: Fire, Air, Earth and Water. The history of the universe is supposed to consist simply of the combining and separating of these elements under the influence of the two forces Love and Strife. The materialist character of his ideas would seem to be confirmed by his defence of trust in the senses. Unlike his predecessor Parmenides (perhaps the one major influence on his thought), Empedokles advocated trusting them as guides to the Truth.

Like Parmenides before him, Empedokles posits an original Sphere, but in his case this Sphere is not a seamless unity, being composed already of the four elements, held together by Love. In the course of time, Love and Strife alternate in controlling the Sphere. That, briefly, is the content of Περὶ φύσεως.

Kirk and Raven⁶ suggest a connection of a microcosm/macrocosm nature between the materialism of that work and the mysticism of οἱ Καθαρμοὶ, positing a parallel between (or the identity of) sexual love and "cosmic Love".

The contents of οἱ Καθαρσμοὶ itself they describe in succinct terms as follows:

"The 'Purifications' is concerned with the fall of man and with the practices necessary for his restoration."

This work posits an age of primal innocence, when Kupris or Aphrodite rules alone, Strife being wholly absent. There was then a "fall", and sin or Strife appeared on the scene.⁸ The individual soul, through its various reincarnations, must strive to purify itself from the Strife element, whereupon it will return to the state of bliss from whence it started. This is precisely the procedure Hölderlin described in the novel "Hyperion", with the exception that he does not complicate matters by introducing reincarnation into the story - Hyperion's return to a lost state of innocence takes place within a far shorter time-span.

Now, I would suggest that the parallels between Empedokles' thought and Hölderlin's are becoming clear. The following equations can be put in diagrammatic form thus:

- a) original Sphere = "ursprüngliche Mitte".
- b) rule of Love = "Gipfel der Zeit".⁹
- c) microcosm/macrocosm = ἐν κτὶ πλν
- d) return of soul to original bliss = return to "Ursprung".
- e) Kupris/Aphrodite = "Liebe als Metaprinzip der Vereinigung".

These correspondences form the basis for the Empedokles/Hölderlin parallel or correspondence in philosophical terms. One may point to other parallels, such as those between the "ursprüngliche Mitte" and the Judaeo-Christian Garden of Eden, "Liebe" as "Metaprinzip" and Plato's "eros" and so on. That other thinkers, mainly representatives of the Neo-Platonic tradition, held similar views in the interim period between Empedokles and Hölderlin is not to be denied. However, in the present context of an attempt to prove a correspondence between the Greek and the German, it is largely irrelevant to refer

to these other thinkers - they were preserving what Empedokles had already put forward, or, even if they thought of these theories independently and had never read Empedokles, the ideas as such had as a matter of fact been expressed first by him - a fact of which, as Uvo Hölscher shows, Hölderlin would have been aware. Also, Empedokles combined into one system the various elements which subsequently, after the decline from the Greek "Gipfel der Zeit", were present only in the works of different thinkers who disagreed with one another: one element in Stoic thought, another in Epicurean thought, etc..

Apart from the parallels listed above, there are certain other similarities of a less obvious nature between the systems of Empedokles and Hölderlin. These require more lengthy discussion.

Firstly, there is the matter of reincarnation. It is a central part of Empedokles' system, or at least of οἱ Κασσέμοι, but not quite so obviously a part of Hölderlin's system. However, we must not forget the poem, or fragment of a poem (or is it even prose?), "Palingenesie":

Mit der Sonne sehn ich mich oft vom Aufgang bis zum
Niedergang den weiten Bogen schnell hineilend zu
wandeln,
oft, mit Gesang zu folgen dem großen, dem Vollen-
dungsgange der alten Natur,
Und, wie der Feldherr auf dem Helme den Adler trägt
in
Kampf und Triumph, so möchte ich, daß sie mich trüge
Mächtig das Sehnen der Sterblichen.
Aber es wohnt auch ein Gott in dem Menschen, daß
er Vergangenes und Zukünftiges sieht und wie vom
Strom ins
Gebirg hinauf an die Quelle lustwandelt er durch
Zeiten
Aus ihrer Taten stillem Buch ist Vergangenenem be-
kannt er durch die goldenes beut....
[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.317.]

This shows, in a context which has no explicit connection with Empedokles, Hölderlin's independently held belief in reincarnation. Again, whether Hölderlin's belief in reincarnation stems originally from his reading of Empedokles or of Herder or simply from his own inde-

pendent cogitations is largely irrelevant. The fact remains that it forms a part of Empedokles' system, and Hölderlin would have been aware of this.

Secondly, the problematics of Love and Strife in Empedokles and of the connection between and compatibility of his two poems, problems which puzzle modern scholars, may perhaps be solved to some extent by reference to Hölderlin's thought, working on the assumption (a safe one, I believe) that Hölderlin understood Empedokles at least as well as these scholars. The Love/Strife problem I refer to is the one seen by Aristotle, who maintained that Empedokles was guilty of muddled thinking in relation to Love and Strife, for he does not explain what higher power compels Love and Strife to act as they do.¹⁰

The solution I suggest stems from the following considerations: as we have seen, in Empedokles' system Love rules supreme at the outset and the ultimate aim or goal of both the universe and the individual soul is the return of Love's exclusive rule. Strife is therefore confined to an intermediate and ultimately subordinate rôle in the process, and it can be seen perhaps as something akin to Goethe's "das Dämonische" - not in itself evil, but destructive in its effects when abused, repressed or mishandled. Strife can in fact lead to positive results. Its relationship with its partner Love is far from being exclusively hostile, any more than night and day are enemies.

If we see Love in Hölderlinian terms as a metaprinciple, the paradox is dissolved. Love and Strife are self-evidently not equals in Empedokles' system: Love rules at the beginning and will rule once more at the end;¹¹ Strife has its day in between at various periods, but cannot ultimately prevail and must submit to its "superior". In Christian terms, this is the relationship between God and Satan, if one takes the view of Satan as a necessary counter-balancing force to God rather than an implacable enemy.

The other question, that of the compatibility of the two poems, is more complex. It is perhaps easiest to follow up this theme backwards from Hölderlin to Empedokles:

As is well known, Hölderlin's *ἐν καὶ πᾶσι* is largely an attempt to solve the difficulty of the apparent incompatibility of the two principles or phenomena "Liebe" and "Selbstheit"¹², and, by extension, an attempt to reconcile the two systems of philosophy termed "Kriticismus" and "Dogmatismus": one system started from the "Ich" and never reached God; the other started from God and left the "Ich" as a mere puppet of this God. This is the problem Schelling dealt with in his "Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kriticismus" (1795). This is Schelling's solution to the problem:

Wer über Freiheit und Nothwendigkeit nachgedacht hat, fand von selbst, daß diese Principien im Absoluten vereinigt seyn müssen - Freiheit, weil das Absolute aus unbedingter Selbstmacht, Nothwendigkeit, weil es eben deßwegen nur den Gesetzen seines Seyns, der innern Nothwendigkeit seines Wesens gemäß handelt. In ihm ist kein Wille mehr, der von einem Gesetze abweichen könnte, aber auch kein Gesetz mehr, das es sich nicht selbst erst durch seine Handlungen gäbe, kein Gesetz, das, unabhängig von seinen Handlungen, Realität hätte. Absolute Freiheit¹³ und absolute Nothwendigkeit sind identisch.

Thus, if one takes the Spinozan position as being basically monist, one can compare it with that of Parmenides in the Greek context, Spinoza's 'Deus sive Natura' being equivalent to Parmenides' Sphere. Parmenides, like Spinoza, started from God or the Absolute or the Whole and in the process left the individual "Ich" a mere passive object swamped by the Whole.

If we turn now from Parmenides to Empedokles, we can see that the latter was attempting much the same with Parmenides' ideas as Hölderlin and Schelling were attempting with Spinoza's. The dualism of Schelling's solution above is precisely equivalent, I would maintain, to the dualism of Empedokles' two "Lehrgedichte": *Περὶ φύσεως* is "Dogmatismus" and *οἱ Καθαρνοὶ* is "Kriticis-

mus". For us to say that Empedokles had reached the identical solution to the problem, it has to be shown that these two works are in fact compatible. This I shall now try to prove.

We have already mentioned the fact that Empedokles, unlike Parmenides, advocated trust in the senses as a guide to the Truth. This close and apparently paradoxical connection between the physical and perception, thought, truth, etc., is where the solution to our problem must be sought:

τῇδε μὲν οὖν ἰότητι Τύχης πεφρόνηκεν¹⁴
ἅπαντα.

"In this way therefore by the will of Fortune all things possess thought."

All things possess thought, and this thought is situated or takes place in the blood around men's hearts. One can compare this theory with that espoused by the famous friend of the Gontards, Samuel Thomas Sömmering, who in his anatomical work "Über das Organ der Seele" put forward the view that the soul must be situated in a liquid part of the body such as the area around the pineal gland. Hölderlin was interested in Sömmering and his theories, as is shown by the "Xenien" he wrote on the subject, and it is probable that the parallel with Empedokles' theories did not escape his notice.

Now, the blood is indubitably something physical. Thoughts, on the other hand, are usually connected with the part of man's make-up which is liable to survive the death of the body, if any part does indeed do so. However, they cannot have been considered in this light by Empedokles: if one believes in reincarnation, one cannot at the same time believe in the survival of the conscious thoughts of one life into the next. So, to Empedokles, the death¹⁵ of the thoughts would not imply the death of the soul.

It remains now to determine the precise nature of the element in our make-up which does survive death. E.R. Dodds describes the situation thus:

...Empedocles....avoids applying the term 'psyche' to the indestructible self. He appears to have thought of the 'psyche' as being the vital warmth which at death is re-absorbed in the fiery element from which it came.... The occult self which persisted through successive incarnations he called, not 'psyche', but 'daemon'. The daemon has, apparently, nothing to do with perception or thought, which Empedocles held to be mechanically determined; the function of the daemon is to be the carrier of man's potential divinity and actual guilt. ¹⁶

This 'daemon' can be compared with the Unconscious, as discovered by the empirical methods of 20th century psychology and psychiatry. When one considers the 'potential divinity' of this element, in Dodds' terminology, one can see that we are on familiar Hölderlinian ground here: the Unconscious as the most precious and significant part of man. ¹⁷

Thus, we can see that the materialism of *Περὶ φύσεως* is not, after all, incompatible with the mysticism of *οἱ Καθαρμοὶ* - the latter simply deals with the part left over after all these physical phenomena have been dealt with. In *Περὶ φύσεως*, Empedokles is talking as the man of enlightenment and science, the "Aufklärung" figure, the Kantian prescribing the limits to what human reason can tell one. In *οἱ Καθαρμοὶ*, he speaks as the inspired poet and seer - the only man who can tell mankind any more than reason as exemplified in *Περὶ φύσεως*. *Οἱ Καθαρμοὶ* is an exercise in revelation of a Teiresian/Hölderlinian nature. In the first poem, Empedokles speaks by virtue of his merely human reason which, as we have seen, is a mechanical function of the mortal part of him. In the second, he resorts to anamnesis, the tool of the inspired poet.

Next, we come to the important connection between Empedokles' thought and Hölderlin's philosophical essay, "das Werden im Vergehen". These are a few of the salient points that Hölderlin makes in that essay:

... die Welt aller Welten, das Alles in Allen, welches immer ist, stellt sich nur in aller Zeit - oder im Untergange oder im Moment, oder genetischer im Werden des Moments und Anfang von Zeit und Welt dar, und dieser Untergang und Anfang ist wie die Sprache Ausdruck Zeichen Darstellung eines lebendigen, aber besondern Ganzen....

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.282.]

Denn wie könnte die Auflösung empfunden werden ohne Vereinigung...

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.282.]

... denn aus Nichts wird nichts...

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.283.]

Hölderlin's thought in this essay becomes extremely dense and complex, but its general drift can easily be seen from these three quotations. This is Empedoklean thought through and through, almost a paraphrase of such fragments as the following:

νήπιοι·οὐ γὰρ σφιν βολιχόφρονές εἰσι μέριμναι,
οἳ δὲ γίγνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἔον ἐλπίζουσιν
ἢ τι καταθνήσκειν τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἅπαντα.¹⁸

Childish fools! For their thoughts are not of long sense/understanding,

In that they expect something to come into being which previously did not exist,

Or something to die and to be destroyed completely.

ἔκ τε γὰρ οὐδ' αὖ ἐόντος ἀμήχανον ἔστι
καὶ τ' ἐόν ἐξαπολέσθαι ἀνήκυστον καὶ ἄπυστον.
αἰεὶ γὰρ τῇ γ' ἔσται, ὅπῃ κέ τις αἰὲν ἐρείδῃ.¹⁹

For out of something which does not exist at all nothing can come into being

And that something that is should be destroyed is not to be accomplished and unknown;

For it will always be where one has put it.

In Empedokles' system, as in Hölderlin's, nothing can actually die or disappear, because there is nowhere for it to go. The process of "Werden und Vergehen" then, to both Empedokles and Hölderlin, is simply a separation and rearrangement of eternal elements. Nothing is wasted, nothing disappears, nothing dies.

The process of history would seem on this account to

be fairly monotonous and uneventful, but one must remember the rôles of Love and Strife, and also the fact that Love is superior to Strife. It is true to say that Love and Strife cannot be thought of in black and white moral terms, as in the Christian concepts of Good and Evil. But I would maintain that Love is most markedly the more highly valued of the two forces. The periods when Love rules are definitely peaks of time in the Hölderlinian sense - there is a top and there is a bottom.²⁰

Interestingly enough in this connection, Hölderlin, in the "Grund zum Empedokles", talks of art in this sense of being a peak of Nature:

Natur und Kunst sind sich im reinen Leben nur harmonisch entgegengesetzt. Die Kunst ist die Blüte, die Vollendung der Natur, Natur wird erst göttlich durch die Verbindung mit der verschiedenartigen aber harmonischen Kunst, wenn jedes ganz ist, was es sein kann, und eines verbindet sich mit dem andern, ersetzt den Mangel des andern, den es notwendig haben muß, um ganz das zu sein, was es als besonderes sein kann, dann ist die Vollendung da, und das Göttliche ist in der Mitte von beiden.

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.152.]

This is also a "strand" situation in the Empedoklean sense - instead of the four elements combining and separating, we have Nature and Art doing so, with "das Göttliche" in between. Now, in the same way as Love is superior to Strife among the motive forces, according to Empedokles, one can also perceive a certain inequality among the elements themselves, if only in a chronological or physical sense. As Aetius points out:

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὸν μὲν αἰθέρα πρῶτον δια-
κριθῆναι, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ πῦρ, ἐφ' ᾧ τὴν γῆν,
ἐξ ἧς ἄρα περισφιγγομένης τῇ ῥύμῃ τῆς περι-
φορᾶς ἀναβλύσαι τὸ ὕδωρ· ἐξ οὗ θυμιαθῆναι τὸν
αἶρα, καὶ γενέσθαι τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν ἐκ τοῦ αἰθέρος, τὸν δὲ
ἥλιον ἐκ τοῦ πυρός, πηλῆθῆναι δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ περίγεια.²¹

Empedokles claims that aither was the first to be separated off, next fire, and after that earth. From the earth, as it was constricted too much by the force of the rotation, sprang the water, from

which came air by evaporation, and the sky on the one hand came into being from the aither, the sun on the other hand from the fire, and the things on the earth were compressed out of the others.'

This physical primacy was turned by Hölderlin into the spiritual aristocracy of "Vater Äther".²² The German poet went one step further than Empedokles. The latter, as far as we can tell, gave aither precedence only in a time sense over the other elements. Hölderlin, on the other hand, lends the element a certain divine aristocracy of a moral nature. For him, it is a binding force of a divine nature.

In the same way, as we have seen above, the element (if we can so term it) Art is given a superior position to the element Nature: it is "die Blüte, die Vollendung der Natur". One can compare this with his statement, in a letter to his brother dated 4th June 1799, "...daß der Kunst- und Bildungstrieb mit allen seinen Modifikationen and Abarten ein eigentlicher Dienst sei, den die Menschen der Natur erweisen". [Gr.St.A.6/1,p.329.] Thus, man serves Nature by perfecting it, bringing it to full fruition. The two elements, Nature and Art, are "harmonisch entgegengesetzt" in much the same way as Empedokles' four elements and the two principles or forces Love and Strife are juxtaposed. Each one "ersetzt den Mangel des andern" in a similar fashion to that in which man complements woman. Each element must have a "Mangel", according to Hölderlin, "um ganz das zu sein, was es besonderes sein kann". In other words, the very fact that someone or something is someone or something particular involves a "Mangel". Hölderlin refers to this again in the Frankfurt plan of his tragedy when he calls Empedokles "ein Todfeind aller einseitigen Existenz, und deswegen auch in wirklich schönen Verhältnissen unbefriedigt, unstät, leidend, bloß weil sie besondere Verhältnisse sind...." [Gr.St.A.4/1,p.145].²³

Empedokles' suicide has for Hölderlin a related significance: again according to the Frankfurt plan, it is

evidence of his desire "durch freiwilligen Tod sich mit der unendlichen Natur zu vereinen". [Gr.St.A.4/1,p.147.] The most important word there is "unendlich": Empedokles rejects all that is "endlich" and "einseitig" and yearns for the infinite and the whole. In the "Grund zum Empedokles" he is described as "ein Geist..., der immer nach Erfindung eines vollständigen Ganzen strebte..." [Gr.St.A.4/1,p.158.]

The stress on Nature in relation to Empedokles is of some considerable significance also. We know what an important rôle it plays in Hölderlin's ideas, and it would be surprising if, considering their close affinity of interest and viewpoint on most other matters, they did not agree on this subject also. In fact, we have already seen that Empedokles reaffirmed the need for trust in the senses. This trust had been rejected by Parmenides and was subsequently rejected by the majority of major philosophers in the European tradition, Descartes being perhaps the most extreme example. In ancient philosophy, the opposition between the Stoics and the Epicureans symbolised the split in European man, between his mind and his senses, the two being seen not as complementary faculties of the same being but as deadly enemies fighting for control over him. The Christian tradition in mediaeval Europe strengthened this split and emphasised it.

I would like to suggest that Hölderlin's great interest in Empedokles was largely due to the fact that the Sicilian, above all the ancients, seriously attempted to retain the integrity of man with all his faculties: his system tries to embrace and bring into harmony man's reason, his senses and the contents of his unconscious. These three elements, when combined, make up the complete and whole man - any bias against or rejection of one or more of the three would lead, according to Empedokles and Hölderlin, to a distortion and a disabling "Einseitigkeit"²⁴. This distortion is described by Hölderlin in his description of the Germans towards the end of his novel "Hyperion":

...ich kann kein Volk mir denken, das zerrißner wäre, wie die Deutschen. Handwerker siehst du, aber keine Menschen, Denker, aber keine Menschen, Priester, aber keine Menschen, Herrn und Knechte, Jungen und gesetzte Leute, aber keine Menschen - ist das nicht, wie ein Schlachtfeld, wo Hände und Arme und alle Glieder zerstückelt untereinander liegen, indessen das vergoßne Lebensblut im Sande zerrinnt?

[Gr.St.A.3,p.153.]

This emphasis on the (re-)creation of the whole man is, I would maintain, at the very centre of Hölderlin's thought. He lived at the end of a century whose intellectual life had been dominated to a large extent by a particularly arid form of rationalism, materialism and scepticism. The Enlightenment had played a valuable rôle in doing away with dark superstition (witch-hunts in the 17th century spring to mind) and in re-awakening man's intellectual curiosity about the world around him: it had been the Age of Oedipus, if one likes to put it in the most favourable light. What worried Hölderlin and others towards the end of the century was the neglect of the Teiresias element. Eighteenth-century man was out of balance: he had developed one part of himself - the reason - to the exclusion of all else. Hölderlin and the so-called Romantics tried to redress the balance by emphasising the other two thirds of the human make-up previously neglected: the senses and the contents of the unconscious. Their purpose was not to reject reason in favour of old or new superstitions, but to re-create a balance in the human psyche which had been impossible in an age of universal scepticism, rationalism and atheism. In fact, it is Hölderlin's view that this balance had ceased to exist (except in the case of exceptional individuals) at the close of the golden age of ancient Greece. Then, it had been destroyed when Plato, the most influential thinker of his age, changed his mind in the "Republic", rejected his previous ideas concerning the 'divine fury' of poets, the 'democratic' aspect of anamnesis, etc., and became a rationalist and an élitist

(very possibly under the influence of the Athenian democracy's treatment of Sokrates)²⁵ rejecting the senses and the unconscious in favour of one only of man's faculties: the Reason. No European thinker had subsequently succeeded in re-uniting these three faculties harmoniously. Since that time, mankind had gone from one extreme - blind superstition - to the other - arid rationalism - without being able to recover this lost unity. Perhaps only the Christian Church, embracing as it does in its thought everything from the rationalism of an Aquinas to the naïve mysticism of a Böhme, was able to hold western man together, satisfying at least two aspects of the triad (rejecting only the senses, in its official teaching at least - in practice, it appealed very openly to the senses in the colourful ritual of the Mass, etc., until the Puritanical reaction of the Reformation put an end to this aspect of Church life in much of Northern Europe.)

Thus, we see the central importance of Empedokles for Hölderlin: he was the thinker who held the three faculties together, the last defender of the whole man, "ein Todfeind aller einseitigen Existenz".

Before the onset of the Presocratic "Aufklärung", man's existence had been dominated by only two of his faculties: the senses and the unconscious. For metaphysics, he relied upon the (supposedly) divine revelations of the priests, the Teiresias figures whose pronouncements were not open to question. The most intelligent and independently minded of the Greeks found this situation unsatisfactory, whereupon the third faculty - Reason - started to come into its own. It is at this point that there arose the unfortunate antagonism between reason and the other two faculties which persists to the present day. One prominent aspect of this antagonism has been the ancient war between art and philosophy. The great artists - Sophokles, Dante, Hölderlin, Beethoven, Wagner - have laid claim to knowledge and wisdom unavailable to the philosophers. This knowledge comes from the unconscious, the same source which provided the Teiresias figures before the Greek

Enlightenment with their revelations. Most philosophers have refused to take account of these claims, with a few exceptions such as Empedokles, the young Plato, Schelling, Heidegger. Of the exceptions mentioned, two were major influences on Hölderlin, one was his main philosophical ally, and the fourth borrowed wholesale from Hölderlin in building his own system.

Empedokles was indeed one of the Presokratic philosophers. His system is in large measure based on that of Parmenides. With the latter, the split between man's Reason and his other faculties, between the philosophers and the scientists on the one hand and the poets, priests and mystics on the other, was well on its way. Parmenides was in fact an out-and-out rationalist. Although he wrote in what must be termed verse, by no stretch of the imagination could he be called a poet.

Now, Empedokles largely accepted Parmenides' rational system, as is reflected by his first poem *Περὶ φύσεως* (first, at least, in a logical sense, if not chronologically), One major point on which he disagreed with Parmenides, as we have seen, is the matter of the senses. With his reaffirmation of his trust in them, Empedokles brought two faculties together: the Reason and the Senses. With his second poem, *οἱ Καθαροὶ*, he brought in the third faculty, the Unconscious.

When we turn to Hölderlin, we see that he was in a similar position. He was preceded by a basically rationalist tradition in European thought, from Descartes to Fichte, comparable with the Presokratic tradition leading up to Empedokles. Like Empedokles, Hölderlin strove to bring what was best and most important in this tradition together with what was excluded from it, ie. the claims of the senses and the unconscious. Thus, he can be seen to occupy a parallel position in modern European thought to that occupied by Empedokles in ancient Greece. His early reading of the Sicilian philosopher/poet arguably had a decisive influence on the whole of his life, up to

and including (as we shall see) his ultimate mental breakdown. It is very probable that he saw his own mission in life as being parallel to that of Empedokles. Something of this comes out in the last stanza of Hölderlin's short poem "Empedokles":

Doch heilig bist du mir, wie der Erde Macht,
Die dich hinwegnahm, kühner Getöteter!
Und folgen möchte ich in die Tiefe,
Hielte die Liebe mich nicht, dem Helden.
[Gr.St.A.1/1, p.240.]

Not only did Empedokles' philosophical system have, in my view, a profound influence on Hölderlin's thought; not only did his personal fate come to serve as something of a model, as I hope to show, for how Hölderlin saw his own life developing: it can even be said that the entire ambience and general style of his later poetry is consciously or unconsciously influenced by Empedokles' poems. For example, one of the most prominent features of Empedokles' style is his presentation of metaphysical and scientific abstraction in a mythological guise, as in Fragment 6 (Aetius I,3,20):

τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ῥιζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε·
Zeὺς ἀργῆς "Ἡρῇ τε φερέσβιος ἦδ' Αἰδωνεύς
Νῆστις θ' ἢ δακρύοις τέγγει κρούωντα βρότειον.²⁶

For the roots of all things first hear:
Shining Zeus and life-bringing Hera and Aidoneus
And Nestis who with her tears fills the springs
of mortals with water.

Here, the four mythological figures Zeus, Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis stand for the four elements Fire, Air, Earth and Water.²⁷

One is familiar with this approach from Hölderlin's poems: "Vater Äther", "der Weingott" and so on. In the German poet, however, it is a slightly different procedure, in that his mythological figures are, as a rule, used more as complex symbols with at least two possible meanings or interpretations, rather than as simple allegorical figures representing one specific substance or entity. In some cases, one can be fairly sure that Höl-

derlin is using his symbol in a purposely dualist manner, as in the case of the Christ/Dionysos figure. In others, as in "Friedensfeier" with its "Fürst des Fests", the symbolism is of such a vague and multiple character that there is no possibility of pinning it down with any degree of certainty to meanings X, Y and Z, and this suggests to me that in these cases the symbol has taken charge of the poet, rather than the latter using the symbol in a conscious manner, and has come flooding up from his unconscious in an irresistible surge.²⁸ The significance of such symbols can best be clarified by Jungian psychoanalysis rather than by the philosopher or the scholar. In view of the paramount importance of the unconscious and its contents in the Hölderlinian/Empedoklean system, and the rôle given by them to the poet in revealing these contents, the parts of Hölderlin's work in which these symbols appear must be regarded as the most important and significant by anyone who is willing to take his metaphysical claims at all seriously. The difficulty lies, perhaps, here as in the work of other artists, in differentiating between the genuine unconscious inspirations and the products of the artist's conscious mind, which are necessarily of far less interest and significance from a metaphysical point of view.

Thus, we come back to the idea of the ultimate Truth(-s) about reality being resident in the Unconscious. The poet's special significance lies in his unique and privileged access to the contents of the Unconscious. This is, by definition, not an access that can be consciously forced. The poet's visions appear out of the Unconscious or they do not appear. This point is central to an adequate understanding of Hölderlin's tragedy, "der Tod des Empedokles", to which we now turn.

As Hölderlin's play opens, we find Empedokles at the end of his career. We arrive on the scene after his great days as philosopher, seer and statesman have faded...

Denn es haben
Die Götter seine Kraft von ihm genommen,
Seit jenem Tage, da der trunkne Mann
Vor allem Volk sich einen Gott genannt.
[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.10.]

This is the central situation. Its accuracy from a historical point of view is dubious, relying as it does on what Burnet describes as "a malicious version of a tale set on foot by his adherents that he had been snatched up to heaven in the night"²⁹ for the final dénouement. However, it is largely irrelevant from an intellectual point of view how accurate or inaccurate the historical background of the play is. Hölderlin chose to write his play about Empedokles because Empedokles had been such a great intellectual influence on him, because he saw himself in general terms as having a similar rôle in German history and intellectual life to that played by Empedokles in ancient Greece, and because Empedokles' death by throwing himself into the volcano presented him with a valuable opportunity for philosophical symbolism. Otherwise, he might just as easily have made his hero Goethe or (anachronistically) Coleridge or Rimbaud: the poet deserted by the gods who inspired him is a timeless figure - Hölderlin's Empedokles is simply the most convenient representative of this species for the poet's purposes.

Another unusual salient feature of Empedokles' case, apart from the three mentioned above, is the question of him declaring himself a god. This is apparently historically accurate.³⁰ This declaration was, according to Hölderlin's version, the occasion for the gods (and with them his inspired visions) deserting him. Empedokles' mistake, his act of "hubris", had been in transferring the epithet "divine" from his visions, which deserved them, to himself, who did not, being their mere vessel. Or to put it in Homeric terms: he foolishly transferred stress from the contents of his $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ to those of his mortal $\Theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$ and confused the two. His visions had pre-

viously come welling up out of his $\psi\chi\eta$. When he neglected the latter in favour of his mortal mind and reason, the well dried up:

O bei den heiligen Brunnen, wo sich still
Die Wasser sammeln, und die Dürstenden
Am heißen Tage sich verjüngen! in mir,
In mir, ihr Quellen des Lebens, strömtet ihr einst
Aus Tiefen der Welt zusammen und es kamen
Die Dürstenden zu mir - vertrocknet bin
Ich nun, und nimmer freun die Sterblichen
Sich meiner - bin ich ganz allein? und ist
Es Nacht hier oben auch am Tage? weh!
Der höhers, denn ein sterblich Auge, sah,
Der Blindgeschlagne tastet nun umher -
Wo seid ihr, meine Götter?

[Gr.St.A.4/1, pp.14-5.]

Empedokles is well aware of his having deserved this punishment:

Es ist vorbei
Und du, verbirg dirs nicht! du hast
Es selbst verschuldet, armer Tantalus,
Das Heiligtum hast du geschändet, hast
Mit frechem Stolz den schönen Bund entzweit,
Elender! als die Genien der Welt
Voll Liebe sich in dir vergaßen, dachst du
An dich und wähnstest karger Tor, an dich
Die Gütigen verkauft, daß sie dir,
Die Himmlischen, wie blöde Knechte dienten!

[Gr.St.A.4/1, p.15.]

This is a situation with which we are familiar from our Sophokles chapter: a hero of exceptional qualities coming to grief due to one fatal mistake, realising and accepting his own responsibility for the ensuing situation, and taking the full consequences upon himself. In this respect, Hölderlin's tragedy is clearly modelled directly upon Sophokles' plays, in particular perhaps "Oedipus Tyrannos". If Oedipus' fault is depicted in Sophokles' play as an unwitting sin against Divine Law, Empedokles in Hölderlin's play is seen as committing a crime against Nature:

Ich sollt es nicht aussprechen, heilge Natur!
Jungfräuliche, die dem rohen Sinn entflieht!
Verachtet hab ich dich und mich allein
Zum Herrn gesetzt, ein übermütiger
Barbar! an eurer Einfalt hielt ich euch,

Ihr reinen immerjugendlichen Mächte!
Die mich mit Freud erzogen, mich mit Wonne genährt,
Und weil ihr immergleich mir wiederkehrtet,
Ihr Guten, ehrt ich eure Seele nicht!
Ich kannt es ja, ich hatt es ausgelernt,
Das Leben der Natur, wie sollt es mir
Noch heilig sein, wie einst! Die Götter waren
Mir dienstbar nun geworden, ich allein
War Gott, und sprachs im frechen Stolz heraus.
O glaub es mir, ich wäre lieber nicht
Geboren!

[Gr.St.A.4/1, pp.20-1.]

It is possible that this difference in emphasis, Divine Law as against Nature, may be due to the two tragedians' respective philosophical roots in the works of Herakleitos and Empedokles, the latter being more notable for his interest in Nature. However that may be, this section, which reads almost like an attack on Fichte's philosophy of nature, shows us the central dilemma of the philosopher/poet: he has cut himself off from his "Ursprung". He as an individual has committed the same sin as Hölderlin describes mankind in general as perpetrating in the seventh stanza of "der Rhein":

Doch nimmer, nimmer vergißt ers.
Denn eher muß die Wohnung vergehn,
Und die Satzung und zum Unbild werden
Der Tag der Menschen, ehe vergessen
Ein solcher dürfte den Ursprung
Und die reine Stimme der Jugend.
Wer war es, der zuerst
Die Liebesbande verderbt
Und Stricke von ihnen gemacht hat?
Dann haben des eigenen Rechts
Und gewiß des himmlischen Feuers
Gespottet die Trotzigen, dann erst
Die sterblichen Pfade verachtend
Verwegnes erwählt
Und den Göttern gleich zu werden getrachtet.

[Gr.St.A.2/1, pp.144-5.]

The key phrase in that stanza is "des eigenen Rechts": mankind has committed an act of hubris and taken too much on itself by imposing its own will on Nature and at the same time forgetting its own dependence on and provenance from Her. Such spurious independence can only end in disaster, as it did in Empedokles' (and Oedipus') case.

Empedokles, aware of his own superiority among mankind and mankind's superiority in Creation, has drawn a false conclusion: that he must therefore be God, if there is a God, because he is the most superior element in Creation! He is another Oedipus figure, but even greater than Sophokles' hero, for Empedokles is not only a man of great intellectual powers like Oedipus - he combines the latter's best qualities with those of a Teiresias, being in addition an inspired poet.

Now, Empedokles' mistake, as he himself subsequently realises, is to think that the top end of Creation, the ultimate development, is the Absolute or God (this is the Hegelian position, with the Absolute at the top of a great pyramid), whereas in fact the Absolute or God is at the bottom (or, more accurately: the beginning), at the "Ursprung". Put another way: God is the "Ursprung". Empedokles was aware (or believed) that his conscious mind, or, in Homeric terminology, his *Θυμός* was more highly developed than that of any of his contemporaries or predecessors. What he forgot was that the most valuable knowledge he was able to hand on to others was not the result of the workings of his conscious mind but a revelation from his unconscious. This revelation came from the "Ursprung", Nature, the gods, God. Once he rejected (or neglected) the latter, this source dried up, with the results that Hermokrates describes:

Es haben ihn die Götter sehr geliebt.
Doch nicht ist er der Erste, den sie drauf
Hinab in sinnlose Nacht verstoßen,
Vom Gipfel ihres gütigen Vertrauns,
Weil er des Unterschieds zu sehr vergaß
Im übergroßen Glück, und sich allein
Nur fühlte; so erging es ihm, er ist
Mit grenzenloser Öde nun gestraft...

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.11.]

Empedokles himself describes his unenviable situation in even more graphic terms:

Ach! ich der allverlassene, lebt ich nicht
Mit dieser heiligen Erd und diesem Licht
Und dir, von dem die Seele nimmer läßt,

O Vater Aether! und allen Lebenden
In einigem gegenwärtigen Olymp? -
Nun wein ich, wie ein Ausgestoßener,
Und nirgend mag ich bleiben...

[Gr.St.A.4/1, pp.18-19.]

This would serve as a very adequate description of Adam's plight after he was ejected from the Garden of Eden. Empedokles' situation is in fact exactly parallel: he also has eaten of the fruit of the tree of knowledge and trodden on forbidden territory. The Christian elements in the tragedy, although not explicit, are too marked to be coincidental. Apart from the parallel with Adam, there is also a strong similarity between the hero's predicament and the story of Christ's persecution and death. Empedokles, in the first version at least, is pursued by the Pharisee-like figures of Kritias and Hermokrates who attempt to turn the people away from him. Hermokrates makes their intention clear as early as the second scene:

...Sie sollen Zeugen sein
Des Fluches, den ich ihm verkündige,
Und ihn verstoßen in die öde Wildnis,
Damit er nimmerwiederkehrend dort
Die böse Stunde büße, da er sich
Zum Gott gemacht.

[Gr.St.A.4/1, p.12.]

The sacrifice element in Empedokles' suicide is another parallel with Christ's story. Empedokles himself stresses this element:

Ihr spannt das Opfertier vom Pfluge los
Und nimmer trifft's der Stachel seines Treibers.
So schonet meiner auch; entwürdigt
Mein Leiden mir mit böser Rede nicht,
Denn heilig ist's....

[Gr.St.A.4/1, p.24.]

The reasons for the two sacrifices are, on the face of it, different. Christ died to release mankind from its sins. However, another reason for His death is given in John 4,31-8; Luther, in his translation, glosses the passage as follows:

Seine Speise ist des Vaters willen thun. Des Vaters willen aber ist/das durch sein leiden das Evangelium in alle welt gepredigt würde. Das war nu furhanden/Gleich wie da zumal die Erndte nahe war.

This is nearer to Empedokles' reason, which is explained by him in Act II, Scene 4, where he rebukes the people:

O lieber Undank! gab ich doch genug
Wovon ihr leben möget. Ihr dürft leben
So lang ihr Othem habt: ich nicht. Es muß
Bei Zeiten weg, durch wen der Geist geredet.
Es offenbart die göttliche Natur
Sich göttlich oft durch Menschen, so erkennt
Das vielversuchende Geschlecht sie wieder.
Doch hat der Sterbliche, dem sie das Herz
Mit ihrer Wonne füllte, sie verkündet,
O laßt sie dann zerbrechen das Gefäß,
Damit es nicht zu andrem Brauche dien',
Und Göttliches zum Menschenwerke werde...

...Denn anders ziemt es nicht für ihn, vor dem
In todesfroher Stund am heiligen Tage
Das Göttliche den Schleier abgeworfen=
Den Licht und Erde liebten, dem der Geist,
Der Geist der Welt den eignen Geist erweckte
In dem sie sind, zu dem ich sterbend kehre.³¹

[Gr.St.A.4/1, pp.73-4.]

The very human considerations which move Empedokles, his wish not to become or be seen to be unworthy of the divine force, which once possessed him and used him, could scarcely apply to the Son of God. However, they do suggest a parallel with Hölderlin himself: Empedokles' suicide, Hölderlin's madness, Rimbaud's flight to Africa and the East can all be seen as reactions to the same phenomenon, the crisis described in Hölderlin's tragedy. Empedokles has outlived his purpose and would rather die than endanger his achievements by serving a lower one. He is not motivated by any overweening pride or conceit: he is concerned lest his previous work and (above all) revelations be subject to scepticism and disbelief if the people see his new, uninspired self. His usefulness is at an end, so he prefers to leave the scene, especially as death holds no terrors for him. As the last line above indicates, he feels he is simply returning at

last to his "Ursprung", having escaped the "wheel of birth" and the necessity for any further reincarnations. It is merely his physical body and his conscious mind which will die. His soul (or "daemon") will be united with God or "der Geist der Welt".

Furthermore, as Hölderlin states in the Frankfurt plan, "er betrachtet [seinen Tod] als eine Notwendigkeit, die aus seinem innersten Wesen folge" [Gr.St.A.4/1,p.148.] In the same plan, Hölderlin mentions "Ehre und Liebe" as "die einzigen Bande, die ihn ans Wirkliche knüpfen" [Gr. St.A.4/1,p.147.]. His rejection by the people puts an end to even that tie, as Pausanias points out at the end of the First "Fassung":

O bei den Seligen! verdamme nicht
Den Herrlichen, dem seine Ehre so
Zum Unglück ward
Der sterben muß, weil er zu schön gelebt,
Weil ihn zu sehr die Götter alle liebten.
Denn wird ein anderer, denn er, geschmäht,
So ists zu tilgen, aber er, wenn ihm

was kann der Göttersohn?
Unendlich trifft es den Unendlichen.
Ach niemals ward ein edler Angesicht
Empörender beleidiget! ich muß
Es sehn,...

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.85.]

This is not to say that Empedokles does not go through some Hamlet- (and Christ-)like hesitations on the way to his death, but his ultimate attitude is one of calm acceptance. The whole gamut of his emotions and thoughts on the subject are indicated in his soliloquy in Act II, Scene 6:

Ha! Jupiter Befreier! näher tritt
Und näher meine Stund und vom Geklüfte
Kömmt schon der traute Bote meiner Nacht
Der Abendwind zu mir, der Liebesbote.
Es wird! gereift ists! o nun schlage, Herz,
Und rege deine Wellen, ist der Geist
Doch über dir wie leuchtendes Gestirn,
Indes des Himmels heimatlos Gewölk
Das immer flüchtige vorüber wandelt.
Wie ist mir? staunen muß ich noch, als fing'
Ich erst zu leben an, denn all ists anders,
Und jetzt erst bin ich, bin - und darum wars,

Daß in der frommen Ruhe dich so oft,
Du Müßiger, ein Sehnen überfiel?
O darum ward das Leben dir so leicht,
Daß du des Überwinders Freuden all
In Einer vollen Tat am Ende fändest?

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.80.]

He then gives his (and, I would maintain, Hölderlin's) final and deepest thoughts on the subject of death. We note that he connects it closely with Nature and with what would appear to be a state of Dionysian intoxication:

... Sterben? nur ins Dunkel ist
Ein Schritt, und sehen möchtest du doch, mein Auge!
Du hast mir ausgedient, dienstfertiges!
Es muß die Nacht itzt eine Weile mir
Das Haupt umschatten. Aber freudig quillt
Aus mutger Brust die Flamme. Schauderndes
Verlangen! Was? am Tod entzündet mir
Das Leben sich zuletzt? und reichest du
Den Schreckensbecher, mir, den gärenden,
Natur! damit dein Sänger noch aus ihm
Die letzte der Begeisterungen trinke!

[Gr.St.A.4/1,pp.80-1.]

He then concludes, in a calmer tone:

Zufrieden bin ichs, suche nun nichts mehr
Denn meine Opferstätte. Wohl ist mir...

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.81.]

I dwell at such great length on Empedokles' death and his own attitude towards it in the play because I feel convinced that Hölderlin is expressing his own heartfelt sentiments through his main character, and that the latter's attitude towards his death is in reality a representation not only of Hölderlin's attitude to death as such, but also to his own impending fate.

Several elements of a parallel nature support this conclusion. Firstly, there is the element of sacrifice: Empedokles kills himself largely in order to benefit the people; Hölderlin risks and eventually loses his sanity so that mankind might have the benefit of the visions that emerge from his Unconscious at the moment of greatest risk. The poet must plunge so deep into his Unconscious (if his work is to have the value he intends) that there is always the risk that he will be unable to come back

out of it. The resultant take-over of the conscious mind by the unconscious, and even the possible complete destruction of the former by the latter, was the risk for Hölderlin, and is in fact what eventually occurred. In twentieth-century terminology, Hölderlin's mind fell into a psychotic condition.

Hölderlin showed time and again in the years preceding his definitive madness that he was aware of this risk, but considered the benefits of his poetic activity for mankind to outweigh the personal danger. In the initial four lines of the first version of "Patmos", he expresses it thus:

Nah ist
Und schwer zu fassen der Gott.
Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst
Das Rettende auch.

[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.165.]

Hölderlin's sacrifice of his sanity, then, was a sacrifice for the people as was Empedokles' suicide. There is no evidence that Hölderlin felt deserted by the gods and then consciously decided to become mad. His mind simply snapped when the strain became too much - the strain of constant "Selbstvertiefung", the strain of loneliness, the strain of the personal fates of Diotima and Sinclair, the strain of his superhuman striving after excellence, after the Absolute. In this sense, there is a slight difference between the two men's respective sacrifices, but the general principle remains the same.

The second parallel, which we have already discussed, is that between their rôles in their respective cultures and societies. This rôle, that of the philosopher/seer (and democratic politician), with the more precise similarity of historical position we have seen, is something of which Hölderlin showed himself to be well aware, as I have tried to show.

Thirdly, there is the symbolic significance of the manner of Empedokles' suicide. The act of hurling himself into the volcano is at one level a symbolic representa-

tion of Empedokles returning to the "Ursprung", to the original chaos before it all began. If one is to take the ἔν κλὶ πᾶν seriously, he is also pointing out the way the whole of the universe is destined to develop and end. Also, this original chaos has marked similarities with the state of affairs inside the mind of a madman: Hölderlin's leap into insanity is a direct parallel to Empedokles' leap into the volcano.

At another level, one can scarcely ignore the possibility of a straightforward Freudian interpretation of the leap:³² the crater would then be seen as a symbol for the female vagina, the leap as either a return to the womb or a representation of the sexual act - the former being perhaps more likely in view of the traditional concept of 'Mother Earth'.

Furthermore, the element that Empedokles lacked after the gods deserted him was the "female" element of intuition, inspiration - what Diotima represented for Hyperion (and his creator). Empedokles was left with the workings of his conscious mind, his reason, and this was inadequate without its complement and dialectical opposite, the inspirational, unconscious element. The volcano and its contents can be seen as a symbolic representation of this element.

The union of the two dialectically opposed elements and its significance is described by Hölderlin in the "Grund zum Empedokles":

Dies Gefühl gehört vielleicht zum höchsten, was gefühlt werden kann, wenn beide Entgegengesetzte, der verallgemeinerte geistig lebendige künstlich rein aorgische Mensch und die Wohlgestalt der Natur sich begegnen. Dies Gefühl gehört vielleicht zum höchsten, was der Mensch erfahren kann, denn die jetztige Harmonie mahnt ihn an das vormalige umgekehrte reine Verhältnis, und er fühlt sich und die Natur zweifach, und die Verbindung ist unendlicher.

[Gr.St.A.4/1, p. 153.]

This is the reaching of the Absolute. As Hölderlin goes on to explain, the polarity and dialectical oppo-

sition of the two factors or forces, "das Aorgische" and "das Besondere" (roughly equivalent to the $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha$ and the $\epsilon\nu$), reach a "Versöhnung" in "der Tod des Einzelnen, derjenige Moment, wo das Organische seine Ichheit.... [und] das Aorgische seine Allgemeinheit....ablegt..." [Gr.St.A.4/1, p.153.]. This is Hölderlin's (and Schelling's) solution to the age-old dilemma of European thought: how to reconcile and relate the individual to the universe, the subject to the object. It may seem paradoxical to some that this "Versöhnung" should take place at the moment of death, but it is a feature of both the Christian and the Platonist traditions (both of which come together in European Romanticism) to see death in a positive light; Hölderlin, Novalis, Blake, Wagner, among others, wrote works where death is treated as not only a merciful release, but as a gateway to great things. Life is associated with the Day: sobriety, self-control, self-limitation, constriction; Death is equated with the Night: Love, passion, the daemonic, ecstasy, self-expansion, release.³³ The ethos is summed up in a stanza from Clemens Brentano's early poem "Wenn der Sturm das Meer umschlinget...":

In uns selbst sind wir verloren,
Bange Fesseln uns beengen,
Schloß und Riegel muß zersprengen,
Nur im Tode wird geboren.³⁴

This attitude is not in the least pessimistic or nihilistic if one assumes the existence of an after-life.

Hölderlin gives a vivid description of this Night element in the following lines from "Brot und Wein":

...die Schwärmerische, die Nacht kommt,
Voll mit Sternen und wohl wenig bekümmert um uns,
Glänzt die Erstaunende dort, die Fremdlingin unter
den Menschen,
Über Gebirgshöhn traurig und prächtig herauf.

Wunderbar ist die Gunst der Hoherhabnen und niemand
Weiß, von wannen und was einem geschieht von ihr.
So bewegt sie die Welt und die hoffende Seele der
Menschen,
Selbst kein Weiser versteht, was sie bereitet,
denn so
Will es der oberste Gott, der sehr dich liebet, und

a Dionysian celebration of community, stressing what they have in common with one another.

Hölderlin seems to have been particularly concerned with this question of the Day/Night antithesis between 1798, when he was working on "der Tod des Empedokles" and his main philosophical essays and 1800, around the time of the composition of "Brot und Wein". The very title of this poem, quite apart from any religious reference, indicates the dualism between the sobriety of the Day ("Brot") and the ecstasy of the Night ("Wein"). The paradox or antithesis is expressed concisely in the following lines:

....es sei um Mittag oder es gehe
Bis in die Mitternacht, immer bestehet ein Maß,
Allen gemein, doch jeglichem ist eignes beschieden.
[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.91.]

For Hölderlin, the great difficulty lies in this problem of how to reconcile the claims of "das Aorgische", with the threatened submersion of the individual "Ich", and the post-Kantian (and French revolutionary) enthusiasm for personal freedom and self-expression. In philosophical terms, this was the conflict between "Dogmatismus" and "Kriticismus". In the context of ancient philosophy, Empedokles was faced with precisely the same problem: in Parmenides' system the individual "Ich" and man's spirituality were swamped in the vastness and immutability of the universe; Empedokles' life work (as, I believe, Hölderlin was aware) was an attempt to reconcile this monist system with the claims of the individual soul, as represented in the Orphic and Pythagorean traditions. In Hölderlin's poem, the ultimate "Versöhnung" is to be accomplished (in "Hesperien") by Dionysos:

Ja! sie sagen mit Recht, er söhne den Tag mit der
Nacht aus...
[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.94.]

Thus, Dionysos is the "metaprinciple", but he is only the "Fackelschwinger", "des Höchsten Sohn" - here the Christ/Dionysos dualism comes into play - and here we see clearly how the Empedoklean Love/Strife régime, which

concerned Aristotle, is put into perspective as a system (or universe) created by and ultimately under the aegis of "der Höchste", apparently similar to or identical with the God of the Christians.

In the "Grund zum Empedokles", it is Death that reconciles Day and Night; in "Brot und Wein", it is Dionysos who performs the same function. This may seem at first sight contradictory. However, we have already seen how Hölderlin associates with one another the ideas of death, madness, ecstasy. At the same time, we have seen how one side of the dualism - Night - is in itself associated with these ideas. Thus, the final "Versöhnung" would appear to favour Night rather than Day. Again, we have already seen how Night must be equated with Empedokles' Love, Day with Strife. So we find the claim for Love's primacy over Strife confirmed by this further analysis. We come in the end to the following equation:

Love = Death = Madness = Ecstasy = Dionysos = "des Höchsten Sohn".

Hence, the submersion of the "Ich" in the "Gipfel der Zeit" is not to be equated with the submission to an artificial moral code and repression of "das Dämonische" associated with the Day (or Strife). It is rather an ecstatic, passionate, joyful and voluntary union -

denn wir sind herzlos, Schatten, bis unser
Vater Aether erkannt jeden und allen gehört.

[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.95.]

Thus, the "Gipfel der Zeit" is not so much the Rule of Love as the occurrence of Love. The loneliness and isolation of the Rule of Strife or Day is temporarily abolished. The "Gipfel der Zeit" or 'Rule' of Love is, among other things, a communal escape from individual loneliness and isolation. The community is tied together by the considerations detailed by Hölderlin in his essay "Über Religion":

Weder aus sich selbst allein, noch einzig aus den
Gegenständen, die ihn umgeben, kann der Mensch
erfahren, daß mehr als Maschinengang, daß ein Geist,

ein Gott, ist in der Welt, aber wohl in einer lebendigeren, über die Notdurft erhabenen Beziehung, in der er stehet mit dem, was ihn umgibt.

Und jeder hätte demnach seinen eigenen Gott, insoferne jeder seine eigene Sphäre hat, in der er wirkt und die er erfährt, und nur insoferne mehrere Menschen eine gemeinschaftliche Sphäre haben, in der sie menschlich, d.h. über die Notdurft erhaben wirken und leiden, nur insoferne haben sie eine gemeinschaftliche Gottheit; und wenn es eine Sphäre gibt, in der alle zugleich leben, und mit der sie in mehr als notdürftiger Beziehung sich fühlen, dann, aber auch nur insoferne, haben sie alle eine gemeinschaftliche Gottheit.

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.278.]

This bond, then, stems from a commonly accepted spiritual belief of a religious nature. We have seen how the poet's vocation is exercised, according to Hölderlin, by virtue of a bond between the "Geist" of the poet and the "Geist der Welt". I believe it is Hölderlin's contention that something similar occurs, except on a far more massive scale, at the "Gipfel der Zeit". The *ἔκστασις* of the poet is experienced by the whole community.³⁶ This is the state of affairs that Empedokles had been striving to achieve in Akragas. We shall now consider his rôle in this respect, and try to draw some general conclusions both as relates to Hölderlin's ideas and activities and with regard to more general theories of political philosophy.

We have already seen the rôle Hölderlin ascribed to Dionysos in preparing the "Gipfel der Zeit": he is the "Fackelschwinger" and "der gemeinsame Gott" ("gemeinsam" in the sense that he creates a "Gemeinschaft"). Dionysos stands for intoxication and every type of ecstatic experience in Greek mythology. He is the god of tragedy, and we have seen, in our Sophokles chapter, the importance Hölderlin gave to that branch of literature. He was also the god of wine, and in "Stuttgart" we find the line:

"Und den eigenen Sinn schmelzet, wie Perlen, der Wein."

[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.87.]

This reference to Cleopatra's extravagance (also alluded to in the short poem "Empedokles" from which we

have already quoted) has the deeper symbolic significance that the ecstatic "Rausch" of a Dionysian experience of whatever type leads those involved to forget their individuality or "Ich" and join together in a communal vision of the Absolute - the type of result that can ensue after (or during) an adequate performance of a Sophoklean or Shakespearean tragedy or a Wagnerian music drama.

This, then, is the rôle of Dionysos, or the Dionysian element in life: to break down barriers between individuals, dissolve differences and animosities, and create a community held together by their common experience and acceptance of the spiritual content of the event. This is the effect that Empedokles had on the "Agrigenter". We can now see this phenomenon as evaluated by two characters in Hölderlin's play, each with a very different point of view. Firstly, a favourable account from Panthea:

...dann tritt er auch
Heraus ins Volk, an Tagen, wo die Menge
Sich überbraust und eines Mächtigers
Der unentschlossene Tumult bedarf,
Da herrscht er dann, der herrliche Pilot
Und hilft hinaus und wenn sie dann erst recht
Genug ihn sehn, des immerfremden Manns sich
Gewöhnen möchten, ehe sie gewahren,
Ist er hinweg...

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.6.]

And the opposite view from Kritias:

Das Volk ist trunken, wie er selber ist.
Sie hören kein Gesetz, und keine Not
Und keinen Richter; die Gebräuche sind
Von unverständlichem Gebrause gleich
Den friedlichen Gestaden überschwemmt.
Ein wildes Fest sind alle Tage worden,
Ein Fest für alle Feste und der Götter
Bescheidne Feiertage haben sich
In eins verloren, allverdunkelnd hüllt
Der Zauberer den Himmel und die Erd
Ins Ungewitter, das er uns gemacht,
Und siehet zu und freut sich seines Geists
In seiner stillen Halle.

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.10.]

Kritias represents the forces of the Day: order, the rule of law, clear distinctions, sobriety. He argues for control and repression (in the neutral sense) of the

people. Like Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor, in "the Brothers Karamasov", he does not think the masses can be trusted to be free, but must be controlled and regulated by sober, calculating lawgivers. This is the point of view that Plato came round to supporting in his old age, as of "the Republic".

Kritias sees Empedokles as a demagogue who is destroying the fabric and framework of ordered society. This is what Kritias sees as the most important element in civil life: the framework, the laws. Empedokles, on the other hand, is only interested in the content, in the people themselves. He knows them thoroughly. He knows their needs and aspirations, spiritual and emotional, and how to supply these needs. He is a "Pilot" who guides them on the correct path, and is able to do so thanks to their trust in him. Kritias complains that Empedokles makes the people ignore laws and customs. Like Sophokles' Kreon, he stands for the established customs of human society as against divinely inspired acts and moral codes. He rejects the Dionysian element completely. To him, "trunken" is a term of abuse.³⁷

What Kritias does not understand is the fact that it is Empedokles' rôle to direct the daemonic forces in human nature in the direction of Love rather than Strife. Kritias wants to repress the daemonic; Empedokles wants to channel it. Needless to say, the problematics of Hölderlin's play should not be regarded as his scholarly contribution to Empedoklean studies, but rather as a discussion of problems which absorbed him personally and which he regarded as permanently relevant to human society *per se*.

As we have seen, Hermokrates and Kritias, in the first version of the play, stand for cold reason and the repression of the passions. This, in Hölderlin's view (as expressed through his main character), is dangerous. His warning is of universal application:

"O gebt euch der Natur, eh sie euch nimmt!"

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.65.]

The danger lies in the possibility of an explosion of the repressed forces, as when Hyperion's army runs riot in the novel.

Nature is the force that is apostrophised throughout the Empedokles tragedy, moreso possibly than in any other work by Hölderlin. It is his failure to retain a humble attitude towards Her that is Empedokles' sin. He thought he was superior to Her, and this brought his ruin. The futility of opposing the workings of Nature is expressed by Empedokles when Pausanias laments at the thought of Empedokles' death:

Vergehn? ist doch
Das Bleiben, gleich dem Strome den der Frost
Gefesselt. Töricht Wesen! schläft und hält
Der heilige Lebensgeist denn irgendwo,
Daß du ihn binden möchtest, du den Reinen?
Es ängstiget der Immerfreudige
Dir niemals in Gefängnissen sich ab,
Und zaudert hoffungslos auf seiner Stelle,
Frägst du, wohin? Die Wonnen einer Welt
Muß er durchwandern, und er endet nicht.

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.79.]

This is the process described by Hölderlin in his essay "das Werden im Vergehen":

...in eben dem Momente und Grade, worin sich
das Bestehende auflöst, fühlt sich auch das
Neueintretende, Jugendliche, Mögliche.

[Gr.St.A. 4/1,p.282.]

The dynamic element, the part which brings about change, is "das Mögliche", which pushes itself into reality, displacing "das Wirkliche", which goes into "Auflösung" and ceases to have any effect. The permanent factor in the situation is the element of "Beziehungen und Kräfte" (Love and Strife). It is my belief that Hölderlin wrote this essay very much under the spell of Presocratic philosophy, in particular Herakleitos and Empedokles. We have seen how Hölderlin would have absorbed Herakleitean ideas through Sophokles^{and other sources}. The flux idea is very Herakleitean. Parmenides opposed Herakleitos on this issue,

stressing rather the element of stability in the universe. Empedokles can be seen as a reconciler of these two opposed views. He retained much of Parmenides' ideas while at the same time allowing for the element of change, accounting for it by means of the two governing principles, Love and Strife. Thus, the dynamic element of change in Hölderlin's essay is entirely Empedoklean in spirit.³⁸ Hölderlin has drunk deeply from this particular well.

The general identity of life and thought is surely enough to indicate that, for Hölderlin, Empedokles was the most important of the Greeks - more important, for example, than Plato, with whose later writings Hölderlin could hardly have agreed. It may be suggested that certain elements which Hölderlin and Empedokles share - the belief in reincarnation, for example - could easily and more conveniently have been drawn by Hölderlin from eighteenth century sources such as Herder. It is undeniable that these elements were present in many eighteenth century writings Hölderlin is liable to have read. But then, it is equally undeniable that the corresponding elements in Empedokles' system were present in, for example, the theories of Parmenides, Herakleitos, Pythagoras and the Dionysian and Orphic cults. The aspect which makes the comparison Empedokles/Hölderlin (rather than, for example, Herder/Hölderlin) particularly apposite is the fact that each one drew these "influences" together into directly corresponding systems within their respective cultures. Hölderlin was to the German "Gipfel der Zeit" what Empedokles was to the Greek "Gipfel der Zeit".

It may also be maintained that Hölderlin's Empedokles in the play bears little or no relation to the actual historical figure. This is largely true, in that Hölderlin, as we have pointed out, projected his own problems and ideas onto the hero of his tragedy. In particular, it might be maintained with considerable justification that Hölderlin's Empedokles loses more and more of the

Greek's philosopher's characteristics and becomes more and more like Hölderlin himself as he goes through the succeeding versions of the tragedy. The stark desolation of the first version, surrounded by enemies and deserted by the gods, plagued by a Trakl-like sense of guilt, is replaced by a very different figure in the third version. This difference is apparent from Empedokles' very first speech:

... vorbei, vorbei
Das menschliche Bekümmernis! als wüchsen
Mir Schwingen an, so ist mir wohl und leicht
Hier oben, hier, und reich genug und froh
Und herrlich wohn ich, wo den Feuerkelch
Mit Geist gefüllt bis an den Rand, bekränzt
Mit Blumen...

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.121.]

In place of the hostile but distinctly human characters Hermokrates and Kritias, we meet the strange mystical figure of Manes the Egyptian,³⁹ whom Empedokles credits with the characteristic of omniscience:

Ich kenne dich im finstern Wort, und du,
Du Alleswissender, erkennst mich auch.

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.136.]

Das sage du mir, der du alles siehst!

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.139.]

Manes talks of Empedokles' "schwarze Sünde" and rebukes him for his light-heartedness. But Empedokles is unrepentant. He sees his death simply as a sacrifice for the people, with no suggestion of any personal sin to be atoned for. Manes had once been his teacher, but Empedokles has outgrown him:⁴⁰

Du lehrtest mich, heut lerne du von mir.

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.139.]

This new Empedokles sees his death as a privilege and a cause for joy:

Ihr Fernentwerfenden! euch dank ich, daß ihr mirs
Gegeben habt, die lange Zahl der Leiden
Zu enden hier, befreit von andrer Pflicht
In freiem Tod, nach göttlichem Gesetze!

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.139.]

There has been past suffering for him, but there is no clear suggestion that it was deserved, as in the first version. This indicates, I would suggest, that the Empedokles of the third version is an out and out representation of Hölderlin, whose madness was a sacrifice for the people pure and simple, and a release from undeserved suffering.

This, then, is the major difference between Empedokles (in the first version of the play) and Hölderlin: the matter of guilt. Hölderlin originally intended his hero to be another Oedipus, a man who had stepped over the boundary line and suffered accordingly. The first version, in other words, is a Greek play, with Greek themes and Greek conclusions. This may have been what left Hölderlin dissatisfied with it. To him, the return of the gods was something more than a simple restoration - it was a return at a higher level. Since Empedokles' day, Christ had died on the cross and much else had taken place. Hölderlin himself, in building his system, had all the benefits and advantages of being able to look back at the Greeks and their achievements, and build on them. Hölderlin is not Empedokles, but the German equivalent, on the German level. Hölderlin's philosophical system, as I have tried to show, is very largely compatible with that of Empedokles, and Hölderlin, I believe, was well aware of this fact, as of the fact that each of them came at an identical stage in the development of their country's thought. When Hölderlin depicted his hero's fate in his tragedy, there can be little doubt that he was thinking of himself and his impending fate. Like "Hyperion", "der Tod des Empedokles" is full of autobiographical elements. Unlike "Hyperion", it is a work about the end of life, ^{was} about an impending act of self-sacrifice. Empedokles ^{was} no longer the man who had written the "Lehrgedichte" and led the people of Akragas. That Hölderlin chose the figure of Empedokles to represent what he had to say in this play shows how dear the Sicilian was to him.⁴¹

CHAPTER FOUR : "PLATO and KANT"

The title of the poem "Menons Klagen um Diotima" gives us two clear pointers towards Plato, in the two names. Diotima is prominent in the "Symposium", while the name "Menon" takes us in another direction: to Plato's dialogue of that name, in which the young Meno and Sokrates discuss the question of knowledge, virtue, etc., whether they are inborn or, if not, how they are acquired, whether they can be taught and, if so, by whom? In his "Anabasis", Xenophon gives a very negative picture of this Meno, as a self-seeking young man lacking any semblance of a conscience. Plato, however, gives a far more positive view. Here we find an extremely self-confident but intelligent character who is genuinely interested in finding the truth. He gives Sokrates a difficult time with his sceptical remarks but listens to his arguments with respect. He occupies a position in relation to Sokrates which reminds one of the Hyperion-Adamas relationship, or that between Pausanias and Empedokles.

In "Meno" 76 a-d we have an interesting reference to Empedoklean ideas in relation to the definition of colour, but the relevance to Hölderlin becomes clearer when virtue is defined as "the desire for the beautiful and the ability to attain to it". Their search for the truth breaks down temporarily, causing Sokrates to go into the question of the possibility of knowledge in considerable depth. This brings him to the doctrine of "anamnesis". As G.C. Field points out, "the general suggestion that the process of acquiring knowledge in these fields is really a process of remembering what we had known in a previous existence outside of the body is first put forward in the 'Meno'".¹

τὸν δὲ χρόνον μεμνημένη ἐστὶ ἡ ψυχή.²

The soul has learned/remembers for ever/since the beginning of time.

If one puts this in modern terms, one might say: the ultimate truths about life and the universe lie in the Collective Unconscious.

Ottomar Wichmann makes an interesting point in relation to this question. He relates Plato's theory of anamnesis to Kant's idea of "Spontaneität" - what Wichmann defines as "das selbsttätige, selbständige und selbstgewisse Vermögen des Geistes"³ - and sees its roots in Pythagorean theories of "prästabilierte Harmonie" and transmigration of souls. However this may be (and Paul Natorp⁴ disagrees with him, tending rather to trace "anamnesis" to Herakleitos' doctrine of the One and the Whole.), the arguments as to the origin of the idea cannot affect Wichmann's conclusion: "Platon ist sich bewußt von diesem Apriori, diesem 'Schöpfen aus sich selbst' her eine allgemeine Fähigkeit nachzuweisen...".⁵

This brings us to the connection with Kant. His theory of "Spontaneität" is what one might term the "Rousseauan" element in his thought.⁶ It involves the individual exercising his freedom of action or of judgment, and is an "allgemeine Fähigkeit", rather than something which may be developed by exceptional individuals. In other words, it binds people together in a community of equals rather than separating them according to intellect or other individual characteristics, although it has to be admitted that, in Kant, this faculty is not so highly valued as the ultimate source of all knowledge and truth. In this sense, Plato is even more of a 'democrat' than Kant... However, Kant's successors brought more of this element into the concept.

It is not usual to see Plato in this light, and there can be no doubt that, in his later works, he became much more of a rationalist and an élitist, but his doctrine of "anamnesis" weighs heavily on the other end of the scales. If the ultimate truths about reality are buried inside every human being (admittedly, deeper in some than in others) as a God-given gift, then the individual, no

matter what intellectual powers or other qualities he may or may not have, takes on a value and an interest which no out-and-out rationalist would grant him.⁷ Plato's conception is nearer to the Christian idea of the value of the individual soul. This does not mean, of course, that Plato at any stage rejected the importance of intellect and reason (any more than did Kant or Hölderlin), and one must always bear in mind the difference between ἐπιστήμη ("knowledge") and ὀρθὴ δόξα ("true judgment").⁸ Only the man of superior wisdom and intellectual powers can aspire to ἐπιστήμη - but this only means that not every man has it in him to be a Sokrates, a Plato or a Kant, which is a fairly obvious fact.

If we turn now to Hölderlin's "Wie wenn am Feiertage", we find the following lines:

... Des gemeinsamen Geistes Gedanken sind,
Still endend, in der Seele des Dichters,

Daß schnellbetroffen sie, Unendlichem
Bekannt seit langer Zeit, von Erinnerung
Erbebt, und ihr, von heiligem Strahl entzündet,
Die Frucht in Liebe geboren, der Götter und Men-
schen Werk,

Der Gesang, damit er beiden zeuge, glückt.⁹

[Gr.St.A.2/1, p.119.]

To paraphrase: the highest truths about reality ("des gemeinsamen Geistes Gedanken") are known to the poet (who is mankind's 'brain' or organ of cognizance of the Absolute) through anamnesis ("Erinnerung"), his soul being associated with "das Unendliche" for a long time. The actual process of creation, whereby the poet puts his knowledge into works of art, is a moment of inspiration ("schnellbetroffen") fired by a "heiliger Strahl" and accompanied by "Liebe", whereby the poet is able to reach the Absolute (ἔρως taking him to τὸ καλόν, in Platonist terms). He thereby achieves a synthesis of the divine and the human, and mediates between the two ("beiden zeuge").

Thus, according to Hölderlin, it is the poet's rôle to gain conscious knowledge of the eternal truths, so

that he may convey them to the rest of mankind and keep them on the correct path. Otherwise, the people's "true belief", not being based on knowledge, might give way to false belief or worse.

Here Hölderlin is following Plato directly, as one can see from "Meno" 99cd, where oracles, seers, creative people and great statesmen are seen as being divinely inspired. There is nothing natural or instinctive about their activity; it is rather divine or super-natural. This feature is stressed by Hölderlin in, for example, the first stanza of his poem "Menons Klagen um Diotima", with which we started this chapter:

... so flieht das getroffene Wild in die Wälder,
Wo es um Mittag sonst sicher im Dunkel geruht;
Aber nimmer erquickt sein grünes Lager das Herz
ihm...

[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.75.]

The wounded deer is a symbol for man, vainly seeking the truth in mere sensual reality. There is a clear antithesis between a normal deer that would be content enough with its natural, instinctive existence, and the wounded deer (ie. man) who is searching for "ein Anderes". This can be compared with a very similar passage from Hölderlin's letter to his brother, dated 4/6/1799:

Warum leben sie nicht, wie das Wild im Walde,
genügsam, beschränkt auf den Boden, die Nahrung,
die ihm zunächst liegt, und mit der es, das Wild,
von Natur zusammenhängt, wie das Kind mit der
Brust seiner Mutter?

[Gr.St.A.6/1,p.327.]

Thus, Hölderlin and Plato are in complete agreement on this point: the idealising tendency of mankind is divinely inspired, not instinctive. As Wichmann points out: "So angesehen ist diese Unbewußtheit freilich etwas sehr Ehrenvolles...".¹⁰

The poet's rôle in the process, and in relation to anamnesis, comes out in "Menons Klagen" at the end of the sixth stanza:

Wenn es drunten ertönt, und ihre Schätze die Nacht
zollt,
Und aus Bächen herauf glänzt das begrabene Gold.
[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.77.]

The "begrabene Gold" is the Absolute or the knowledge thereof, "die Nacht" is the unconscious, not of an individual but of mankind. The reference to "Bäche" emphasises the naturalness of the process, which cannot be forced; therefore its medium or vessel has to be someone who is sensitive to such natural processes in a world-historical sense, in fact a poet rather than simply a philosopher (but admittedly a poet with a thorough knowledge and understanding of philosophy). The philosopher per se, being limited to what he can prove definitively by the logic of an argument, is by his very nature unable to avail himself of the same opportunities.

This poem is by no means the only place in Hölderlin's work where this idea comes out. For example, in "Mnemosyne", the very title of the poem - *Μνημοσύνη* has the primary meaning "memory", and then became the proper name for the mother of the Muses, possibly because memory played such an important part in the arts, particularly poetry, in early Greek society - refers us to the idea of *Ἐνάμνησις*, memory of a deeper, more metaphysical kind which is, for a man developing a theory of "Mythologie der Vernunft", the source of inspiration for the participants in all the arts. In the poem itself, we find in the first stanza a reference to the murky possibilities which threaten if the emotions ignore the mind or vice versa:¹¹

... Aber bös sind
Die Pfade. Nämlich unrecht,
Wie Rosse, gehn die gefangenen
Element' und alten
Gesetze der Erd. Und immer
Ins Ungebundene gehet eine Sehnsucht.
[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.197.]

Then the great secret is revealed:

Vorwärts aber und rückwärts wollen wir
Nicht sehn. Uns wiegen lassen, wie
Auf schwankem Kahne der See.

[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.197.]

This secret can be applied to the world-historical or the private, individual context. Hölderlin is depicting a situation of ἑκστασις as in Sophokles' tragedies. The dynamic element of change which rules the world and our lives for the most part has given way to a stillness, a 'peace beyond understanding'. This is the condition which it is the individual's and mankind's aim to achieve. Hölderlin, as I hope to show, saw art as the prime means of achieving this state, which might be termed, following Jung, "the identity of the conscious and the unconscious", or the ultimate achievement of the state recommended by the Delphic oracle: γνῶθι σεαυτόν. The ἑκστασις is a result of achieving a balance between dialectically opposed forces: mind and passions, conscious and unconscious, state and people, etc..

These ideas are not, in themselves, strictly philosophical. But we have already seen that Hölderlin saw art as embodying truths more profound than those that are within the reach of a strictly philosophical argument. One can relate this to the passage in the "Systemprogramm": "... weder Gott noch Unsterblichkeit außer sich suchen dürfen". [Gr.St.A.4/1,p.298.] . If an individual wishes to find any sort of ultimate truth with absolute value, he cannot expect to find it simply by the logic of an argument. The argument can take you so far, but its ultimate end is something incommunicable to others who have not shared the experience. This I take to be an important ingredient in Hölderlin's apparently extravagant claims for poetry, and his constant call for humility before Nature.

"Anamnesis" for Plato can be seen, at least in his earlier works, to occupy a similar position. In the "Mnemosyne" poem, if I am right in equating Mnemosyne, Mother of the Muses, with the Platonist doctrine of

"anamnesis", the lines in the last stanza take on a special mythic significance:

Am Kithäron aber lag
Eleutherä, der Mnemosyne Stadt. Der auch, als
Ablegte den Mantel Gott, das Abendliche nachher
löste,
Die Locken. Himmlische nämlich sind
Unwillig, wenn einer nicht die Seele schonend sich
Zusammengenommen, aber er muß doch; dem
Gleich fehlet die Trauer.
[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.198.]

Mnemosyne's town, Eleutherä (ἐλευθερία = "freedom"), can be seen as an attempt on Hölderlin's part to equate the ideas of Truth and Freedom: only in a free society can man develop his inner capabilities to the full; only when the individual is free can he fulfil himself. When the Greek "Gipfel der Zeit" ended, knowledge of the Eternal Truths disappeared at the same time as political freedom. Humility ["wenn einer nicht die Seele schonend sich/ Zusammengenommen"] is crucial in the search for truth.

The analogy can be drawn here between the tyranny of the mind over passions and political tyranny - the tyrant thinks he knows best what is good for the people and represses the latter's independent desires; in the same way the conscious mind or reason thinks it knows best what rôle the passions and the unconscious should play and runs the risk of repressing them. The ideal is a balance between state and people, which are not identical - the idea that political freedom can be achieved or retained without a sense of responsibility is not implied, but Hölderlin saw mankind as a general rule as having a tendency to idealise (but also a contrary tendency: "Nämlich unrecht..."). When this tendency to idealise is allowed to develop freely, all is well. A similar set of criteria applies to the individual: each human being is a composite of good and 'bad' tendencies. The 'bad' tendencies are not in themselves evil: they are neutral. It is only repression which turns them into

the wrong channel, and can ultimately cause an explosion of these repressed forces.

The ideal balance is achieved when the individual "die Seele schonend sich/ Zusammengenommen...". But this is difficult to achieve if the individual is striving for the Absolute or consciously attempting to idealise. The great heroes were really great, but their greatness led them to forget themselves at times and lose their humility. This is the tragic dilemma expressed in the short phrase : "aber er muß doch". If the hero does not attempt anything, he will never achieve anything. We have gone into this matter in the chapter on Sophokles.

However, if we turn back now to the Kantian aspect of the problem, it will be of interest to investigate the psychological basis of his theory of "Spontaneität", within the general context of his philosophy. Kant's ideas about the unconscious were formed within the context of the profound differences on the subject which obtained at that period between the Anglo-Saxon Empiricists on the one hand and the Continental Rationalists on the other. The most famous debate was that between Locke and Leibniz: Locke with his idea of the 'tabula rasa' denying the possibility of innate ideas.

Kant's position on this question is somewhat complex. He agrees with Locke on the difficulty, if not impossibility, of assuming the existence of "Vorstellungen" of which one is not conscious. However, he sees an answer to the problem in the idea of recovering them through "Schlüsse".

Kant compares the human soul with a large "Karte" on which some spots are illuminated and others not. The dark spots are the realm of "dunkle Vorstellungen", the bright parts that of the "klare Vorstellungen", the very brightest that of the "deutliche Vorstellungen". The dark part, as Kant sees it, is by far the largest area in the soul.

This is at first sight a remarkably modern psychological theory, and indeed, as Vladimir Satura points

out: "Wenn diese Lehre Kants vom Unbewußten mit jener der heutigen Psychologie verglichen wird, sieht man, daß sie die Hauptaspekte des Unbewußten eher nur berührt als allseitig ausarbeitet.... Von den heute üblichen Klassen fehlt ihm nur das Verdrängt-Unbewußte und das Kollektiv Unbewußte."¹² There is no need to assume any direct influence from Kant to see that Hölderlin understood the consequences of Kant's thought in this direction and extended the concept as appropriate for his own post-Fichteian system of ideas. This involved the addition of the very ideas or types of the unconscious that Satura sees as being excluded from Kant's scheme of things: "das Verdrängt-Unbewußte", in the shape of the "Rosse" going out of control in "Mnemosyne", for example, and "das Kollektiv-Unbewußte" in the shape of "Erinnerung", "Gedächtnis" etc. throughout his works.

This brings us back to Plato. As Satura again points out, "die Idee selbst von der Existenz des Unbewußten geht auf Plato zurück und zieht sich durch die ganze rationalistische Tradition".¹³ The process of recovering truths from the unconscious described by Kant is closely related to Plato's dialectics, whereby the truth can be brought to light or uncovered. This is the process described by Hölderlin (in the letter to his brother dated 4/6+1799) as being the main function of philosophy: "Die Philosophie bringt jenen Trieb zu idealisieren zum Bewußtsein..." [Gr.St.A.6/1, p.329.]

In Plato's philosophy there is a close relationship between the *διαλεκτική τέχνη*, the *μαευτική τέχνη* and anamnesis: the *διαλεκτική τέχνη* originally applied to the process of argument and counter-argument in a debate, but Plato also uses it (for example, in "Theaitetus" 189 E - 190 A) to apply to an internal dialectical process of thinking which leads to a 'judgment' (*δόξα*) formed by the person concerned, this being the culminating point of the dialectical process; the *μαευτική τέχνη*, as in "Meno" 85c to 86c, for example, is the process of realising or releasing the 'idea' (*εἶδος* or

ἰδέα) in a human being by means of the questioning so favoured by Sokrates; the connection with anamnesis lies in the common factor of awakening something which lies dormant, in this case Δόξαι or 'judgments', which are present in everyone's unconscious. As we have seen, this procedure is very relevant to Hölderlin's theory of tragedy: "Alles ist Rede gegen Rede, die sich gegenseitig aufhebt". [Gr.St.A.5,p.201.]. Here we can also note that the aspect of Hölderlin's theory of prosody and aesthetics known as the "Wechsel der Töne" shows clear signs of having been influenced by Plato's dialectics: in Hölderlin's note on "der Rhein",¹⁴ for example, the actual procedure of "Progreß und Regreß" is the dialectical process itself and the point reached in the last triad, where everything is "mit durchgängiger Metapher... ausgeglichen", is the culminating point in Plato's dialectics, where the Δόξα is formed. The dialectical process in "der Rhein" is very different from the pessimism of Kant's dialectics, destined merely for the "Auflösung der Trugschlüsse", and, perhaps less obviously, from the dialectics of Hegel's system: there is no direct progress from thesis + antithesis to synthesis but rather an alternating process of analysis and synthesis. The "Entgegensetzung" Hölderlin refers to is that between Plato's two principles of analysis and synthesis or διαίρεσις and συναγωγή, in the sense that, for example, in the first Triad there is a "Progreß" in the "Form" from the particular ("Im dunkeln Efeu saß ich...") to the general ("Doch unverständig ist/Das Wünschen vor dem Schicksal..."), while the second Triad ("der Form nach... entgegengesetzt") goes from the general ("Ein Rätsel ist Reinentsprungenes. Auch/Der Gesang kaum darf es enthüllen.") to the particular ("...Der Vater Rhein, und liebe Kinder nährt/In Städten, die er gegründet."). These two opposites are not followed by a synthesis. They are rather counter-balanced by a concurrent unity in the "Stoff", in that both Triads deal with the course of the Rhine.

The third and fourth stanzas form a direct parallel

but at the same time a dialectical opposite: "der Form nach gleich, dem Stoff nach entgegengesetzt", in that they both end in a "harmonischer Ausgleich" ("...unbezwungen, lächelnd..." , "...Gutes mehr/Denn Böses findend...") but have different "Stoffe" (human destiny in general in the third Triad, Rousseau and his ideas in the fourth Triad).

The culminating point of the dialectical process comes in the fifth and final Triad, which contains the Σ , in Plato's terminology, beginning with the lines:

Dann feiern das Brautfest Menschen und Götter,
Es feiern die Lebenden all,
Und ausgeglichen
Ist eine Weile das Schicksal.

[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.147.]

The union of the divine and the human, the reaching of the Absolute, is a temporary circumstance ("... eine Weile...") rather than a permanent synthesis. This is a necessary result of its character as an experience rather than a "Begriff" in the Hegelian sense.

Then, in the centre of the last Triad, we have the important lines:

... bis in den Tod
Kann aber ein Mensch auch
Im Gedächtnis doch das Beste behalten,
Und dann erlebt er das Höchste.
Nur hat ein jeder sein Maß.
Denn schwer ist zu tragen
Das Unglück, aber schwerer das Glück.
Ein Weiser aber vermocht es
Vom Mittag bis in die Mitternacht,
Und bis der Morgen erglänzte,
Beim Gastmahl helle zu bleiben.

[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.148.]

It is impossible to have a permanent experience of the Absolute, but man can retain "das Beste" and "dann" (ie. on his death) he can experience "das Höchste". The manner in which he can retain "das Beste" is of particular interest to us within the context of this chapter: "Im Gedächtnis". This is not the simple memory, I would suggest, but anamnesis, the source of the knowledge of

"das Beste" (τὸ καλόν) for Plato and for Hölderlin. The man 'remembers' "das Beste" from having experienced it at exceptional moments of his life, but also from before his birth.

The connection with Plato is further reinforced by the reference to Sokrates ("Ein Weiser") who in Plato's "Symposium" (223 B-D) is reported to have discoursed on the subject of tragedy and comedy through the night, remaining bright and awake after having reduced Aristophanes and Agathon to sleep. In Hölderlin's poem, I would suggest that the terms "Mittag", "Mitternacht" and "Morgen" take on an additional symbolic significance as stages in man's life, which would imply that the "Gastmahl" also has a secondary meaning, as life itself. Man's great task in life is to remain awake and watchful - "helle zu bleiben" - through all these stages, to the end of his life.

After this culminating point of the poem, the last stanza takes on a more specifically religious or Christian tone: "Dir mag... Gott erscheinen", "und nimmer ist dir/Verborgen das Lächeln des Herrschers...". The work then ends with the return to night and "Uralte Verwirrung".

However that may be, the most important points for us in the present context are the Platonist dialectical process which takes one to the Absolute (however temporarily) and the retention of "das Beste" or τὸ καλόν "im Gedächtnis". The dialectical process in Plato is, as Natorp puts it, "Grundlage der Philosophie überhaupt oder in andrer Wendung ... ihr höchster Gipfel".¹⁵ It will therefore be readily apparent why Hölderlin, as a Platonist, laid such stress on it in his poems, especially from about the time of "der Rhein" (1801) onwards, and why it was of such great importance to him, as he puts it in the "Anmerkungen zum Oedipus", "die Poesie, auch bei uns, den Unterschied der Zeiten und Verfassungen abgerechnet, zur μνηστῆρ der Alten [zu erheben]". [Gr.St.A.5,p.195.] This peculiarity of his aesthetic theory is further

described in the "Anmerkungen zur Antigonä" as follows:

So wie nämlich immer die Philosophie nur ein Vermögen der Seele behandelt, so daß die Darstellung dieses Einen Vermögens ein Ganzes macht, und das bloße Zusammenhängen der Glieder dieses Einen Vermögens Logik genannt wird, so behandelt die Poesie die verschiedenen Vermögen des Menschen, so daß die Darstellung dieser verschiedenen Vermögen ein Ganzes macht, und das Zusammenhängen der selbstständigeren Teile der verschiedenen Vermögen der Rhythmus, im höhern Sinne, oder das kalkulable Gesetz genannt werden kann.

[Gr.St.A.5,p.265.]

"Die Poesie", unlike philosophy, is concerned with the whole man, with all his faculties. We have seen how important this was for Hölderlin in the chapter on Empedokles. Here, we can note the rôle he ascribed to the "kalkulable Gesetz", his poetic version of Plato's $\delta\iota\alpha\lambda\epsilon\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\ \tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\eta\eta$. If one looks at a poem such as "der Rhein" simply from the poet's point of view, it is an example of the $\delta\iota\alpha\lambda\epsilon\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\ \tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\eta\eta$: the poet follows his own dialectical thought process which ultimately leads him to the orgasmic culminating point - the Absolute. The artistic process is not simply a spontaneous outpouring. The poet must work hard and soberly on the technical aspects of his craft. As Hölderlin puts it in "Reflexion":

Da wo die Nüchternheit dich verläßt, da ist die Grenze deiner Begeisterung. Der große Dichter ist niemals von sich selbst verlassen, er mag sich so weit über sich selbst erheben, als er will. Man kann auch in die Höhe fallen, so wie in die Tiefe.

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.233.]

The $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\eta\eta$ of the poet is the fixed, conscious aspect of his work. The production of a poem is dependent on achieving a balance or happy synthesis between the $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\eta\eta$ and the "Begeisterung", the unconscious element. Or, to put it in orthodox Platonist terms: the $\delta\iota\alpha\lambda\epsilon\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\ \tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\eta\eta$ of the poet's thought leads to the uncovering of a $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ already present in the poet's unconscious (and ultimately in mankind's unconscious per se).

If we turn now to the relationship of the poet to his

audience, we will see that for Hölderlin this was an example of ἡ μαλιντική τέχνη . We have already seen how Hölderlin believed that art could draw an audience upwards to a vision of the Absolute. This it was able to do because of a characteristic of art described by Hölderlin in the letter to his brother dated 4/6/1799:

"Die schöne Kunst stellt jenem Triebe zu idealisieren sein unendliches Objekt in einem lebendigen Bilde, in einer dargestellten höhern Welt dar..." [Gr.St.A.6/1,p.329]

Art, like philosophy, is concerned with the "unendliches Objekt" of man's urge to idealise: τὸ καλόν or the Absolute. The difference lies in the fact that art is able to show man this "Objekt" in a "lebendiges Bild": the "daemonic" aspect of a work of art is able to affect the emotions of the audience or reader while, at the same time, the intellectual content occupies his mind. The orgasmic emotional release occasioned by a great work of art is not merely emotional; if the artist is a real master of his craft, it will involve the audience's ^{same} faculties in their totality in much the way as the creative act itself involves all the poet's faculties. Thus, the achievement of the identity of the conscious and the unconscious is possible only through a work of art. A work of philosophy, occupying as it does only one of man's faculties, cannot achieve the same effect. This effect is described by Hölderlin in the "Grund zum Empedokles" in the following terms:

Dies Gefühl gehört vielleicht zum höchsten, was gefühlt werden kann, wenn beide Entgegengesetzte, der verallgemeinerte geistig lebendige künstlich rein aorgische Mensch und die Wohlgestalt der Natur sich begegnen. Dies Gefühl gehört vielleicht zum höchsten, was der Mensch erfahren kann, denn die jetzige Harmonie mahnt ihn an das vormalige umgekehrte reine Verhältnis, und er fühlt sich und die Natur zweifach, und die Verbindung ist unendlicher.

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.153.]

This may be compared with the famous section at the end of Schelling's "System des Transzendentalen Idea-

lismus:

Die Kunst ist eben deswegen dem Philosophen das Höchste, weil sie ihm das Allerheiligste gleichsam öffnet, wo in ewiger und ursprünglicher Vereinigung gleichsam in Einer Flamme brennt, was in der Natur und Geschichte gesondert ist, und was im Leben und Handeln, ebenso wie im Denken, ewig sich fliehen muß. Die Ansicht, welche der Philosoph von der Natur künstlich sich macht, ist für die Kunst die ursprüngliche und natürliche.¹⁶

The effect of a work of art is dependent, in Hölderlin's terms, on the awakening of a memory of a "vormalige Harmonie" - the harmony of the "intellektuale Anschauung" in "Urteil und Sein" - by a temporary re-establishment of that harmony. In other words: anamnesis is the basis of all art.¹⁷ Hölderlin saw his work's special significance in the fact that he combined in his poems the two main methods mentioned by Plato for reaching the truth: the "divine fury" of the poet and the *Διαλεκτικὴ Τέχνη* of the philosopher. The metaphysical basis of Hölderlin's dialectics or "Wechsel der Töne" may seem dubious,¹⁸ but there can be little doubt that he took it seriously. This comes out clearly at the beginning of his essay "Über die Verfahrungsweise des poetischen Geistes":

Wenn der Dichter einmal des Geistes mächtig ist, wenn er die gemeinschaftliche Seele, die allem gemein und jedem eigen ist, gefühlt und sich zugeeignet, sie festgehalten, sich ihrer versichert hat, wenn er ferner der freien Bewegung, des harmonischen Wechsels und Fortstrebens, worin der Geist sich in sich selber und in anderen zu reproduzieren geneigt ist, wenn er des schönen im Ideale des Geistes vorgezeichneten Progresses und seiner poetischen Folgerungsweise gewiß ist...

[Gr.St.A.4/1, p.241.]

The phrase "die gemeinschaftliche Seele, die allem gemein und jedem eigen ist" is a reference to the *ἕν καὶ πᾶν*, the doctrine of the interpenetration of the one and the whole, and can be compared with the lines in "Wie wenn am Feiertage...":

... Des gemeinsamen Geistes Gedanken sind,
Still endend, in der Seele des Dichters...
[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.119.]

Thus, the poet has a special gift for "Selbstvertiefung", by virtue of which he can find within himself, in the depths of his unconscious, truths of universal validity. As we have noted above, Hölderlin was a direct forerunner of the psychologist Jung in this respect. The latter's doctrine of the Collective Unconscious is directly parallel to Hölderlin's idea.

The "frei^e Bewegung... worin der Geist sich in sich selber und in anderen zu reproduzieren geneigt ist" is the dialectical process of "Wechsel der Töne", which is seen as a universal law of thought. It is not a conscious, careful logical argument but a "freie Bewegung" of self-revelation of the spirit, a process similar to that envisaged by Heidegger as being the main rôle of the philosopher. To Heidegger, as to Hölderlin, the truth reveals itself in the act of philosophising. The philosopher does not propound carefully elaborated theories or doctrines - he philosophises. This is very similar to the *διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη* of Plato - Sokrates, in the dialogues, does not give out a set system of dogmas to be learned by rote, but rather uses his question-and-answer technique to approach or discover the truth there and then. This freedom and spontaneity of the dialectical process in Plato's dialogues, I would maintain, was an inspiration for Hölderlin in his later work, and formed the intellectual basis for the theory of "Wechsel der Töne".¹⁹ For Hölderlin, the great poet is the man who is aware of this universal law of thought, which enables him to bring to light "des gemeinsamen Geistes Gedanken". In other words, he is conscious of the existence of the Absolute and of how to reach it.

An interesting example of anamnesis being applied to the sphere of ethics, rather than aesthetics or metaphysics, is provided by a line in one of the "hymnische

Entwürfe":

Im Gedächtnis aber lebet Philoktetes...

[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.224.]

This line is of particular interest in that it provides an example in Hölderlin of what one thinks of more often as the Kantian and Fichtean concern with ethics. It is therefore interesting to note that "Gedächtnis" is the basis of Philoktetes' behaviour, rather than any Moral Law.²⁰ Philoktetes was, of course, the hero of one of Sophokles' plays: the physically weak but morally strong opponent of the unscrupulous Odysseus, who represents the principle of "might is right". Hölderlin's view of Odysseus is clear from his first essay "Über Achill":

Von Ulyß konnte [Homer] Sachen genug beschreiben. Dieser ist ein Sack voll Scheidemünze, wo man lange zu zählen hat, mit dem Gold ist man viel baldert fertig.

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.224.]

Here Hölderlin is arguably seeing Odysseus through Sophokles' eyes rather than Homer's.

In connecting the idea of "Gedächtnis" with Philoktetes, Hölderlin is implying that anamnesis is the source of moral as well as metaphysical truth. One might be tempted to object that Philoktetes' attitude is more an example of Kant's Moral Law at work: he does what is right of his own free will, not from any desire to achieve a given end. As John Kemp puts it:

... in obeying the moral law for the sake of the law alone, the will is autonomous because it is obeying a law which it imposes on itself.²¹

However, Hölderlin associates Philoktetes' name with "Gedächtnis", not "Gesetz". There is no hint of Kantian "universalisability". This can be explained in terms of the general synthesising tendency of the Post-Kantians,²² and their starting point (in the case of Schiller and Hölderlin, at least) in the third "Kritik", with its notions of aesthetic intuition and so on. Like Kant,

Hölderlin was impressed by Rousseau's theory of 'bonté naturelle', and as a result drew the basically logical conclusion that men acted correctly, if they did, not by virtue of having gained conscious understanding of any law, but by virtue of something in-born. He connected this, again quite logically and consistently, with Plato's idea of 'anamnesis'. Kant explained evil in terms of an "Abfall" from 'bonté naturelle'. For example, in "die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft", we have the following argument:

Wie es nun möglich sei, daß ein natürlicher-
weise böser Mensch sich selbst zum guten Menschen
mache, das übersteigt alle unsere Begriffe; denn
wie kann ein böser Baum gute Früchte bringen?...

Die Wiederherstellung der ursprünglichen An-
lage zum Guten in uns ist also nicht Erwerbung
einer verlorenen Triebfeder zum Guten; denn
diese, die in der Achtung fürs moralische Gesetz
besteht, haben wir nie verlieren können, und wäre
das letztere möglich, so würden wir sie auch nie
wiedererwerben.²⁵

Hölderlin's ideas on the subject, as we have seen, are somewhat more complex, involving such modern notions as repression. However, this much Hölderlin always retained in common with Kant: he never lost his belief in the basic, original goodness of man, however evil his actions might be from time to time.

Thus, we find that "Gedächtnis" or ^a ~~am~~nesis is the ultimate source of all knowledge in the fields of metaphysics, aesthetics and ethics. For Hölderlin, the truths embodied in works and actions in all three fields spring from inside the person concerned rather than being imposed from without. Similarly, "Spontaneität" in Kant is an active principle whereby man acts as a free agent, following an inner light of his own. The highest form of this free activity (for Hölderlin) is the 'divine fury' of the poet, in Platonist terms. Already for Kant, poetry is the highest art form, as he makes clear at the beginning of Section 53 of the third "Kritik":

Unter allen behauptet die Dichtkunst (die fast gänzlich dem Genie ihren Ursprung verdankt, und am wenigsten durch Vorschrift, oder durch Beispiele geleitet sein will) den obersten Rang. Sie erweitert das Gemüt dadurch, daß sie die Einbildungskraft in Freiheit setzt und innerhalb den Schranken eines gegebenen Begriffs, unter der unbegrenzten Mannigfaltigkeit möglicher damit zusammenstimmender Formen, diejenige darbietet, welche die Darstellung desselben mit einer Gedankenfülle verknüpft, der kein Sprachausdruck völlig adäquat ist, und sich also ästhetisch zu Ideen erhebt. Sie stärkt das Gemüt, indem sie es sein freies, selbsttätiges und von der Naturbestimmung unabhängiges Vermögen fühlen läßt, die Natur, als Erscheinung, nach Ansichten zu betrachten und zu beurteilen, die sie nicht von selbst, weder für den Sinn noch den Verstand in der Erfahrung darbietet, und sie also zum Behuf und gleichsam zum Schema des Übersinnlichen zu gebrauchen.²⁴

Thus, in Kant also, ethics and aesthetics have this element in common, that their basis is in each case a spontaneous outpouring. Similarly, in Hölderlin, Philoktetes is spontaneously right in a moral sense, due to "Gedächtnis"; Hölderlin himself is spontaneously right in a moral sense, due to "Gedächtnis".

I would not care to suggest that the three thinkers we have been considering in this chapter - Plato, Kant and Hölderlin - would have agreed with each other entirely across the board. In particular, as I have mentioned, Hölderlin would have disapproved, I am sure, of Plato's turn towards rationalism from "the Republic" onwards. He also extended Kant's ideas, no doubt, beyond what Kant himself would have approved of. However, Hölderlin's basic philosophical concerns and, in general terms, his conclusions are in harmony with those of Kant and (perhaps to a lesser extent) Plato. Hölderlin's life's work (and also Schelling's) can be seen largely as a logical extension of Kant's 'God, Freedom and Immortality'. In this sense, I would maintain that Hölderlin and Schelling were Kant's true successors. Neither Fichte nor Hegel maintained Kant's theistic belief in a God recognisable as such - the Absolute Ego and "Geist",

however noble and all-pervasive they may be, are hardly comparable. Fichte's ideas on God are complex and controversial. He himself was most indignant at the accusation of atheism which cost him his professorship at Jena in 1799. However, in his earlier writings, God is seldom mentioned, and an equation of the Absolute Ego with God is scarcely in harmony with the spirit of the 'Wissens-²⁵schaftslehre'. It is only in his later period, with such works as Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben, oder auch die Religionslehre (1805-06), that a strong Christian element seems to enter his thought. Fichte had seen the need to go behind consciousness to find its ultimate ground (in God). Whether one sees his later work as a logical consequence of his earlier writings or not, the fact remains that the religious element is much more prominent in the later period.

I say that Hölderlin's and Schelling's ideas are perhaps less in harmony with orthodox Platonism. However, this must be qualified by the reminder that Plato's theories concerning Eros, Anamnesis, the Dialectics and Divine Fury are completely in harmony with their thought and were almost certainly major influences on Hölderlin when he was formulating his philosophical system. The element of disharmony or contradiction stems simply from the fact that Plato changed his mind and, in particular, started to doubt the desirability (if not the adequacy) of his early ideas concerning Eros and Divine Fury. Hölderlin, being a poet himself and coming under the influence of Kant's anti-rationalism and democratic, Rousseauan ideals, could not accept this turn in Plato's thought. For this reason, one must surely conclude that, of all the Greek philosophers, Empedokles - not Plato - was the one that Hölderlin would have found himself in most complete agreement with: Empedokles was a poet, accepted Divine Fury and was a democratic politician. With that conclusion, we can now leave the Greeks behind, and examine more closely the development of Hölderlin's system from the awakening of his philosophical interests to the full maturity of his ideas.

CHAPTER FIVE : "BETWEEN KANT and HEGEL"

The period in German philosophy with which we deal in this chapter was a crucial one in many ways. With Hume's help, Kant had dismantled the oppressive rationalist dogmatism of Leibniz, and had proceeded to investigate the possibilities of the human mind, and of metaphysical knowledge. The ultimate questions of philosophy, the questions which interest every member of the human race according to their various capacities for ruminating on the subject - does life have a meaning? is there a God? will any part of me survive the death of my body? - these, the very questions whose answers men are likely to seek in the works of a philosopher, Kant left largely unanswered. In his ethical writings, he was concerned to establish the autonomy of the will, in other words to free moral action from any religious basis in revealed commandments, and also from metaphysical determinism such as that implied by Spinoza's system. In this, he might perhaps be seen as performing a function similar to that of the Chinese sages who, without making any claim to knowledge of any god or of anything that might be termed super-natural or meta-physical, confined themselves to drawing up rules for human conduct in this life which will maximalise individual contentment and the stability of society. At various points in his works, however, Kant brings in God (whose existence he nowhere proves, but simply assumes on the basis of equivocal empirical evidence) as a necessary prop to his moral system.¹ Before one accepts Kant's ethics 'in ₂ toto', one has to accept his assumptions concerning God. Thus, it might be maintained that Kant is leaving the door wide open for atheism and radical nihilism in metaphysics and ethics. This is a problem which concerned the younger generation of German intellectuals deeply - one thinks of Kleist, with his "Kantkrise", which may

have been a contributing factor in his ultimate suicide, persuading him that it was futile to remain in a world where nothing important could be known or proved.

This concern was voiced with particular clarity and force by Jean Paul Richter in the section of his novel "Siebenkäs" entitled "Rede des toten Christus vom Weltgebäude herab, daß kein Gott sei":

...[Ich] erschrak... über den giftigen Dampf, der dem Herzen dessen, der zum ersten Mal in das atheistische Lehrgebäude tritt, erstickend entgegenzieht. Ich will mit geringern Schmerzen die Unsterblichkeit als die Gottheit leugnen: dort verlier' ich nichts als eine mit Nebeln bedeckte Welt, hier verlier' ich die gegenwärtige, nämlich die Sonne derselben; das ganze geistige Universum wird durch die Hand des Atheismus zersprengt und zerschlagen in zahllose quecksilberne Punkte von Ichs, welche blinken, rinnen, irren, zusammen- und auseinanderfliehen, ohne Einheit und Bestand...

Auch hab' ich die Absicht, mit meiner Dichtung einige lesende oder gelesene Magister in Furcht zu setzen, da wahrlich diese Leute jetzo, seitdem sie als Bauefangne beim Wasserbau und der Grubenzimmerung der kritischen Philosophie in Tagelohn genommen worden, das Dasein Gottes so kaltblütig und kaltherzig erwägen, als ob vom Dasein des Kraken und Einhorns die Rede wäre.³

Now, this is the problem that a whole generation of German writers and thinkers set themselves to solve. For our purposes, five names are outstanding: Fichte, Schiller, Hölderlin, Schelling, Hegel. Their quest was for knowledge, understanding and, if possible, proof concerning the questions Kant had left unanswered or in doubt. Many years later, Friedrich Nietzsche described their quest, and this whole period of German thought, in the following terms:

Es kam der Honigmond der deutschen Philosophie; alle jungen Theologen des Tübinger Stiftes gingen alsbald in die Büsche - alle suchten nach 'Vermögen'. Und was fand man nicht alles - in jener unschuldigen, reichen, noch jugendlichen Zeit des deutschen Geistes, in welche die Romantik, die boshafte Fee, hineinblies, hineinsang, damals, als man 'finden' und 'erfinden' noch nicht auseinanderzuhalten wußte! Vor allem ein Vermögen

fürs 'Übersinnliche': Schelling taufte es die intellektuale Anschauung... Man kann dieser ganzen übermütigen und schwärmerischen Bewegung, welche Jugend war, so kühn sie sich auch in graue und greisenhafte Begriffe verkleidete, gar nicht mehr Unrecht tun, als wenn man sie ernst nimmt und gar etwa mit moralischer Entrüstung behandelt; genug, man wurde älter, - der Traum verflog.⁴

I hope to show that the condescension and disdain with which Nietzsche treats the philosophical efforts of the Romantics are completely unjustifiable, and are merely a symptom of the sad decline of German philosophical debate in the course of the nineteenth century, the 'argumentum ad hominem' having replaced reason and logic as the main debating technique. The philosophical position which Nietzsche regards as 'realistic' and, by inference, adult, is in fact the position that filled the Romantics with such horror and dismay.

It is an interesting point that Nietzsche blamed Kant for the "excesses" of the Romantics. In Nietzsche's words, Kant "war stolz darauf, im Menschen ein neues Vermögen, das Vermögen zu synthetischen Urteilen a priori,⁵ entdeckt zu haben. Gesetzt, daß er sich hierin selbst betrog: aber die Entwicklung und rasche Blüte der deutschen Philosophie hängt an diesem Stolze und an dem Wettstreit aller Jüngerer, womöglich noch Stolzeres zu entdecken..."⁶

Now, it lies outwith the scope of this thesis to attempt an in-depth analysis of Kant's philosophy, but one point might be made here briefly: Kant's philosophical opus, despite the destructive aspects of his early attacks on rationalism, was basically constructive in character. He was concerned to form a solid philosophical basis upon which mankind could advance in all intellectual fields towards ever greater enlightenment. Nietzsche, on the other hand, was in all essentials a destructive thinker, concerned to show that all such hopes are illusory, and that human existence is ultimately meaningless.

This fundamental difference can be adduced as an interesting example of the phenomenon noted by Fichte and Jaspers: the influence of a person's basic character and outlook on his choice of philosophical stance. However this may be, one must not lose sight of the fact that either the Romantics are right and Nietzsche was wrong or Nietzsche was right and the Romantics were wrong; either God exists, or he does not exist; either life has a meaning or it has no meaning; either each one of us possesses an immortal soul, or he possesses no such thing. Let us proceed to examine the evidence in favour of the more optimistic viewpoint.

At the beginning of the 1790's, there were several signs that Kant's philosophical position was regarded widely as inadequate in certain respects. The criticisms and the developments of Kant's work can perhaps best be arranged according to their main focus or starting point in his work. Fichte, for example, with his overwhelming preoccupation with ethics, was largely concerned with the second "Kritik", whereas Schiller, Hölderlin and Schelling were taken up more with the third. Let us first consider Fichte's innovations.

One of the main points in Kant's work which worried Fichte was the "Ding an sich". He saw it as a dangerous remnant of dogmatic rationalism in the critical philosophy. This unknowable entity, outwith the grasp of human cognition, was in Fichte's view inconsistent with the general liberating spirit of Kant's work, and a threat to the freedom of man and to his supremacy over Nature - hence Fichte's need to posit a supra-individual mind or subject which is not subject to the limitations of Kant's individual "Ich". Fichte, in his mature works, expresses his opposition to the determinism of the Spinozan system, which he sees as the main alternative to his own, and which, interestingly enough, he does not claim is wrong - simply undesirable and unacceptable! This is what Copleston⁷ means by the term "one-sided exaggeration" in reference to Fichte's position (and

Hegel's) - this "Ego-centric" form of Idealism neglected the aspect of the truth Spinoza had understood (here we see the roots of Schelling's philosophy of Nature).

Thus, in Fichte's system, we have an all-powerful "Ich" or subject (representing mankind, if you will, or its intellectual faculties and efforts), which is completely dominant over the "Nicht-Ich" (which might be equated with Nature or matter). Now, in his "Differenzschrift" (1801), Hegel went into a thorough critique of Fichte's position, making it clear why Hölderlin, Schelling and he found it necessary to go beyond it in their own work. The basic problem is that posed by the opposition and mutual limitation of the "Ich" and the "Nicht-Ich". Fichte claims that his "Ich" is infinite and unlimited in its scope. But it finds itself opposed by the "Nicht-Ich", which would appear to impose a limitation on the scope of the "Ich",⁸ exactly what Fichte was attempting to avoid when he posited the "Ich" originally. In Hegel's words:

Diesen Widerspruch sucht Fichte zu vereinigen, aber dessenungeachtet läßt er den Grundschaten des Dualismus bestehen; so ist er nicht aufgelöst, und das Letzte ist nur ein Sollen, Bestreben, Sehnen. 9

This problem was the cause of Schelling's interest in Spinoza's philosophy of Nature and in the ancient concept of the *ἑκ-στανσις*. To Fichte, Philosophical Idealism and the Spinozan system were irreconcilable opposites. Schelling, however, sought to perfect Idealism by the inclusion of Spinoza's philosophy of Nature. His aim was to take the starting-point of Kant and Fichte (the "Ich") and the starting-point of Spinoza (God), and incorporate them both into his own system, thereby overcoming the flaws in the previous systems of Idealism.

We have already seen how Schiller, Hölderlin and Schelling, unlike Fichte, took Kant's third "Kritik" as their starting-point. This is of particular interest

in view of the fact that it was in this "Kritik" that Kant made his major attempt to solve the problem of the unknowable thing-in-itself, by means of the 'aesthetic intuition'. In the "Kritik der reinen Vernunft", Kant had dealt with the theoretical activities of human reason and its limitations. In the "Kritik der praktischen Vernunft", he had dealt with practical thinking. Now, in the "Kritik der Urteilskraft", he considers the following question:

Ob nun die Urteilskraft, die in der Ordnung unserer Erkenntnisvermögen zwischen dem Verstande und der Vernunft ein Mittelglied ausmacht, auch für sich Prinzipien a priori habe...¹⁰

The wider implications of this investigation are described by Copleston, in a remarkably interesting passage of his "History of Philosophy", in terms of "the problem of reconciling the scientific view of the world as a mechanical system with the demands of the moral and religious consciousness".¹¹ Copleston finds it "arguable" that, in attempting to solve this problem, "[Kant] left us with 'a bifurcated reality'".¹² The difficulty he sees is the following:

There is no valid reason for asserting that the phenomenal world is the only reality. But at the same time there is no theoretical proof of the existence of a supersensuous reality. It is a matter of practical faith, resting on the moral consciousness.¹³

Copleston concludes:

It is true that in the third 'Critique' Kant endeavoured to bridge the gulf between the two worlds to the extent in which he considered this to be possible for the human mind. But it is understandable if other philosophers were not satisfied with his performance...¹⁴

Thus, in this respect, Kant's third "Kritik" might with some justification, be regarded as his most important work, or at least his most constructive work.

Although Kant does deal with works of art in this work, in general he subordinates them to the beauties of

Nature, and seems to maintain that these works are to be valued in proportion to the extent to which they partake of these beauties.¹⁵ It is his theistic attitude towards Nature which he is concerned to stress, along with man's relationship to this God-created Nature. Ultimately, even in this third "Kritik", Kant's appeal is to faith rather than logical proof, despite all his arguments for the teleological view of Nature, but in this he comes nearest to providing a solution to these ultimate problems. It is therefore hardly surprising if this work became a great source-book for his contemporaries and successors in their attempts to gain secure knowledge of these matters.

The first important figure to take this route was Schiller. Hegel described "das 'große Verdienst Schillers'...., als der Erste die Kantische Subjektivität und Abstraktion des Denkens durchbrochen und den Versuch gewagt zu haben, 'über sie hinaus die Einheit und Versöhnung denkend als das Wahre zu fassen'".¹⁶

Needless to say, in the process he laid far greater stress on and attributed far greater importance to the work of art than Kant was prepared to do. Schiller was also concerned to stress the connection between aesthetic and moral excellence in a manner reminiscent of Plato's theory of forms. But perhaps the most significant point that Schiller stresses is the synthesising nature of aesthetic judgment and enjoyment. The dichotomy between reason and matter is solved in the aesthetic act. Sensuous dependence and moral freedom are seen to be reconcilable in that the individual is at the same time exercising his practical perception and judgment and also acting as a receiver of impulses from external physical reality. The aesthetic act is a synthesis, bringing together the two elements, the subject and the object. In the process of developing this theory, Schiller laid far greater stress on the emotional element in the aesthetic act than Kant had done. In this, he was arguably coming nearer to the reality of the artistic situation. He also

took one step further in the direction of Schelling's theory of the "Ekstase". Furthermore, in his "Theosophie des Julius", he took one step further along the road towards Hölderlin's theory of Love as a 'Metaprinciple of Unification'.¹⁷ Schiller's male/female orgasmic unification of subject and object is in stark contrast to the antagonistic relationship between "Ich" and "Nicht-Ich" in Fichte's system and is well on the way towards the system of Hölderlin and Schelling, although the "Ich" is still by far the senior partner.¹⁸ It is important to note, nevertheless, that for the first time in our experience of the German Idealists, the idea of Nature affecting the "Ich", rather than being affected by it, is regarded with equanimity, if not approval. This is very different from Kant's calm theistic speculations on the teleological structure of Nature, and in particular from Fichte's downright disapproval of and antagonism towards material Nature. This contrast can perhaps be explained by the different starting-points Fichte and Schiller took in Kant's work: Fichte started from the second "Kritik" which discusses how the "Ich" should act (what it acts on is largely irrelevant), whereas Schiller took the third "Kritik" as his starting-point, where Kant discusses the relationship between the "Ich" and the "Nicht-Ich", the subject and the object. This relationship or dichotomy, which was to be the ultimate stumbling-block for Fichte, was the starting-point for Schiller, Hölderlin and Schelling. In this subject/object dichotomy and synthesis lies the root of the famous concept of the Dialectics, which played an important rôle in the further development of Idealism, and which some scholars, such as Fuhrmans, seem to identify with Idealism per se. It has its (modern) origins in Kant's concept of mutually incompatible theses which cannot be brought into harmony unless one ignores the difference established in his work between "Ding an sich" and "Erscheinung".

This, then, was the task men like Schelling and Höl-

derlin saw before them: to find some way of uniting in harmony what in Kant seemed to be irreconcilable and in mutual opposition, and to redress the one-sided "Ich"-concentration of Kant and Fichte by trying to take adequate account of Nature , human passions, "das Dämonische" and God.

At this point we enter the most complex part of the development of German Idealism. It is simple enough to consider Kant's philosophical system for its own sake, and then to discuss where Fichte differed from him. At the other end, chronologically, it is also fairly easy to define the differences between Hegel's mature system and the ideas propounded by Schelling and Hölderlin. The difficult part is the period when the young friends, Schelling, Hölderlin and Hegel, were working together to develop an adequate system of philosophy. Who influenced whom when and how? Where did they disagree and to what extent? These are all questions which have called forth considerable discussion and contention in recent years. It is my present purpose to concentrate more on the ideas for their own sake rather than on making distinctions between personalities. This much needs to be said, however: in general terms, throughout the 1790's, it was Schelling and Hölderlin who led and Hegel who followed. This situation continued, as far as the interested German public was concerned, well into the first decade of the new century. Hegel's "Differenzschrift" (1801) was widely taken as the contribution of an orthodox Schelling disciple. During the next two years he co-operated with Schelling on the "Kritische Journal der Philosophie". It was only really with the publication of the "Phenomenology" in 1807 that it became apparent to the wider public that Hegel had developed his own system of Idealism which was incompatible with Schelling's ideas. This is not to say, of course, that Hegel had not been brooding over this system for some considerable time prior to the publication of the "Phenomenology". This became clear on the belated publication of his Jena lectures, covering the

period 1803-06.¹⁹ How much further back than Jena one can place Hegel's stirrings of independence is a matter of dispute among scholars, a dispute which tends to overlap with the even hotter dispute over the authorship of the "Systemprogramm".

It will perhaps be appropriate at this point to gain a firm grasp of the chronology of the period. So many immensely important works of philosophy and literature were being produced within such a short period that this can sometimes be confusing. For the present purpose, we shall confine ourselves to the works of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hölderlin and Hegel up to but excluding the Jena period (in the case of Schelling and Hegel):²⁰

1781 Kant: "Kritik der reinen Vernunft".

1788 Kant: "Kritik der praktischen Vernunft".

1790 Kant: "Kritik der Urteilskraft".

1791 Hölderlin's first poems published.

1792 Fichte: "Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung".

1793 Hölderlin leaves Tübinger Stift.

1794 Fichte: "Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre".

Schelling: "Über die Möglichkeit einer Form der Philosophie überhaupt".

Hölderlin: "Thalia-Fragment" of "Hyperion".

Hölderlin attends Fichte's lectures at Jena.

1795 Schelling: "Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie".

Schelling: "Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kritizismus".

Hölderlin: "Über Urtheil und Seyn".

Hegel: "Das Leben Jesu".

Hölderlin arrives in Frankfurt.

1796 "Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus".

Hegel: "die Positivität der christlichen Religion".

Hegel: "Eleusis".

1797 Schelling: "Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur".

Hölderlin: "Hyperion", Vol.I.

Hegel arrives in Frankfurt.

1798 Schelling: "Von der Weltseele".

Hölderlin: "Homburger Aufsätze".

Hölderlin moves to Homburg; works on "Empedokles".

1799 Hölderlin: "Hyperion", Vol. II.

1800 Schelling: "System des transzendentalen Idealismus".

Hölderlin moves to Stuttgart.

If we stop here at the turn of the century, we shall find ourselves at a convenient turning-point in many ways: Hölderlin has written all his strictly philosophical works, is on the verge of producing his major Elegies and Hymns and of going on his fateful trip to Bordeaux; he has six years of sanity left to him. Schelling has completed the first phase of his work, "die negative Philosophie", and is firmly established as a major independent thinker, having freed himself from Fichte with his works on Nature in the last three years of the century. Hegel has completed his early 'theological' essays, and is on the verge of joining Schelling at Jena and of publishing his first philosophical work, the "Differenzschrift".

The interesting period from our point of view is the six years between 1794 and 1800. During this time we can watch the three friends going through a fascinating process of development. At the very least, we can say for them that they produced one of the four main varieties of German Idealism. A more generous (and possibly more accurate) estimate is that they produced the only variety of German Idealism which provides a solid bulwark against the materialist and nihilist tendencies which have dominated much of European thought since their day.

During his five years at Tübingen, apart from his official studies (well described by H.S. Harris in his book "Hegel's Development") and his literary interests, we know a reasonable amount about Hölderlin's philosophical interests from his letters - it is fairly safe to assume that he would bother to mention in his personal correspondence only the writers who interested him personally. In a letter to Neuffer in November 1790, he

mentions Leibniz [Gr.St.A.6/1,p.56.]. Writing to his mother in February of the next year, he discusses Spinoza at some length. This passage is worth quoting:

Ich studierte denjenigen Teil der Weltweisheit, der von den Beweisen der Vernunft für das Dasein Gottes und von seinen Eigenschaften, die wir aus der Natur erkennen sollen, handelt, mit einem Interesse dafür, dessen ich mich nicht schäme, wenn es gleich auf einige Zeit mich auf Gedanken führte, die Sie vielleicht unruhig gemacht hätten, wenn Sie sie gekannt hätten. Ich ahnete nämlich bald, daß jene Beweise der Vernunft fürs Dasein Gottes, und auch für Unsterblichkeit, so unvollkommen wären, daß sie von scharfen Gegnern ganz oder doch wenigstens nach ihren Hauptteilen würden umgestoßen werden können. In dieser Zeit fielen mir Schriften über und von Spinoza, einem großen edeln Manne aus dem vorigen Jahrhundert, und doch Gottesleugner nach strengen Begriffen, in die Hände. Ich fand, daß man, wenn man genau prüft, mit der Vernunft, der kalten, vom Herzen verlassenen Vernunft, auf seine Ideen kommen muß, wenn man nämlich alles erklären will. Aber da blieb mir der Glaube meines Herzens, dem so unwidersprechlich das Verlangen nach Ewigem, nach Gott gegeben ist, übrig.

[Gr.St.A.6/1,p.63-4.]

Here, Hölderlin seems to have left Leibniz well behind him and be coming round to a roughly Kantian position.²¹ His respect for Spinoza is to be noted, however, and compared with that subsequently shown by Schelling in his writings.

In a letter to Neuffer in November, he mentions Rousseau [Gr.St.A.6/1,p.70.]. In 1793, we find mentions of Plato [Gr.St.A.6/1,p.86.] and Hemsterhuis [Gr.St.A.6/1, p.89.]. In September of that year, he left the Stift. On doing so, he was described in his testimonial as "Philologiae, inprimis graecae, et philosophiae, inprimis Kantianae... assiduus cultor" [Gr.St.A.7/1,p.479.].

If one judges solely from the letters, his main philosophical interests at this stage would appear to be Spinoza, with whom he is far from being in complete agreement and Plato (and the Platonists). It is not until a letter to Hegel dated 10th July 1794 that we find the following statement:

Kant und die Griechen sind beinahe meine einzige Lektüre. Mit dem ästhetischen Teile der kritischen Philosophie such ich vorzüglich vertraut zu werden.

[Gr.St.A.6/1,p.128.]

It is to be noted, however, that Hölderlin had been acquainted with the works of Schiller since at least his mid-teens, and had shown fervent enthusiasm for them throughout his period at the Stift. Thus, it might be said that he was acquainted with the consequences of Kant before he made a close study of Kant's works at first hand.²²

In any case, it did not take Hölderlin^{long} to see the need to go beyond Kant, as is shown in his letter to Neuffer dated 10th October 1794:

Vielleicht kann ich Dir einen Aufsatz über die ästhetischen Ideen schicken; weil er als ein Kommentar über den Phädrus des Plato gelten kann, und eine Stelle desselben mein ausdrücklicher Text ist... Im Grunde soll er eine Analyse des Schönen und Erhabnen erhalten, nach welcher die Kantische vereinfacht, und von der andern Seite vielseitiger wird, wie es schon Schiller zum Teil in seiner Schrift über Anmut und Würde getan hat, der aber doch auch einen Schritt weniger über die Kantische Grenzlinie gewagt hat, als er nach meiner Meinung hätte wagen sollen. Lächle nicht! Ich kann irren; aber ich habe geprüft, und lange und mit Anstrengung geprüft.

[Gr.St.A.6/1,p.137.]

In the following month he travels to Jena and attends lectures by Fichte:

Fichte ist jetzt die Seele von Jena. Und gottlob! daß ers ist. Einen Mann von solcher Tiefe und Energie des Geistes kenn ich sonst nicht. In den entlegensten Gebieten des menschlichen Wissens die Prinzipien dieses Wissens, und mit ihnen die des Rechts aufzusuchen und zu bestimmen, und mit gleicher Kraft des Geistes die entlegensten, kühnsten Folgerungen aus diesen Prinzipien zu denken, und trotz der Gewalt der Finsternis sie zu schreiben und vorzutragen, mit einem Feuer und einer Bestimmtheit, deren Vereinigung mir Armen ohne dies Beispiel vielleicht ein unauflösliches Problem geschienen hätte, - dies, lieber Neuffer! ist doch gewiß viel, und ist gewiß nicht zu viel gesagt von diesem Manne. [Gr.St.A.6/1,pp,139-40.]

This gives us some idea of Hölderlin's philosophical position in this key year of 1794, in which Fichte's star was at its zenith - the year which saw the publication of the "Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre" as well as an important paper by Fichte's disciple Schelling.²³

This year also saw the publication of the "Fragment von Hyperion", in Schiller's "Thalia". This version of the novel Hölderlin had been working on for over two years was described by the author in a letter to Neuffer dated 10th October: it is a representation of "der große Übergang aus der Jugend in das Wesen des Mannes vom Affekte zur Vernunft, aus dem Reiche der Phantasie ins Reich der Wahrheit und Freiheit". [Gr.St.A.6/1,p.137.]

This is straightforward orthodox Idealism, with no suggestion of any return to the "Ursprung" or of a special rôle for Nature.

After moving to Jena, Hölderlin starts work on the "metrische Fassung". This, as one might expect, is largely Fichtean in tone:

Du denkst wohl, ich spreche jugendlich.
Ich weiß, es ist Bedürfnis, was uns dringt,
Der ewig wechselnden Natur Verwandtschaft
Mit dem Unsterblichen in uns zu geben,
Doch dies Bedürfnis gibt das Recht uns auch.
Auch ist mir nicht verborgen, daß wir da,
Wo uns die schönen Formen der Natur
Die Gegenwart des Göttlichen verkünden,
Mit unsrem Geiste nur die Welt beseele.

[Gr.St.A.3,p.193.]

The general tone is Fichtean. In particular, the last line is a thoroughly Fichtean concept - an aspect of Fichte's thought that was to be of considerable importance for Novalis. However, the fifth line is significant: as in the letter to his mother, quoted above, Hölderlin's appeal is to something other than reason: it is his poet's intuition which leads him to stress Nature despite his admiration for Fichte. It is his poet's intuition which leads him to believe in God and freedom despite Spinoza. His faith in this intuition is what led Hölderlin on past

Kant, past Schiller, past Fichte, until he was satisfied that he had established a system of philosophy (in collaboration with Schelling) which took account of both this intuition, which he trusted implicitly, and human reason and logic, which he was far from despising.

Elsewhere in this "metrische Fassung" he talks of the "Hülfe" which Nature provides, "die Bereitwilligkeit, womit sie der Vernunft die Hände bietet". [Gr.St.A.3,p.186.] This is clearly a development of the element in Schiller's aesthetics mentioned above, whereby, in contradistinction to the Kantian position, room was allowed for man to be affected in a passive manner in the aesthetic experience. This is the difference between the thinkers (Kant and Fichte) and the poets (Schiller and Hölderlin): the latter are aware, through their experience as artists, that the archetypal artistic experience is one of passivity, a readiness to remain open to experiences and impressions from Nature or human individuals, and to one's own unconscious inspirations.²⁴

It is precisely this passive aspect which Kant, Fichte and subsequently Hegel refused to admit into their systems. Their concern was to establish the rights of the all-conquering "Ich" rather than to examine closely the conditions for the existence of this "Ich". Their point of departure was the existence of the "Ich" - the other extreme from Spinoza. Perhaps the main insight of Hölderlin and Schelling was centred on their vision of the interaction of the "Ich" and the "Nicht-Ich", subject and object, active and passive principles. Their Absolute was not a logical conclusion at the end of a long dialectical process (Hegel), but an event which occurs as a result of the interaction of these two elements.

Thus, here in Jena, we see Hölderlin reaching the point equivalent to that which Empedokles occupied at the outset of his career. The task facing the German poet and philosopher was identical to that awaiting Empedokles at the conclusion of the Greek Enlightenment: the additions and modifications Hölderlin was about to make to

the German Idealist system can be compared closely with those Empedokles had made to Parmenides' system: trust in the senses and interest in the Unconscious (Revelation) were major concerns to both the Greek and the German.

The year 1795 sees Hölderlin (and Schelling) groping forward into the unknown, for something beyond Fichte's position. This "something" did not come fully into fruition until two years later, with the publication of the first volume of "Hyperion" and of the first of Schelling's works on Nature. However, these early beginnings are worthy of close study.

The first important document of the year is Hölderlin's letter to Hegel dated 26th January. In it he describes his first impressions of Fichte's system when he read "seine ersten Blätter" in Waltershausen, before he came to Jena and before he had a chance to meet him and attend his lectures:

Fichtens spekulative Blätter - Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre - auch seine gedruckten Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten werden Dich sehr interessieren. Anfangs hatte ich ihn sehr in Verdacht des Dogmatismus; er scheint, wenn ich mutmaßen darf, auch wirklich auf dem Scheidewege gestanden zu sein, oder noch zu stehn - er möchte über das Faktum des Bewußtseins in der Theorie hinaus, das zeigen sehr viele seiner Äußerungen, und das ist ebenso gewiß, und noch auffallender transzendent, als wenn die bisherigen Metaphysiker über das Dasein der Welt hinaus wollten - sein absolutes Ich (= Spinozas Substanz) enthält alle Realität; es ist alles, und außer ihm ist nichts; es gibt also für dieses absolute Ich kein Objekt, denn sonst wäre nicht alle Realität in ihm; ein Bewußtsein ohne Objekt ist aber nicht denkbar, und wenn ich selbst dieses Objekt bin, so bin ich als solches notwendig beschränkt, sollte es auch nur in der Zeit sein, also nicht absolut; also ist in dem absoluten Ich kein Bewußtsein denkbar, als absolutes Ich hab ich kein Bewußtsein, und insofern ich kein Bewußtsein habe, insofern bin ich (für mich) nichts, also das absolute Ich ist (für mich) Nichts.

[Gr.St.A.6/1,p.155.]

His understanding of Fichte was obviously imperfect at this stage. In particular, he does not seem to have understood the rôle of the "Nicht-Ich". It is also rather

strange, at first sight, that he should equate Fichte's "Ich" with Spinoza's "Substanz". One remembers that he made his first acquaintance with Fichte's work "unmittelbar nach der Lektüre des Spinoza". [Gr.St.A.6/1,p.156.] We can assume, I feel, that Hölderlin eventually noticed that Spinoza's "Substanz" and Fichte's "Ich" were travelling in opposite directions, so to speak, or at least that Fichte pointed this out to him in lectures or discussions at Jena. The fact that Hölderlin noticed the parallel between these two theories at this early stage is perhaps significant, in that the future form of his and Schelling's system was based on the correspondence of and relationship between these two elements. In this sense, it can be seen as a fruitful mistake.

However, this may have been something more than a beginner's mistake on Hölderlin's part. His friend Schelling, in his letters to Hegel during 1795, in which he explained Fichte's ideas, equated the Absolute Ego with God, rejecting the Kantian idea of a transcendent deity, which Hegel still accepted. Spinoza also rejected this concept, and equated the infinite divine substance with Nature - hence Hölderlin's description of him, in the letter quoted above, as "Gottesleugner nach strengen Begriffen" [Gr.St.A.6/1,p.64.]. That Fichte did not equate the divine with Nature must have been obvious to his young disciples, but they may nevertheless have felt justified in pointing to similarities between the two systems in this respect.²⁵

However this may be, Hölderlin himself stresses that this was a first impression, and, later in the same letter, he goes on to discuss the matter of the "Ich" and the "Nicht-Ich" in terms that show beyond any doubt that, by the time he wrote this letter, he understood Fichte's ideas on this subject, at least.²⁶ It is most unfortunate that Hegel appears to have lost a section of the letter which began: "Fichte bestätigt mir..."

In general, perhaps the most interesting aspect of Hölderlin's account is the fact that he noticed that

Fichte was dissatisfied with the limitations imposed on human reason by Kant, and that Hölderlin's first instinct was to defend the Kantian position for the sake of preserving the freedom established by Kant for the "Ich". His high regard for Kant is further shown in the same letter by the following passage:

Daß Du Dich an die Religionsbegriffe machst, ist gewiß in mancher Rücksicht gut und wichtig. Den Begriff der Vorsehung behandelst Du wohl ganz parallel mit Kants Teleologie; die Art, wie er den Mechanismus der Natur (also auch des Schicksals) mit ihrer Zweckmäßigkeit vereinigt, scheint mir eigentlich den ganzen Geist seines Systems zu enthalten; es ist freilich dieselbe, womit er alle Antinomien schlichtet.

[Gr.St.A.6/1,p.156.]

Several points deserve to be mentioned here. Firstly, Hölderlin's attitude towards Kant would seem to be largely conditioned by the tone and aspirations of the third "Kritik". Kant's teleological view of Nature has not escaped his attention. To equate Kant's "Teleologie" with "Vorsehung" and Nature with Fate is in agreement with the spirit of the third "Kritik", but is also pointing beyond it, towards future concerns with Revelation. When Kant pointed towards a supposed teleological structure in Nature, it is doubtful if he himself meant to achieve any more than to provide another piece of empirical evidence to support his theistic beliefs. However, this element in the third "Kritik" was of overwhelming significance for future developments. It showed Hölderlin, in all probability, the flaw in Fichte's system: if Nature (= the "Nicht-Ich") has a teleological structure, how can it play the rôle ascribed to it by Fichte? It must surely do more than limit the activities of the "Ich": it must somehow act on the "Ich", in a reciprocal fashion. When Hölderlin equated Nature with Fate, he is stressing this active rôle.

Then, there is the question of the Antinomies. In his second "Anmerkung" to Section 57 of the third "Kritik", Kant describes their function as follows:

ther the "Mechanismus" and the "Zweckmäßigkeit" of Nature, he was referring to precisely this synthesising process. Here we see the first sign of the general tendency of the German Idealists, with the possible exception of Fichte: when faced with two contradictory propositions or arguments concerning a certain subject, their first instinct is to bring the opposing views into harmony by taking a wider view, rather than agreeing with one side or the other. However, for Kant at least, it is undesirable to accept the dogmas of atheistic nihilism and moral subjectivism. It was, indeed, to a large extent the advantage of Leibnizian Dogmatism that it provided an apparent bulwark against these views. Kant, however, rejects the rationalists' attempts to prove their dogmas, while at the same time keeping sight of the basic problem and agreeing with their general world-view. He also rejects the Empiricist dogmas of the Anglo-Saxon philosophers: why should one assume that all there is to reality is what is given to one in sense data?

Kant sees the solution in the distinction between the "Erscheinung" and the "Ding an sich". He agrees that the world as a "Ding an sich" is either finite or infinite, but he claims that it is impossible for either the empirical or the rationalist approach to prove its case one way or the other. The same approach is applied by him to the simple/complex Antinomy. As regards the natural causality/freedom Antinomy, his solution is more complex. The Behaviourist approach to ethics may be empirically true: a man may become a mass murderer because of his background, lack of education, etc.. But Kant claims that these circumstances are no excuse for his actions: the fact remains that he ought not to have become a mass murderer. Whence does Kant take this "ought"? From Reason, which is free from natural causality. Lastly, on considering whether God is necessary or not, Kant takes the following approach: if one restricts the world to the collection of "Erscheinungen" postulated by the Empiricists, there is no room for a necessary first cause,

because by this view everything in existence is contingent and empirically conditioned. However, Kant claims that it is still possible to posit a non-sensible cause of the whole sensible world. This differs from the Leibnizian position in the respect that the latter involves an attempted proof of the divine causality of each individual monad.

In this way, then, Kant attempted to take account of the ideas, dogmas and preoccupations of both the Empiricist and the Rationalist tradition. The connection between this solution of the Antinomies and the "Mechanismus"/"Teleologie" synthesis referred to by Hölderlin becomes clear when one reads the following passage from the third "Kritik":

Da es aber doch wenigstens möglich ist, die materielle Welt als bloße Erscheinung zu betrachten, und etwas als Ding an sich selbst (welches nicht Erscheinung ist) als Substrat zu denken, diesem aber eine korrespondierende intellektuelle Anschauung (wenn sie gleich nicht die unsrige ist) unterzulegen: so würde ein, ob zwar für uns unerkennbarer, übersinnlicher Realgrund für die Natur Statt finden, zu der wir selbst mitgehören, in welcher wir also das, was in ihr als Gegenstand der Sinne notwendig ist, nach mechanischen Gesetzen, die Zusammenstimmung und Einheit aber der besonderen Gesetze und der Formen nach denselben, die wir in Ansehung jener als zufällig beurteilen müssen, in ihr als Gegenstände der Vernunft (ja das Naturganze als System) zugleich nach teleologischen Gesetzen betrachten, und sie nach zweierlei Principien beurteilen würden, ohne daß die mechanische Erklärungsart durch die teleologische, als ob sie einander widersprächen, ausgeschlossen wird.²⁸

Thus, our situation in the universe might be compared with that of a young lion born in a safari park. He is born into a world of "Erscheinungen" which, from his point of view, are simply there: a set of particular natural phenomena (and others such as fences, signs, hides) whose origins are a mystery to him. If the park is large enough, he might live out his whole life in it without ever seeing a game warden or any other human being. It is nevertheless the case that his entire en-

vironment and the conditions of his existence are planned by man, a creature of whose very existence he has no empirical knowledge. Likewise, within that planned environment, he possesses considerable personal freedom - to hunt, to play, to breed. Also, he has personal responsibility, whether he acknowledges it or no: if he attacks a human visitor to the park, he will be held accountable.

This rough parallel, then, shows one the basic Kantian view of man's place in the universe. It is his attempt to solve the problem mentioned by Copleston in the passage quoted above: how to reconcile the Copernican and Christian world views, or the world of the "Erscheinung" and the world of the "Ding an sich".

If we return now to Hölderlin's letter, we can note two further points:

1. In equating Kant's "Teleologie" with Hegel's more religious term "Vorsehung", Hölderlin strengthens an implication which is latent in the Kantian proposition: the teleological aspect of Nature (to which we belong) is the force against which the Idealists are normally seen as fighting - necessity, blind fate, the $\alpha\lambda\theta\eta$ of the Greeks.
2. In applying the mechanism/teleology dualism not only to Nature but also to "Schicksal", he divides this force into two distinct species: the fate ordained by divine will and the fate composed of contingent phenomena. Here lies the basis of much of Hölderlin's future work: the freedom of action of the "Ich" is rightly employed by the individual in opposing the second species (as in building dams to keep out the sea, harnessing Nature to produce food, defending oneself ^{against} attack, etc.), but opposition to the first species of fate is, in Hölderlin's eyes, hubris. This ignoring or opposing of the divine aspect or variety of Fate is the sin of Oedipus, Empedokles, Plato from "the Republic" onwards, Fichte, and Hegel from Jena onwards (if one looks at their actions and ideas through Hölder-

linian eyes). Hubris, in fact, can be seen as the great danger of the Idealist world view, and also of the Empiricist position - both see the world from the point of view of the "Ich".

Here we have the tightrope the post-Kantian Idealists were walking: they were dissatisfied with Kant's ultimate conclusion that these "ultima^e res" were unknowable; they approved of his dismissal of Dogmatism with its ultimately deterministic negation of freedom, but they feared that Kant's admission of unknowability would lead to scepticism about the existence of God, immortality and the need for freedom. Their worst fears have been fully justified by the subsequent development of European thought. The teleological aspect of Nature and the dialectics were the elements in Kant's thought which provided them with the best hope of overcoming this problem. Hölderlin gained further assistance and inspiration from the Greeks, as we have seen.

During the first half of 1795 in Jena, Hölderlin was in constant personal contact with Fichte, Schiller and Goethe. It was at this stage that the famous meeting and discussion at Niethammer's house took place, with Fichte, Hölderlin and Novalis among the guests - the only known occasion on which Hölderlin and Novalis met. This discussion apparently turned largely around the subjects of religion and revelation, and the future tasks of philosophy. Given the future development of their thought, it is fairly safe to assume that Hölderlin and Novalis expressed dissatisfaction with the present state of Idealism, and looked to Revelation as a solution or complement. Fichte's reaction can only have been sceptical.²⁹ However this may be, it is important to note that Revelation was one of the main topics of discussion.³⁰

In the summer, Hölderlin moved to Nürtingen, where he seems to have gone through a period of loneliness and frustration, as is shown by a letter to Schiller dated 4th September:

Das Mißfallen an mir selbst und dem, was mich umgibt, hat mich in die Abstraktion hineingetrieben; ich suche mir die Idee eines unendlichen Progresses der Philosophie zu entwickeln, ich suche zu zeigen, daß die unnachlässliche Forderung, die an jedes System gemacht werden muß, die Vereinigung des Subjekts und Objekts in einem absoluten - Ich oder wie man es nennen will zwar ästhetisch, in der intellektualen Anschauung, theoretisch aber nur durch eine unendliche Annäherung möglich ist, wie die Annäherung des Quadrats zum Zirkel, und daß um ein System des Denkens zu realisieren, eine Unsterblichkeit ebenso notwendig ist, als sie es ist für ein System des Handelns. Ich glaube, dadurch beweisen zu können, inwieferne die Skeptiker recht haben, und inwieferne nicht...

Ich fühle nur zu oft, daß ich eben kein seltener Mensch bin.

Ich friere und starre in dem Winter, der mich umgibt. So eisern mein Himmel ist, so steinern bin ich.

Auf den Oktober werd ich ^h wahrscheinlich eine Hofmeisterstelle in Frankfurt beziehen...

[Gr.St.A.6/1,p.181.]

The proposition that Hölderlin has set himself to prove here has striking similarities with the manner in which Hegel criticised the Fichtean system in the "Differenzschrift", on the grounds that, despite its avowed intention of doing away with Kant's unknowable thing-in-itself, Fichte's system left the Absolute equally unattainable except by an infinite number of "Begründungsschritte".³¹

Perhaps the key point in Hölderlin's discussion of the problem in his letter to Schiller is where he says that the "Vereinigung" which is impossible theoretically is nevertheless possible "ästhetisch, in der intellektualen Anschauung". In fact, these philosophical ambitions of Hölderlin are a logical extension of the problematics of the short essay "Über Urtheil und Seyn" which he had written on the flyleaf of a book while he was still in Jena (probably in April). To this essay we now turn.

For the purposes of this discussion, I shall accept the proposition supported by Henrich and Harris that Beißner's arrangement of the essay, with the section on "Urteil" coming first, is a mistake and has no justifi-

cation either in the content or otherwise.³² If we therefore take "Sein" first, the argument of the essay runs as follows:

- a) "Sein" = the original seamless joining of subject and object.
- b) This "Sein" is not the same as "Identität" - the proposition "Ich = Ich" can only be produced by a "Trennung" of the "Ich" from itself. Self-consciousness can only be achieved by separation and opposition. "Also ist die Identität keine Vereinigung des Objekts und Subjekts, die schlechthin stattfände, also ist die Identität nicht = dem absoluten Sein." [Gr.St.A.4/1,p.217.]

With that, Hölderlin closes the first half of his essay. The following points are worth noting:

1. In the beginning, the subject and the object are joined together in the "Sein". There is no consciousness involved at this stage, because consciousness involves separation. (The play on words - "Ur-teil"/"Teilung" - is very Heideggerian.)
2. In describing this state of consciousness-less harmony, Hölderlin adds the simile: "wie es bei der intellektualen Anschauung der Fall ist." Ergo, for Hölderlin, consciousness and the "intellektuale Anschauung" would seem to be incompatible. This might, at first sight, seem strange, considering the fact that the "intellektuale Anschauung" is Hölderlin's great hope for attaining absolute knowledge of the most important metaphysical truths. However, one must remember that this is not seen by him as a method whereby X can know Y in Fichte's sense (Y being a passive object), but rather as an interpenetration or two-way relationship of X and Y. Here, consciousness is used in the narrow sense of logical separation into isolated phenomena and

categories (in a roughly Aristotelian sense).

3. The "intellektuale Anschauung" is a condition brought about by the binding force of Love in the Platonic sense. Hence the original "Sein" can be equated with the original rule of Love in Empedokles' system. "Teilung", the "Urteil", consciousness, are phenomena related to Empedoklean Strife.
4. Consciousness, in this Hölderlinian sense, is as we have seen, a state of mind whereby distinctions are made and phenomena are isolated from or even hostile towards each other. One might equate this with the Aristotelian and Empiricist strands in philosophy, with their tendency to see things as isolated unique phenomena, rather than concentrating on what binds them together.
5. Fichte's system, taking as it does its beginning from a state of "Teilung", never attains to the harmony of Hölderlin's "Sein" but wastes itself in eternal "Sehnen" and opposition - in other words, Fichte's system involves a permanent state of Empedoklean Strife.
6. In replacing "Ich = Ich" by "Sein" as the starting point of his system, Hölderlin was tacitly supporting the Rousseauan conception of «bonté naturelle» against original sin, in that the original Empedoklean state of Love or harmony applies just as much to the individual as it does to world history.

If we now carry on to the second section, on "Urtheil", we find the following propositions:

- a) "Urtheil" = the original separation of the subject and object, previously joined together in the "intellektuale Anschauung", whereby "erst Objekt und Subjekt möglich wird".
[Gr.St.A.4/1, p.216.]
- b) This separation involves the mutual interrelation-

ship of subject and object - "und die notwendige Voraussetzung eines Ganzen, wovon Objekt und Subjekt die Teile sind." [Gr.St.A.4/1,p.216.]

- c) "Ich = Ich" is the "theoretische Urtheilung"; "Ich = Nicht-Ich" is the "praktische Urtheilung".
- d) His final paragraph deals (in a rather confusing manner) with the three realms of "Vernunft", "Verstand" and "Anschauung". He sees "Vernunft" as the realm of "Notwendigkeit", "Verstand" as that of "Möglichkeit" and "Anschauung" as that of "Wirklichkeit". In the process he makes what at first seems to be a strange claim: "Wenn ich einen Gegenstand als möglich denke, so wiederhol ich nur das vorhergegangene Bewußtsein, kraft dessen er wirklich ist." [Gr.St.A.4/1,p.216.] I take this to be a Platonist reference to the Theory of Forms, and also a claim to the effect that the "intellektuale Anschauung" is historically prior to the condition of "Verstand".

In general, with regard to the "Urtheil" section, one might make the following remarks:

1. Behind the claim (in Section d above) for the priority of "Wirklichkeit" over "Möglichkeit" there lies the deeper and more important implication that the difference between Hölderlin's system and that of Fichte can be reduced to the fact that where Fichte bases his ideas on Kant's second "Kritik" and on the realm of "Verstand" (and therefore "Möglichkeit"), he (Hölderlin) bases his on the third "Kritik" and on "intellektuale Anschauung" (and therefore "Wirklichkeit"). In Kant, Reason (whether 'Pure' or 'Practical') and Understanding have two elements in common: they both furnish a priori laws

(the first of freedom, the second of nature), and they are both independent of the particular subject (unlike Judgment). The respective significance of Reason, Understanding and Judgment is relative to the two elements of the Universal and the Particular: Understanding is the ability to have knowledge of the Universal, Reason that to determine the Particular through the Universal, Judgment that to subsume the Particular under the Universal. Thus, Judgment is the only one of the three situations where one is faced originally by the Particular; this, as we have seen, is the very area where Fichte's system seems to encounter difficulties.

2. Hölderlin's way of expressing his proposition concerning "Möglichkeit" and "Wirklichkeit" is almost certainly influenced by the doctrine of ἀρσενικὸς as expounded by Plato in the "Meno", the "Phaedrus" and elsewhere. Kant's ideas on the subject are altogether more matter-of-fact:

Nun beruht... alle unsere Unterscheidung des bloß Möglichen vom Wirklichen darauf, daß das erstere nur die Position der Vorstellung eines Dinges respektiv auf unsern Begriff und überhaupt das Vermögen zu denken, das letztere aber die Setzung des Dinges an sich selbst... bedeutet. 33

However, this quotation (from Section 76 of the third "Kritik") shows us that, for Kant also, "Wirklichkeit" has priority over "Möglichkeit", the former being connected with the concept of the "Ding an sich".

3. One need hardly stress that, for Hölderlin, this "Wirklichkeit" was not the empirical reality of natural science, but the semi-mystical reality intuited in the "intellektuale Anschauung" - his solution, in fact, to the problem of reconciling the Copernican and Christian world views. This

reality is a composite of the empirical or material reality (the "Nicht-Ich") and spiritual reality (the "Ich"), whereby, rather than one component overcoming the other (as in Fichte) or rising up above it (as in Hegel), the two components are brought together in harmony by the "Metaprinciple" of ἔρως or "Liebe!"

4. The fact that, for Hölderlin, subject and object together form a larger whole and that the one is incomplete without the other, can be seen as Hölderlin's major contribution to German thought. His theory holds just as well for the individual within himself as for his relationship with the external world - in Novalis' words, "der Mensch ist so gut Nicht-Ich, als Ich".³⁴ In the historical sense, man (or his intellectual faculties) became separated from Nature with the onset of the Pre-Socratic Enlightenment, and he soon came to see Nature simply as an alien, even hostile force which he could only combat and strive to control. In the personal sense, a man becomes divided within himself when and if he begins to see his various faculties (reason, senses, unconscious) as mutually opposed, as, for example, in the Freudian world view.

Thus, we find that Hölderlin had already gone a considerable length beyond Fichte's position. His insight that "Ich" and "Nicht-Ich" are combined originally within the larger unit of the self or "Sein" is completely new. At the period in question, Schelling (still at the "Stift") was an orthodox Fichtean, even if he betrayed considerable sympathy with Spinozan ideas in his "Philosophische Briefe" of that year. In his "Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre" (1796-7), he was still maintaining:

Das einzige Beispiel einer absoluten Identität der Vorstellung und des Gegenstandes finden wir also in uns selbst. Was sich allein unmittelbar, und dadurch erst alles andere, erkennt und versteht, ist das Ich in uns. Bei allem andern Objekt

bin ich genöthigt zu fragen, wodurch das Seyn des-
selben mit meiner Vorstellung vermittelt werde? Ich
aber bin ursprünglich nicht etwa für ein erkennen-
des Subjekt außer mir, wie die Materie, sondern für
mich selbst da, in mir ist die absolute Identität
des Subjekts und des Objekts, des Erkennens und des
Seyns...³⁵

To Hölderlin, man was a composite in the sense of Kant's second antinomy. In the beginning, he is unaware of his composite nature; this awareness comes with the "Ur-theilung". For Fichte, and for Schelling at this stage, man was a simple entity possessing self-awareness from the outset, then awareness of the "Nicht-Ich". When Schelling talks of the Identity of "Erkennen" (= Hölderlin's "Urtheil") and "Seyn" in the individual and/or the Universe, this is very different from Hölderlin's position, whereby the original "Seyn" is divided against and within itself by the onset of "Erkennen" or "Urtheil".

Thus, we see that Friedrich Strack's description of the situation at this stage in the history of German Idealism has all the hallmarks of accuracy:

Wenn es stimmt - wie Plitt berichtet -, daß Hölderlin bei seinem Besuch in Tübingen im Sommer 1795 Schelling über seine philosophischen Versuche 'getröstet' und zu ihm gesagt haben soll: 'Sei du nur ruhig, du bist grad soweit als Fichte, ich habe ihn ja gehört', dann besagen diese Worte auch, daß Hölderlin sich dem Freund gegenüber philosophisch gewachsen fühlte und ihm sogar noch einiges voraus zu haben glaubte, während Hegel zur gleichen Zeit im Brief an Schelling darüber klagt, 'nur ein Lehrling' in der neuesten Philosophie zu sein.³⁶

Thus, rather than seeing the philosophical differences between Hölderlin and Schelling at this stage as evidence of a significant disagreement, one should understand them as the difference between two different stages on the same path. Hölderlin had had the opportunity to attend lectures by Fichte at Jena, and to discuss his ideas with him in private. He had come to terms with his system and made considerable progress in achieving what Schelling evidently agreed was desirable (as is shown by his "Philosophische Briefe"): a combination of Fichte's sys-

tem with Spinoza's, with the help of Kant's third "Kritik" and Plato's "Vereinigungsphilosophie". Schelling himself later went on to achieve this desirable aim in his writings on Nature from 1797 onwards, following Hölderlin's lead.

What of young Hegel, whom we last encountered wrestling with the concept of "Vorsehung" in his unpublished essays on religious themes? What lay behind his concern with religious topics, very different from the more strictly philosophical interests of Hölderlin and Schelling? The following excerpts from his writings of the period may help us to understand what he was attempting to achieve:

a) Es liegt in dem Begriffe der Religion, daß sie nicht bloße Wissenschaft von Gott, seinen Eigenschaften, unserem Verhältnis und dem Verhältnis der Welt zu ihm und der Fortdauer unserer Seele, was uns allenfalls entweder durch bloße Vernunft annehmbar oder auch auf einem anderen Weg uns bekannt wäre - nicht eine bloße historische oder räsionierte Kenntniss ist, sondern daß sie das Herz interessiert, daß sie einen Einfluß auf unsere Empfindungen und auf die Bestimmung unseres Willens hat - indem teils unsere Pflichten und die Gesetze einen stärkren Nachdruck dadurch erhalten, daß sie als Gesetze Gottes uns vorgestellt werden; teils indem die Vorstellung der Erhabenheit und der Güte Gottes gegen uns - unser Herz mit Bewunderung und mit Empfindungen der Demut und Dankbarkeit erfüllt.

Die Religion gibt also der Moralität und ihren Beweggründen einen neuen erhabenern Schwung, sie gibt einen neuen stärkren Damm gegen die Gewalt der sinnlichen Antriebe ab. 57

b) Die reine aller Schranken unfähige Vernunft ist die Gottheit selbst - Nach Vernunft ist also der Plan der Welt überhaupt geordnet; Vernunft ist es, die dem Menschen seine Bestimmung, einen unbedingten Zweck seines Lebens kennen lehrt; oft ist sie zwar verfinstert, aber doch nie ganz ausgelöscht worden, selbst in der Finsternis hat sich immer ein schwacher Schimmer derselben erhalten -

Unter den Juden war es Johannes, der die Menschen wieder auf diese ihre Würde aufmerksam machte - die ihnen nichts fremdes sein sollte, sondern die sie in sich selbst, in ihrem wahren Selbst,... in der Ausbildung des göttlichen Funkens, der ihnen zu teil geworden ist, der

ihnen das Zeugnis gibt, daß sie in einem erhabenern Sinne von der Gottheit selbst abstammen - Ausbildung der Vernunft ist die einzige Quelle der Wahrheit und der Beruhigung, die Johannes etwa nicht ausschließend oder als eine Seltenheit zu besitzen vorgab, sondern die alle Menschen in sich selbst aufschließen können... 38

Concerning quotation (a), I should like to make the following points:

1. Hegel is interested in religion not so much as a revelation of metaphysical truths as for the possibilities and means it supplies for influencing the behaviour of the people.
2. The main advantage religion has in the performance of this task is that, unlike abstract ethical tracts, it can appeal directly to the emotions (in a manner similar to that of Pindar's Odes, Sophoclean tragedy and Wagner's "Gesamtkunstwerk").
3. In the process, religion's main 'enemy', and the force it most needs to control, is "die Gewalt der sinnlichen Antriebe". Hegel's attitude here is similar to that of Plato in his later years, from "the Republic" onwards. Hölderlin, for example, would scarcely have used the word "Damm" in this context. Rather than bringing all man's faculties together, Hegel would seem to wish to manipulate the people's emotions (for their own good, needless to say) without any serious appeal to their reason.

However, this is an early essay and perhaps misrepresents Hegel's position by 1795. Let us therefore move on to the excerpt from "das Leben Jesu". About this, the following points can be made:

1. The surprising equation of God with "die reine aller Schranken unfähige Vernunft" would seem to be an out-and-out relic of "Dogmatismus". We may remember that Hegel was reputed to be far less enthusiastic about Kant at the Stift than Hölderlin.

2. For one moment, in the second paragraph, when one is asked to consider a quality that all men possess "in sich selbst, in ihrem wahren Selbst", one might assume that Hegel is about to discuss some Hölderlinian concept of the Unconscious. But no: the inner quality concerned is the divine spark of reason, which, unrealistically enough, all men are supposed to possess in equal measure. Why all men should be expected to possess equal powers of reason, when their capacities for running, playing musical instruments, lifting weights, etc., are so obviously disparate, is not explained. I feel that Hegel, who has clearly based his approach on Plato's theories, is here guilty of a misunderstanding of the *διαλεκτική τέχνη*. The latter is a procedure for uncovering *δοξαί* already present in the unconscious of anyone and everyone, not for bringing everyone's logical prowess up to the level of a Sokrates or a Plato.
3. Once more, we note the rejection^{ion} of or sceptical attitude towards the senses and the emotions. Hegel's attitude here towards man's "Triebe nach Glück^slichkeit" is part of the general vision of the pure rationalist, which Hegel evidently was at this time. His world view, like that of the aging Plato, is one of man's reason rising up out of the mire of Nature, and leaving it behind as rapidly as possible. Hegel here might be said to have earned a share in Kant's rebuke of Plato:

Die leichte Taube, indem sie im freien Fluge die Luft teilt, deren Widerstand sie fühlt, könnte die Vorstellung fassen, daß es ihr im luftleeren Raum noch viel besser gelingen werde. Ebenso verließ Plato die Sinnenwelt, weil sie dem Verstande so vielfältige Hindernisse legt, und wagte sich jenseits derselben auf den Flügeln der Ideen, in den leeren Raum des reinen Verstandes... 39

Hegel's radically different attitude towards

Plato's rationalism can be seen from this passage, taken from his mature works:

Was Sokrates begann, ist von Plato vollführt. Er erkennt nur das Allgemeine, die Idee, das Gute als das Wesenhafte. Durch die Darstellung seiner Ideen hat Plato die Intellektualwelt eröffnet. Sie ist nicht jenseits der Wirklichkeit, im Himmel, an einem anderen Orte, sondern sie ist die wirkliche Welt... Das Wesen der Ideen ist die Ansicht, daß nicht das sinnlich Existierende das Wahre ist, sondern allein das in sich bestimmte Allgemeine, - die Intellektual-Welt das Wahre, Wissenswerthe, überhaupt das Ewige, an und für sich Göttliche ist. 40

Thus, Kant and Hegel agree about the general nature of Plato's theories. The only point of difference is that, while Kant disapproved, Hegel approved.⁴¹

4. The basic difference between Hegel's attitude towards Nature and that of Fichte is that, while the latter sees Nature as something opposite and opposed to man, Hegel sees it as the root or base out of which man grew. As we have seen, Hegel was almost certainly strongly influenced by Plato's later works in this matter. His attitude is seen at its most extreme in the following passage from "das Leben Jesu":

In den Stunden seines Nachdenkens in der Einsamkeit kam ihm [= Jesus] einst der Gedanke, ob es nicht der Mühe verlohnte, durch Studium der Natur und vielleicht durch Verbindung mit höheren Geistern es soweit zu bringen zu suchen, unedlere Stoffe in edlere, für den Menschen unmittelbarer brauchbare zu verwandeln, etwa wie Steine in Brot, oder sich von der Natur überhaupt unabhängiger zu machen..., aber er wies diesen Gedanken ab, durch die Betrachtung der Schranken, die die Natur dem Menschen in seiner Macht über sie gesetzt hat, - durch die Betrachtung, daß es selbst unter der Würde des Menschen ist, nach einer solchen Macht zu streben, da er in sich eine über die Natur erhabene Kraft besitzt, deren Ausbildung und Erhöhung die wahre Bestimmung seines Lebens ist...⁴²

What for Hegel was "unter der Würde des Menschen"

would be hubris for Hölderlin: a substantial difference.

Thus, we see that, in this important year of 1795, the three friends from the Stift, despite similarities, especially between Hölderlin's ideas and those of Schelling, all have distinct philosophical positions, which can be characterised as follows:

- a) Hegel was to all intents and purposes an orthodox Platonist of the rationalist variety, with little trace of Kantian or Spinozan preoccupations.
- b) Schelling was a fairly orthodox Fichtean, with, however, very un-Fichtean sympathies for Spinoza.
- c) Hölderlin had gone beyond Kant to Fichte, and then beyond Fichte to achieve the synthesis of Fichte and Spinoza which was to form the basis of his and Schelling's future system.

These distinctions must be borne in mind as we proceed to the year 1796 and to one of the great areas of contention in German Idealist studies: the "Systemprogramm". One can summarise its contents in the following terms:

- a) All future metaphysics must be based on "die Moral", or Kantian "praktische Postulate". This would seem to indicate a stronger interest in Kant's second "Kritik" than in the third on the part of the writer.
- b) The author starts his system with "das freie, selbstbewußte Wesen", the "Ich". Simultaneously with this "Ich", a "Welt" appears in a "Schöpfung aus Nichts". This would appear to be orthodox Fichtean doctrine.
- c) The desired relationship of science to Nature is "schöpferisch". The important question is: "Wie muß eine Welt für ein moralisches Wesen beschaffen sein?" Fichte once more.
- d) The next paragraph is largely devoted to an anar-

chist rejection of the state on the grounds that it represses human freedom. This also is compatible with what we know of Fichte.

- e) Then comes a section interesting enough to quote in full:

Endlich kommen die Ideen von einer moralischen Welt, Gottheit, Unsterblichkeit - Umsturz alles Afterglaubens, Verfolgung des Priestertums, das neuerdings Vernunft heuchelt, durch die Vernunft selbst. - Absolute Freiheit aller Geister, die die intellektuelle Welt in sich tragen, und weder Gott noch Unsterblichkeit außer sich suchen dürfen. [Gr.St.A.4/1,p.298.]

The first part would seem to indicate an enthusiasm for Kant. The last sentence presents problems of interpretation. It would seem to imply that some "Geister" contain within themselves "die intellektuelle Welt" while others do not. One can perhaps compare this with the lines from Hölderlin's "Menschenbeifall":

An das Göttliche glauben
Die allein, die es selber sind.
[Gr.St.A.1/1,p.250.]

Can one equate "die intellektuelle Welt" with Reason? We are told to seek God and immortality within ourselves, but how? By the development of our reason, Hegel's "divine spark"? Or by a more Hölderlinian examination of the contents of the Unconscious? From the context, the first alternative would seem to be intended.

- f) The next section puts forward the proposition:
"daß der höchste Akt der Vernunft, der, indem sie alle Ideen umfaßt, ein ästhetischer Akt ist, und daß Wahrheit und Güte, nur in der Schönheit verschwistert sind." [Gr.St.A.4/1,p.298.]

This leaves Fichte behind, and turns from the second to the third "Kritik". The influence of Schiller and/or Plato would also seem to be present, in the rôle of "Schönheit".

There follows a hymn of praise to "der ästhetische Sinn", which is just as necessary for philosophers as it is for poets.

- g) The next paragraph deserves to be quoted in full:

"Die Poesie bekömmt dadurch eine höhere Würde, sie wird am Ende wieder, was sie am Anfang war - Lehrerin der Menschheit; denn es gibt keine Philosophie, keine Geschichte mehr, die Dichtkunst allein wird alle übrigen Wissenschaften und Künste überleben. [Gr.St.A.4/1,p.298.]

This Chiron-esque paragraph is the most Hölderlinian section of the "Systemprogramm", containing as it does a reference to a return to the "Ursprung" and a claim for the superiority of the aesthetic act over the "Begriff".

- h) This is followed by what would appear to be a reference to Hegel's ideas: "der große Haufen" needs a "sinnliche Religion". But, this writer claims, "Nicht nur der große Haufen, auch der Philosoph bedarf ihrer". [Gr.St.A.4/1,p.298.]

This goes beyond Hegel to a Hölderlinian plea for the whole man.

- i) Here a new and important idea makes its appearance:

"Zuerst werde ich hier von einer Idee sprechen, die, soviel ich weiß, noch in keines Menschen Sinn gekommen ist - wir müssen eine neue Mythologie haben, diese Mythologie aber muß im Dienste der Ideen stehen, sie muß eine Mythologie der Vernunft werden. [Gr.St.A.4/1,p.298-9.]

This mythology must be "vernünftig" to appeal to the philosophers and "ästhetisch" to appeal to the masses, with the aim of making the philosophers "sinnlich" and the masses "vernünftig" so as to join the whole people together. In place of the traditional situation in Christian (especially mediaeval Catholic) Europe, where an élite class of priests and theologians hold all the secrets and the masses remain in ignorant fear, the writer of the "Systemprogramm" puts forward the ideal of

the masses being introduced painlessly to these secrets through the work of art. The main advantage of the artist over the philosopher would seem to lie in the former's ability to appeal to men's hearts as well as to their minds. What is totally absent is any appeal to the concept of revelation.

j) The "Systemprogramm" ends on a prophetic note:

Ein höherer Geist vom Himmel gesandt, muß diese neue Religion unter uns stiften, sie wird das letzte, größte Werk der Menschheit sein.

[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.299.]

It is perhaps worth noting that the author does not appear to identify himself with this "höherer Geist". This may be a tacit admission on his part that he is not a poet.

Let us now consider who might have written this manifesto. Whoever the author was, he can be said with assurance to have come under the influence of the ideas of a) Kant b) Fichte c) Plato. This would fit very well with what we know of Hölderlin, far less well with Hegel, whose interest in Kant and Fichte at this stage was in its infancy. Also the attitude towards Nature expressed in the section on physics is not in accord with the attitude expressed by Hegel (through Jesus) in the section of "das Leben Jesu" quoted above. In this respect, the attitude of the "Systemprogramm" is Fichtean, not Hegelian. On the other hand, there is no reference to the teleological aspect of Nature in the Kantian/Hölderlinian sense. Nor is there any suggestion of the original "Seyn" posited by Hölderlin in "Über Urtheil und Seyn". On the contrary, the "Ich" and "die Welt" are represented as coming into existence separately and as being in opposition from the outset. If we are to admit Hölderlin as the author of the "Systemprogramm", we must assume that between writing "Urtheil und Seyn" and the "Systemprogramm" he went back from his philosophical position in the former to a strict Fichtean orthodoxy. This does not

seem at all likely in view of the further development of his work in the course of the next ten years.

The second half of the "Systemprogramm" is, as we have seen, far more Hölderlinian in its tone and doctrines. If we are to admit Hegel as its author, we must assume that there has been, in Harris' words, "a major advance in Hegel's theory of human nature" which "involves a revolution in his conception of the relation between "Vernunft" and "Phantasie"". ⁴³ The conception of the "Volkserzieher" (or artist) appealing to the "Herz" of the masses in order to bring them up to an appreciation of the ideas and develop their "Vernunft" is in perfect harmony with Hegel's known ideas at this time; but that is the only use of "Phantasie" or the aesthetic sense in his eyes. In the "Systemprogramm", on the other hand, the conception of the "ästhetischer Sinn" seems to be altogether more Kantian, in the sense that it is involved in the philosopher's apprehension of the Truth rather than merely in his communication of it to others.

Thus, I feel sure that we can exclude the possibility of either Hegel or Hölderlin having written the "Systemprogramm", if one accepts its date as 1796. It is too Fichtean for Hölderlin and too Hölderlinian for Hegel. What other possibility remains?

Let us consider whether Schelling might have composed the piece. I would put the following points forward for consideration:

- a) Schelling at this stage was a fairly orthodox Fichtean in metaphysics.
- b) He was searching for a means of advancing beyond Fichte in the same direction as Hölderlin.
- c) He still maintained the Fichtean theory of the "Ursprung" (put forward in the "Systemprogramm") a year later, in 1797.
- d) The rôle ascribed to poetry in the "Systemprogramm" is identical to that given it by Schelling in the

"System des transzendentalen Idealismus".

There is admittedly no trace of a Spinozan attitude towards Nature, but this could have been developed by Schelling subsequent to the writing of this document.

In conclusion, then, I would say that if one of the three friends must be cited as the author of the "Systemprogramm" and if it was written in 1796, by far the most likely candidate is Schelling. If this proposition could be generally accepted, it would be a great help to us in ascertaining how close Schelling was on Hölderlin's heels, so to speak, in the development and perfection of German Idealism. Leaving out of consideration the Fichtean theory regarding the "Ursprung", there are only two major elements lacking: a Spinozan theory regarding Nature and an Empedoklean/Platonic theory regarding the Unconscious as a vessel of divine revelation. As we have seen, the "Systemprogramm"'s view of poetic creation seems to owe more to Kant's "Kritik der Urteilkraft" than to Plato's "Phaedrus".

By this time, of course, Hölderlin was living in Frankfurt, and had met and was in contact with his Diotima, Susette Gontard. Even his choice of the name "Diotima" for his ideal - and real - beloved is indicative of his philosophical preoccupations: it was, after all, Diotima who taught Sokrates about Love as the binding force between man and the gods.⁴⁴ This is the same binding force that he mentions in his letter to Niethammer dated 24th February 1796:

[Ich] will... das Prinzip finden, das mir die Trennungen, in denen wir denken und existieren, erklärt, das aber auch vermögend ist, den Widerstreit verschwinden zu machen, den Widerstreit zwischen dem Subjekt und dem Objekt, zwischen unserem Selbst und der Welt, ja auch zwischen Vernunft und Offenbarung, - theoretisch in intellektueller Anschauung, ohne daß unsere praktische Vernunft zu Hilfe kommen müßte. Wir bedürfen dafür ästhetischen Sinn...

[Gr.St.A.6/1,p.203.]

From Frankfurt onwards, then, we are confronted with Hölderlin's mature philosophical system. We have already seen how his early interest in the Greeks was decisive in the development of this system. In 1797, with the publication of the first volume of "Hyperion", the public at large, or those amongst them who followed developments closely enough, became aware that German Idealism had taken a further step, with the new attitude towards Nature, and also towards the "Ursprung". In this same year, Schelling started to publish his very un-Fichtean essays on Nature. Something startlingly new had made its appearance on the German philosophical scene.

CHAPTER SIX : CONTINUITY in HÖLDERLIN and SCHELLING

(a) HÖLDERLIN

I have tried to demonstrate in this thesis that there is a consistency and depth to Hölderlin's thought which is impressive on both the literary and the philosophical plain. Whatever others may conclude about the worth of his achievements, it seems clear that he took his life's task very seriously indeed, and would scarcely be flattered if commentators made condescending allowances for the fact that he was "merely" a poet. He would want his work to be judged on its own terms, ambitious as these terms might seem to the professional philosopher or even to the professional student of literature. Like Beethoven in his later years, Hölderlin saw his work as embodying truths more profound than those attainable by philosophy.

Attempts have been made by Germanists and philosophers to prove that Hölderlin and Schelling afford no viable alternative to the more widely defended systems of Kant and Hegel, partly on the grounds that their thought is inconsistent in itself, and therefore not worthy of serious investigation. In the recent past, for example, Jochen Schmidt has published a volume with the provocative title: "Hölderlins später Widerruf".¹ In this book, Schmidt attempts to prove, mainly on the basis of the late odes "Chiron", "Blödigkeit" and "Ganymed", that Hölderlin had a profound change of mind and direction in the last period before his madness. He is supposed to have rejected the Dionysian aspect of his earlier work in favour of classical restraint:

Es ist... das entscheidend Neue der späten Gedichte, daß sie die Entgrenzung nicht mehr als Erlösung aus der Enge des Daseins ersehen, sondern sie abzuwehren versuchen, weil die tatsächliche innere Gefährdung so stark ist, daß nun die Furcht vor der Zerstörung überwiegt.²

This conclusion is in startling contrast to that of

Guido Schmidlin, for example, who sees a symbolic significance in Hölderlin's ultimate madness, equating "der geisteskranke Dichter" with "der absolute Geist".³ In this interpretation, Hölderlin's madness is comparable symbolically with the deaths of Sokrates, Empedokles and Christ. Schmidlin in fact suggests that Hölderlin himself attempted (unsuccessfully) to communicate this symbolism to Schelling: "Hölderlin wollte sich Schelling zeigen und ihm den chironischen Sinn seiner Krankheit zu verstehen geben".⁴

Thus, both Schmidt and Schmidlin refer to the ode "Chiron" - to support diametrically opposed theories concerning the last phase of Hölderlin's poetic activity. It will therefore be of interest in the context of the present chapter to examine the ode in question, and also the adequacy of these two interpretations.

Schmidt's examination of the poem⁵ stresses the restraint and sobriety of the style and tone, the avoidance of all ecstatic emotion, makes considerable play with the description of the state of alienation from Nature and the original "Ur-Teilung" symbolised by the centaur and the "Halbgott"⁶ and by the figure of Prometheus which, as Schmidt points out,⁷ was identified by Sinclair with "Reflexion", "der uns vom Olympus losgerissen". He notes the further division or "Gift" between the "Tatsphäre" in human life (= Herakles) and the "Logossphäre" (= Chiron).⁸ He describes Chiron's rôle in the following terms:

„Als Künstler ringt Chiron nun in Erinnerung an die ursprüngliche Einheit um Synthese des inzwischen Getrennten... Chiron vermag die Synthese nur theoretisch zu imaginieren, nicht wirklich zu gestalten... denn es scheint nun festzustehen, daß gerade die Idealität der Vorstellung die Konstituierung künstlerischer Realität verhindert und daß es Kunst und Dichtung nur geben kann, sofern sie hinter den⁹ idealen Vorstellungen des Künstlers zurückbleibt.

He then turns to the symbol of the "Gewitter", used both in "Chiron" and in the earlier "Blinde Sänger", but

to very different ends in each case, according to Schmidt: in "Chiron", he claims, "statt zum harmonischen Wachstum führt sie zum grenzenlosen Wuchern".¹⁰

He further describes what seems to be a drastic change of direction on Hölderlin's part: "Die Berührung mit der Sphäre des Elementaren kann zerstörend wie Feuer wirken. Die Erde würde dann nicht befruchtet, sondern verbrannt. Wo der blinde Sänger den Einbruch des Elementaren als stärkstes Mittel der Belebung vorbehaltlos bejaht, dort befürchtet Chiron Gefahr und Zerstörung."¹¹

At the end of this analysis comes the following confident statement:

Es kann hier nur skizziert werden, wie nahe Hölderlin mit diesem umfassenden Entwurf, der alle wichtigen Manifestationen des menschlichen Geistes in geschichtlicher Reihenfolge auf ein absolutes Ziel hin ordnet, dem in der 'Phänomenologie des Geistes' und am Schluß der 'Enzyklopädie' entwickelten Grundansatz der Hegelschen Philosophie steht. Im Unterschied zu Schelling, der die Kunst schon im 'System des transcendentalen Idealismus' (1800) an die oberste Stelle rückt, da nach seiner Meinung die ästhetische Anschauung die objektiv gewordene intellektuelle ist, gelangt Hegel zu der gleichen Reihenfolge der Instanzen des Geistes wie Hölderlin: Kunst - Religion - Philosophie. Die Gründe sind nicht bis in jede Nuance, aber doch im wesentlichen die gleichen.¹²

If we examine these topics one by one, we may in the process come to some conclusion as to the adequacy of Schmidt's theory of the "später Widerruf". As far as the style and tone of "Chiron" are concerned, we can agree with Schmidt that the statements are more curt and angular, the word order unusual - all prominent features of Hölderlin's "Spätstil". This, however, is scarcely relevant to the content of the poem, metaphysical or otherwise. If Schmidt is implying, with his references to Friedrich Schlegel and the "Verschmelzung von Individualität und Universalität",¹³ that Hölderlin's earlier poems were simply mindless examples of uncontrolled Romantic "Schwärmerei", and that he suddenly, about the time of "Chiron" (begun on Hölderlin's return from France

in 1802), worried by signs of madness in himself, reverted to a Goethean restraint and Classicism, two points must be mentioned in reply: firstly, the description of Hölderlin's earlier poems and other works¹⁴ is surely inadequate. The style and tone are different, to be sure - more passionate, perhaps, and certainly less obtuse - but that this change is a collapse and an admission of failure rather than merely a change or even a sign of logical progress is something Schmidt fails to prove convincingly. Secondly, even if we are willing to agree that the change in tone between "der Blinde Sänger"(1801) and "Chiron"(1802-3) has its roots in events in Hölderlin's biography, there is no need to assume that it is his own approaching madness which has caused him to make a conscious change of direction. Surely, the death of Diotima in June 1802 is sufficient as an explanation for the lack of ecstatic passion in "Chiron" and others of the "Nachtgesänge" (published together in the "Taschenbuch für das Jahr 1805. Der Liebe und Freundschaft gewidmet"), whose very title can be taken as an expression of the mood brought about by this event:

Weh mir, wo nehm ich, wenn
Es Winter ist, die Blumen, und wo
Den Sonnenschein,
Und Schatten der Erde?
Die Mauern stehn
Sprachlos und kalt, im Winde
Klirren die Fahnen.

("Hälfte des Lebens") [Gr.St.A.2/1,p.117.]

We are more accustomed to think of "Nacht" in Hölderlin in terms of his philosophy of history, but there is no reason why it cannot apply just as easily to the microcosm of the individual as to the macrocosm of the world. When we read in the first stanza of "Chiron" the following lines:

... doch mir zürnt, mich
Hemmt die erstaunende Nacht nun immer.

[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.56.]

we have a darker picture in our minds than that conveyed by the first two stanzas of "Brot und Wein", where "die Nacht" is also termed "die Erstaunende", but is described in a positive fashion in the second stanza, even though she is "die Fremdlingin unter den Menschen" and "wohl wenig bekümmert um uns". The difference in tone could well be due to a change in personal circumstances for Hölderlin between "Brot und Wein" (1800) and "Chiron". The most prominent change is, as stated, the death of Diotima. But whether Hölderlin's biography is necessary at all to explain the tone of the poem is another matter: it is difficult to imagine a lighter or more ecstatic tone being appropriate to the subject - Chiron is, after all, suffering from an unhealable wound.

It is perhaps also worth pointing out that "der Blinde Sänger", which Schmidt wishes to put forward as an example of ecstatic mysticism and formless Romanticism, itself fits well inside the period of the "gesetzlicher Kalkül", having probably been written some months after Hölderlin started work on "der Rhein". In his attempt to point out and emphasise the difference and contrast between the two versions as clearly as possible, in the interest of his larger argument, Schmidt seems to have forgotten that even in the cold calculations of Hölderlin's poetic theory, allowance is made for the fact that different tones predominate in different poems, and in different parts of one poem.

The next main point Schmidt emphasises in his analysis is Hölderlin's description of the state of alienation from Nature:

... Und bei der Sterne Kühle lernst ich,
Aber das Nennbare nur...

[Gr.St.A.2/1, p.56.]

As Schmidt puts it:

'Der auf Nutzung und Erkenntnis bedachte Umgang mit der Natur führt zum Verlust der ursprünglichen Vertrautheit mit ihr, und damit reduzieren sich die nur in dieser Vertrautheit möglichen tieferen, eigentlich lebendigen Naturerfahrungen auf die

bloßen Schemata des verfügenden Zugriffs."¹⁵

Then, more specifically:

'So spricht denn auch die vierte Strophe der Chiron-Ode nicht mehr wie die zweite allgemein und ohne Namen von 'Kräutern', sondern in auffallend definitionistischen Namenfülle von Krokus und Thymian und Korn.¹⁶

The stanza in question runs as follows (with additional lines to complete the sense):

Ich wars wohl. Und von Krokus und Thymian
Und Korn gab mir die Erde den ersten Strauß.
Und bei der Sterne Kühle lernt ich,
Aber das Nennbare nur. Und bei mir

Das wilde Feld entzaubernd, das traurige, zog
Der Halbgott, Zeus Knecht, ein, der gerade Mann..¹⁷
[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.56.]

The "Halbgott" is Herakles. As Schmidt puts it:

Der Einzug des Herakles signalisiert die Trennung, ja die Zerfallenheit des ursprünglich-einigen Seins und zugleich den Beginn des heroisch-mühevollen Integrationsprozesses, an dessen Ende das Sein sich wiederum als ein Ganzes, aber in der Form des Bewußtseins findet.¹⁷

This general idea is, of course, nothing new in Hölderlin's work. Schmidt himself quotes a reference to it in "Hyperion":

Nun sprach ich nimmer zu der Blume, du bist
meine Schwester! und zu den Quellen, wir sind
Eines Geschlechts! ich gab nun treulich, wie ein
Echo, jedem Dinge seinen Namen.¹⁸
[Gr.St.A.III,p.42.]

The concept of the "Ur-Teilung" goes back at least as far as "Urteil und Sein" (1795). The only new element that Schmidt would seem to be trying to bring out in "Chiron" is the "Gift" between the "Tatsphäre" and the "Logossphäre" and Chiron's inability "die Synthese... wirklich zu gestalten".¹⁸

As far as the mythology is concerned, the "Gift" is a reference to the blood of the dead Hydra on Herakles' arrow, with which Chiron was wounded accidentally and incurably - not even death can release him from his tor-

ment, because he is immortal. Hölderlin symbolises in Herakles the agent of the "Ur-Teilung"; the "Aufklärer" who "zog... ein..., Das Wilde Feld entzaubernd". [Gr.St. A.2/1, p.56.] He unintentionally wounded Chiron in the process, and the latter is awaiting Herakles' return to find out if he can give up his immortality in return for the freeing of Prometheus, whose redemption can only occur if a god gives up his immortality for him.

According to Schmidt's interpretation, the "Gift" symbolises the "Dissoziierung"¹⁹ between Herakles and Chiron, the hero and the poet.²⁰ It is therefore necessary for him to take the "uns" in "Weil Gift ist zwischen uns" as being Herakles and Chiron. But this is surely stretching a point: the last mention of Herakles was four lines previously. On the other hand, "frische Erd und Wolken der Liebe" are mentioned in the previous line. It is more natural to take them as being Chiron's partners in the "uns". They symbolise the powers of Nature, the "Licht" in the first stanza, from which the world and Chiron have been alienated by the activities of the "Aufklärer" Herakles. The phrase "Weil Gift ist zwischen uns" is a simple indication of the reason for poetic activity as such: it is the only means whereby the original union destroyed by the "Ur-Teilung" can be re-established, at a conscious level - by "mein Gedanke". There is no indication here that Chiron - or Hölderlin - feels that he has failed, or is failing, in this task. It is, however, an onerous task, hence the need for "ein/Freundlicher Retter".

Chiron himself is thus the only one who can reestablish the lost harmony with Nature, at a higher level. Herakles, who did not intend to wound him in the first place, and who can be equated, symbolically, with his fellow - "Aufklärer" Prometheus, has realised the enormity of his error and the fact that he and Prometheus are ultimately helpless without Chiron, whose eternal bliss as one of the immortals he, Herakles, has ended. Chiron's task is not, as Schmidt suggests,²¹ the "Versöhnung von Gedanke und Tat", but the "Versöhnung" of

mankind with the "Licht" from which it has alienated itself by means of its heroic "Tat", and which it can only come back to by means of Chiron's "Gedanke". The heroic "Tat" of Prometheus and Herakles was a necessary stage. The next stage is in the hands of Chiron.

Chiron, however, cannot consciously achieve this synthesis. Schmidt tries to suggest²² that the "Donnerer" in stanza seven of "Chiron", which is the key stanza by virtue of its solitary, central position, is a negative symbol, unlike its counterpart in "der Blinde Sänger". In the latter poem, as Schmidt would concede, the "Donnerer" and his "Stimme" are positive symbols for the inspiration or inner illumination for which the blind bard has been waiting in order to re-establish the lost harmony with Nature. In "Chiron", however, he claims, the energy of the "Gewitter" leads up to "grenzenloses Wuchern".²³ He takes his evidence for this from stanzas eight and nine, ignoring stanza seven itself completely. He offers no explanation for the fact that the advent of the "Donnerer" in stanza seven leads to the state of affairs that "der Boden/Reiniget sich, und die Qual Echo wird". If we follow him to stanza eight, we find him stressing the negative function of the "üppiges Kraut", relating it to the "üppig neidiges/Unkraut " of "Wenn aber die Himmlischen...". We can agree with Schmidt that this symbol is in itself negative, but that is not all that needs to be said: the symbol's function within the poem is, after all, of decisive importance. Schmidt would have us believe that it is a plastic representation of the "Gefahr des Übermaßes".²⁴ He would seem to imply that its presence in stanza eight is a direct consequence of the advent of the "Donnerer" in stanza seven, and the "gewaltig Feuer" of stanza eight is also a negative, not to say catastrophic consequence of the same event, which he equates with "die Berührung mit der Sphäre des Elementaren".²⁵

This interpretation seems to ignore the positive terms "Retter", "Befreier" and even "tötend" - death or the

renunciation of his immortality represents for Chiron an end to his suffering. The first two lines of the stanza are reminiscent of Christ's activities in Hell after his crucifixion:

Den Retter hör ich dann in der Nacht, ich hör
Ihn tötend, den Befreier...

[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.57.]

The apocalyptic vision of the rest of the stanza, which is taken by Schmidt to represent the negative consequences of the "Donnerer"'s arrival, can surely just as adequately be explained as a depiction of the negative state of affairs which the "Donnerer" and his "Feuer" are meant to purge:

... und drunten voll
Von üppgem Kraut, als in Gesichtern,
Schau ich die Erd, ein gewaltig Feuer;

[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.57.]

When we turn to stanza nine, we find that Schmidt provides a precise paraphrase. The stanza runs:

Die Tage aber wechseln, wenn einer dann
Zusiehet denen, lieblich und bös, ein Schmerz,
Wenn einer zweigestalt ist, und es
Kennet kein einziger nicht das Beste;

[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.57.]

Schmidt paraphrases it as follows: "Die Tage aber wechseln. Wenn einer dann denen zusieht, wie sie bald lieblich, bald bös sind (das Prädikat fehlt), dann ist (wieder fehlt das Prädikat) es ein Schmerz, wenn einer zweigestaltig ist, d.h. wenn er unter dem Eindruck solch zwiespältigen Geschehens nicht weiß, wie er sich entscheiden soll".²⁶ He elucidates his interpretation further: "Zwar erscheint die Nacht, die eine innere Nacht war, durch die Berührung mit der Elementarsphäre überwunden. Doch ist es nicht einfach Tag. Vielmehr gibt es nun Tage ganz verschiedener Art: die Tage 'wechseln'".²⁷

Again, we can agree with Schmidt that Hölderlin is depicting a negative state of affairs. Once more, Schmidt sees this as being a direct consequence of the intervention of or contact with the "Elementarsphäre". There

are, however, some points he seems not to explain. Firstly, if stanza nine is simply a continuation of stanza eight's description of the negative consequences of the "Donnerer"'s arrival, and there is no break or caesura in the sense, why does Hölderlin employ the word "aber": "Die Tage aber wechseln..."? Either Schmidt is wrong about stanza eight or he is wrong about stanza nine - they cannot both have the same import.

Again, Schmidt's paraphrase has a full stop after "wechseln", which the poem does not. He gives no justification for this. The effect of this change is to separate the verb from its adverbs: "lieblich und böse". Hence his need to invent a "Prädikat". He then fails to make a proper caesura between the two halves of the stanza: "ein Schmerz" is surely the start of a completely new section. He takes "einer" in line three to be a person, like the "einer" in line one. This would seem, however, to make "kein einziger" in line four redundant. If "einer" is a person, then what follows would surely be something like "... und er/Kennet nicht das Beste". The "einer" must stand for "ein Tag", which is "zweigeteilt", i.e. an age of mediocrity. Lines one and two thus refer to the variation in the character and quality of the "Tage", the next two lines to the specific situation which obtains when an age is "zweigeteilt".²⁸ The "aber" is there to indicate that the ideal state of affairs brought about by the purgative activities of the "Donnerer" (in world history and in an individual) cannot last. The Absolute has to be stormed anew every time. This is the same situation as that described by Hölderlin in the first stanza of the last triad of "der Rhein":

Dann feiern das Brautfest Menschen und Götter,
Es feiern die Lebenden all,
Und ausgeglichen
Ist eine Weile das Schicksal.
Und die Flüchtlinge suchen die Herberg,
Und süßen Schlummer die Tapfern,
Die Liebenden aber
Sind, was sie waren, sie sind
Zu Hause, wo die Blume sich freuet

Unschädlicher Glut und die finsternen Bäume
Der Geist umsäuselt, aber die Unversöhnten
Sind umgewandelt und eilen
Die Hände sich ehe zu reichen,
Bevor das freundliche Licht
Hinuntergeht und die Nacht kommt.

[Gr.St.A.2/1, pp.147-8.]

The event described in the last two lines of this stanza is the same as that described in stanza nine of "Chiron", especially the first two lines.

Thus, it would seem that Schmidt's interpretation of "Chiron" is less than adequate, in common with the interpretations of others who feel it necessary to make excuses for Hölderlin's ideas and convince us that he realised in the end that the ideas of the 'real' philosophers, in particular Hegel, were of greater import and intellectual value. I hope this thesis has gone some way towards showing convincingly that, if Hölderlin, at any stage in his career, were to consider that his ideas were inferior to those of any contemporary philosopher, this philosopher would most certainly not be Hegel, or, to be more precise: the 'mature' Hegel of the 'Phenomenology', etc..

If we turn now to Schmidlin's interpretation,²⁹ if such it can be termed (it is more of a general discussion of the significance of the Chiron myth for Hölderlin), we find that it is considerably nearer the reality of the situation, if only in the respect that Schmidlin's main concern is to demonstrate the close relationship between the work of Hölderlin and that of Schelling, rather than Hegel. I have referred to Schmidlin's ideas earlier in this chapter. In the context of the present discussion, I should like to confine myself to an outline of his interpretation of the Chiron myth's significance for Hölderlin, and of how it differs from Schmidt's ideas on the subject.

In line with his general concentration on the rela-

tionship between Hölderlin and Schelling, Schmidlin deals with Chiron more as a "Lehrer der Naturwissenschaft"³⁰ than as simply a poet: "Ein 'ursprünglicher' Lehrer nämlich ist der Dichter für den Naturphilosophen, indem er dessen naturphilosophischen Standpunkt aus dem Ursprung erst ermöglicht, ihn in den 'Gesichtspunkt' versetzt, aus dem sich 'die Natur am besten einsehn läßt'".³¹ Without going into Schelling's ideas at this point, we can simply note that Schmidlin sees the Chiron myth as being central to Hölderlin's later poetry, seeing it as part of the wider Prometheus myth, and relating it to the Herakles and Christ myths. There is no suggestion of any change of course in the ode "Chiron". On the contrary, this myth complex is seen by Schmidlin as being the main means whereby Hölderlin fulfilled his "mythologische Aufgabe" from the turn of the century onwards.³²

Schmidt also deals with Chiron as an "Erzieher",³³ but simply in his traditional rôle as a "Heldenerzieher". He sees this aspect coming out chiefly in the last stanza of "Chiron". He takes it as further confirmation of the rejection of the Dionysian element by the late Hölderlin: "Denn die Ode führt ja von einem ursprünglichen, harmonischen Naturzustand... zu einer - allerdings ungemein sublim, weil als höchste Bewußtseinsleistung verstandenen - 'örtlichen' Fixierung und sogar 'städtischen' Zivilisierung, wie die antithetische Pointierung durch den als 'unstädtisch' bezeichneten Ursprungszustand der 'Väter' zeigt."³⁴

Quite apart from the fact that the "Knabe" in the last stanza of 'Chiron'³⁵ would seem to be encouraged simply to go to meet the returning Herakles - I can see no suggestion that he is being told to set up a free market economy or anything of the sort - we can note the similarity with Schmidlin's position, that the centaur is seen as an "Erzieher". The difference between Schmidt and Schmidlin lies in the question of the matter of this "Erziehung". Schmidlin sees "die Naturwissenschaft" as the main subject Chiron is qualified to teach. In this,

he has the direct support of an unequivocal statement by Hölderlin (something Schmidt seems to lack consistently):

"Centauren sind deswegen auch ursprünglich Lehrer der Naturwissenschaft, weil sich aus jenem Gesichtspunkte die Natur am besten einsehn läßt."

[Gr.St.A.5, p.289.]

If we are correct in equating the centaur with the poet, this statement would mean that the latter, by virtue of his special gift for "Selbstvertiefung", can reveal, in his moments of inspiration, the profoundest truths about Nature. Schmidlin tries to lend specific content to Hölderlin's "Lehre" by claiming a "Chironic" meaning for Hölderlin's journeys in the last years before his ultimate madness, and for the madness itself. Whatever the truth may be regarding the symbolism of the journeys, there is some considerable evidence for Hölderlin having regarded his madness as being symbolic. Quite apart from the matter of the "divine fury" of the poets in Plato, it is interesting to note that in Hölderlin's later works there consistently appears a poet figure - Empedokles, Chiron, etc. - who ultimately commits an act of self-sacrifice for others which is at the same time a release for him from some torment. In most cases, this act involves death, but in Hölderlin's own case, it is, of course, the sacrifice of his sanity. It is significant in this context that death for Hölderlin was something positive, as in the second last stanza of "der Rhein":

... bis in den Tod
Kann aber ein Mensch auch
Im Gedächtnis doch das Beste behalten,
Und dann erlebt er das Höchste.

[Gr.St.A.2/1, p.148.]

If Hölderlin's case is to be taken as directly parallel to those of his poet-heroes, madness must also be taken as something ultimately positive.³⁶

Again, there is the matter of Hölderlin's journey to and return from Bordeaux, which, following Schmidlin, we

might regard as a trip away from Hölderlin's own geographical "Ursprung" (ie. Germany). On his return to his "Ursprung", he showed signs of madness. To put it in abstract terms, and to follow the symbolism through to its logical conclusion: the return to the "Ursprung", which is equivalent to the reaching of the Absolute, is a return to original Chaos. In a similar fashion, Empedokles re-attains his lost harmony with the powers of Nature by throwing himself in a volcano - the inside of the volcano is Chaos: "Uralte Verwirrung".

This may seem to some to be crass irrationalism and "Schwärmerei". However, the concept of the Absolute as Chaos is at the root of the Romantic world-view, and of the mystical world-view in general. Jakob Böhme, such a profound influence on Romanticism in general and Schelling in particular (also Kant), had a similar theory, as Nicholas Berdyaev points out: "To Boehme, chaos is the root of nature, chaos, that is to say, freedom. The 'Ungrund', the will, is an irrational principle. In the Godhead itself there is a groundless will, in other words, an irrational principle. Darkness and freedom in Boehme are always correlative and coinherent. Freedom even is God himself and it was in the beginning of all things." ³⁷

Whether or not we accept this theory regarding the symbolism of Hölderlin's madness - and the present writer would be inclined to accept it - it would seem evident that any theory produced, by Jochen Schmidt or others, to the effect that Hölderlin had a profound change of heart when his madness began to make itself apparent, and became a Goethean Neo-Classicist or a Hegelian, is without support from the texts of his poems, or from any other source. In fact, if we grant him the honour of taking his ideas seriously, any such change of mind on his part would have been an act of cowardice and treason against all he had stood for throughout his career. The poet had to renounce conscious control over his creative processes

in the last analysis, because his work, if it was to have any worth, had to be a revelation from the depths of his psyche:

Nah ist
Und schwer zu fassen der Gott.
Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst
Das Rettende auch.

[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.165.]

Finally, in our discussion of this myth complex (Chiron - Herakles - Prometheus) and its significance for Hölderlin, it will perhaps be convenient to discuss briefly Hegel's pronouncements on the subject. His interpretation of the Prometheus myth does not seem to jar noticeably with the Hölderlinian view:

... seine Künste und Erfindungen, die zur Bildung des Menschen gehören, beziehen sich nur auf die Bedürfnisse des Menschen, sind nur für das Leben überhaupt - es sind keine sittlichen Gewalten, Gesetze usf.. Diese kommen dem Zeus zu; das Sittliche ist nicht titanisch, es gehört den neuen Göttern an. In einer Vorstellung bei Plato, wo er von Prometheus spricht, heißt es, er habe zwar das Feuer aus der Akropolis geholt, aber die *πολιτεία*, das Sittliche unter den Menschen, habe er nicht bringen können; sie sei in der Burg des Zeus aufbewahrt gewesen, Zeus habe sie sich vorbehalten. Prometheus wird an den Kaukasus geschmiedet, und ein Geier nagt beständig an seiner immer wachsenden Leber - ein Schmerz, der nie aufhört. Was Prometheus die Menschen gelehrt, sind nur solche Geschicklichkeiten, welche die Befriedigung natürlicher Bedürfnisse angehen. In der bloßen Befriedigung dieser Bedürfnisse ist nie eine Sättigung, sondern das Bedürfnis wächst immer fort und die Sorge ist immer neu - das ist durch jenen Mythos angedeutet.³⁸

Thus, Hegel, like Hölderlin, stresses the ultimate hopelessness of Prometheus' position and the fact that he has alienated himself - and mankind - from the "ursprüngliche Harmonie", although the latter does not have the same significance for Hegel as for Hölderlin. As far as Hegel is concerned, the pre-Promethean situation of mankind was one of superstition and a failure to realise man's superiority over the rest of Nature, in particular

the animal kingdom. Prometheus, he claims, lifted the taboo which obtained among the ancient Indians and Egyptians against slaughtering animals. Thus, the pre-Promethean situation is very different in the two systems, but Prometheus's own situation (and his achievement) are similar. For Hegel, Prometheus' action and achievement are of considerable value, an improvement, but ultimately inadequate. For Hölderlin, they are unfortunate, a deterioration, but a necessary stage on the way to a higher state of affairs.

When we turn to Hegel's treatment of the Herakles myth, we find that the discrepancy between his views and Hölderlin's becomes clearer. First he states:

Die Heroen sind... nicht unmittelbar Götter,
sie müssen erst durch Arbeit sich in das Göttliche setzen. 39

This would be impossible in Hölderlin's account - no amount of "Arbeit" would enable the hero to achieve this without the aid of the poet figure, Chiron.

Hegel continues:

Unter den Göttern ist... Herakles... besonders zu bemerken. Er ist der einzige Gott, der vorgestellt ist als Mensch, der unter die Götter versetzt wird. Er ist ein menschliches Individuum, das es sich hat sauer werden lassen: er hat im Dienste gestanden und sich durch Arbeit den Himmel errungen. Er ist rein geistige Individualität als solche, als Mensch. Diese geistige Individualität des Menschen steht höher als Zeus und Apollo; denn die menschliche Geistigkeit ist freie, reine, abstrakte Subjektivität ohne Naturbestimmtheit. 40

This would have been absolute hubris to Hölderlin. Thus, Hegel's delineation of the significance of these myths differs in important respects from Hölderlin's, perhaps most importantly in the absence of any possible rôle for Chiron: Prometheus remains bound, Herakles manages to reach the level of the gods on his own, through "Arbeit". There is surely no possibility of reading these Hegelian concepts into Hölderlin's "Chiron" or any other of his later works.

(b) SCHELLING

The continuity dispute with regard to Schelling over the last few decades centres around the works of two scholars: Horst Fuhrmans and Walter Schulz. Fuhrmans is the main proponent of the view that Schelling had a profound change of mind at some point in his career, and that he was trying to achieve something entirely different in his latter years, having left Idealism behind; Schulz, on the other hand, claims that Schelling's work is consistent within itself, and that his last works are a logical consequence of the earliest writings. To a large extent, of course, this argument takes place on territory well outside the chronological scope of this dissertation, in that the works of Schelling which are the objects of the dispute were mostly written after Hölderlin had been effectively silenced by the onset of madness. The discussion around Schelling does, however, provide an interesting parallel and contrast to the corresponding dispute around Hölderlin's later poems, dealt with in the first half of this chapter: a parallel in the sense that both Hölderlin and Schelling are supposed to have had a profound change of direction at some point in their respective careers; a contrast in that the direction of the supposed change is very different in each case, Hölderlin's change being allegedly towards Hegelian rationalism, Schelling's towards mystical Christianity.

Fuhrmans puts forward his theory of non-continuity in two main works: "Schellings letzte Philosophie" (1940), and "Schellings Philosophie der Weltalter" (1954). The remarkable thing about these two volumes is that they contain two conflicting statements regarding the date of Schelling's conversion from Idealism to mystical Christianity: according to Fuhrmans' first book, Schelling changed direction around 1827, whereas "Schellings Philosophie der Weltalter" puts the break far earlier, around 1801.

The argument of his first book is much concerned with

the opposition of the two terms "positive Philosophie" and "negative Philosophie". This distinction is central to an understanding of Schelling's work and, in particular, of his ferocious criticism of Hegel in his later years. The basic difference between the two might be described in the following terms: negative philosophy deals solely with abstract concepts and reasoning; positive philosophy is concerned with empirical reality (to which belong, in Schelling's view, such elements as revelation and mythology). To Schelling, the main flaw in Hegel's system was that it tried to achieve through negative philosophy what could only be achieved by the positive variety. He thought that Hegel had reverted to the "one-sided exaggeration" of Fichte,¹ and had thereby aligned himself with the rationalist tradition stemming from Descartes, which puts trust in the unaided human reason as the means of ascertaining the ultimate metaphysical truth(-s) about reality. The dialectically opposed tradition starting with Spinoza in modern times, is neglected in the process. Hölderlin and Schelling, on the other hand, had seen the task before them as being that of combining the two strands, the one starting from the "Ich", the other from God (or Nature). Each element has its rôle to play. As Hermann Zeltner puts it: "Die negative Philosophie sucht, 'durch eine umfassende dialektische Entwicklung den Begriff des göttlichen Seins' und damit des Absoluten zu gewinnen. Hier aber hat sie der Philosophie der Erfahrung Platz zu machen, d.h. der undialektisch vorgehenden positiven Philosophie, 'die Gott als Anfang hat'".²

Kant had shown that reason alone could not reach the thing in itself, or the Absolute. God, freedom and immortality were merely postulates, ie. they could not be proved to be necessary. One must therefore give up the search for sure knowledge of such matters or (and this is the path chosen by Hölderlin and Schelling) look elsewhere. Zeltner again: "Die Grundunterschiede von negativer und positiver Philosophie sind aber nicht die von Wesen

und Existenz, sondern von Notwendigkeit und Nicht-Notwendigkeit,³ negative Philosophie vermag zu ergreifen, was logisch gefordert und notwendig ist..., das Nicht-Notwendige ist nicht nur das Zufällige, sondern 'alles Geschehen aus Freiheit', und diese 'zweite Grenze aller apriorischen Philosophie' interessiert 'Schelling im Grunde allein primär'".⁴

Fuhrmans, however, identifies the "negative Philosophie", the dialectics, with Philosophical Idealism per se. Now, if one accepts this definition, it is easy to see the problem in including such late works as the "Philosophie der Mythologie" (1842) and the "Philosophie der Offenbarung" (1841 ff.), both published posthumously, within that definition. Zeltner describes Fuhrmans' conclusions in the following terms: "Für ihn ist die Spätphilosophie bestimmt durch die 'Wende zu einem christlich orientierten Denken'; 'das philosophisch Bedeutsame' ist nach ihm: 'In dieser ganzen Wende vollzieht sich gleichzeitig ein faktischer Bruch mit dem Idealismus, und zwar ein notwendiger Bruch' ... Geschichte kann.. nicht mehr, wie im Idealismus, als kontinuierlicher Aufstieg aufgefaßt werden, es gibt einen Bruch zwischen der vollkommenen Welt der Schöpfung und der abgefallenen Welt, ebenso wie zwischen dieser und der Welt der Erlösung."⁵

The tripartite process described in the last clause could serve as an adequate description of the plot of Hölderlin's "Hyperion" - published in the late 1790's! Thus, if we are to take Fuhrmans' arguments seriously, Schelling waited until either 1801 or 1827 to adopt a philosophical position which his close friend and associate Hölderlin, with whom he was in constant contact throughout the '90's, had held and put into published works years previously. The first volume of "Hyperion" was published in 1797, but Hölderlin still had not lost interest in the dialectics as a thought process in 1801, when he wrote "der Rhein" - for him at least, a rejection of "kontinuierlicher Aufstieg" does not necessarily in-

volve a rejection of the dialectics.

A far more convincing explanation for the two 'halves' in Schelling's work is, in my view, that the dialectical method, which Fuhrmans likes to identify with Philosophical Idealism, is in reality merely the method appropriate to one half or element in it: the "negative Philosophie". Schelling stresses the dualism of his approach to philosophy from the outset, in such works as the "Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kriticismus" (1795):

Wer über Freiheit und Nothwendigkeit nachgedacht hat, fand von selbst, daß diese Principien im Absoluten vereinigt seyn müssen - Freiheit, weil das Absolute aus unbedingter Selbstmacht, Nothwendigkeit, weil es eben deßwegen nur den Gesetzen seines Seyns, der innern Nothwendigkeit seines Wesens gemäß handelt. In ihm ist kein Wille mehr, der von einem Gesetze abweichen könnte, aber auch kein Gesetz mehr, das es sich nicht selbst erst durch seine Handlungen gäbe, kein Gesetz, das, unabhängig von seinen Handlungen, Realität hätte. Absolute Freiheit und absolute Nothwendigkeit sind identisch.

Towards the end of the same work, Schelling addresses himself in a critical manner to unnamed people who represent the point of view normally identified with Philosophical Idealism:

Ihr, die ihr selbst an die Vernunft glaubt, warum klagt ihr die Vernunft darüber an, daß sie nicht zu ihrer eignen Zerstörung arbeiten kann, daß sie eine Idee nicht realisieren kann, deren Wirklichkeit alles zerstören würde, was ihr selbst mühsam genug aufgebaut habt? Daß es die ändern thun, die mit der Vernunft selbst von jeher entzweit sind, und deren Interesse es ist, über sie Klagen zu führen, wundert mich nicht. Aber daß ihr es thut, die ihr selbst die Vernunft als ein göttliches Vermögen in uns preist! - Wie wollet ihr denn eure Vernunft gegen die höchste Vernunft behaupten, die für die eingeschränkte endliche Vernunft offenbar nur die absoluteste Passivität übrig ließe. Oder, wenn ihr die Idee eines objektiven Gottes voraussetzt, wie könnt ihr von Gesetzen sprechen, die die Vernunft aus sich selbst hervorbringt, da doch Autonomie allein einem absolut freien Wesen zukommen kann... Ihr klagt die Vernunft an, daß sie von Dingen an sich, von Ob-

jekten einer übersinnlichen Welt nichts wisse. Habt ihr nie - nie auch nur dunkel - geahnt, daß nicht die Schwäche eurer Vernunft, sondern die absolute Freiheit in euch die intellektuale Welt für jede objektive Macht unzugänglich macht, daß nicht die Eingeschränktheit eures Wissens, sondern eure uneingeschränkte Freiheit, die Objekte des Erkennens in die Schranken bloßer Erscheinungen gewiesen hat?

This description of the Kantian position, with its radical criticism, reveals the essential problematics of Schelling's philosophy right up to the end of his career. Ultimately, neither Fichte nor Hegel was able to solve the problem delineated by Schelling here. How can one imagine a God who is a mere passive object perceived by man's reason? But if one posits an active God, an all-embracing ego of the human variety, what place is there for the free will and reason of a mere man? Spinoza's answer to this was simple: there is no place for them. The German Idealists were unwilling to accept this conclusion, but they still had to face the problem. Hegel never solved it: his system, with its development of human reason, rising out of chaos and superstition and ultimately out of nothing, stands only if one rejects the possibility a priori of an active God, who, were He to exist, would bring Hegel's carefully constructed system tumbling down.

The only serious attempt to solve this dilemma of Idealism is provided by Schelling's system, in which the ultimate truths about reality, which Kant rightly saw could not be ascertained by mere human logic, are found by the "positive Philosophie" with its empirical description of the contents of three sources of knowledge concerning these ultimate truths: Mythology, Revelation and Art. These are the three sources, according to Schelling, of the pronouncements of the active God, who is otherwise left out of the reckoning by the main representatives of German Idealism: Kant, Fichte and Hegel. For Hegel, God comes at the end, not the beginning, as Walter Schulz points out: "... wenn die Vernunft Gott nur in

der Ungedachtheit, der Unbewegtheit hatte, dann konnte ihr bewußtes Haben, d.h. ihr Denken, nur zu einem gedachten Gott führen, zu einem Gott, mit dem nichts anzu- fangen ist. Schelling nennt diesen gedachten Gott den 'Gott am Ende', d.h. den Gott, der im Widerspruch zu sich selbst steht, weil er nicht lebendiger, wirkender Geist, sondern nur 'substantieller Geist' ist; und als einen solchen Gott bezeichnet er den 'absoluten Geist' Hegels..."⁸

This nefarious concept of the "Gott am Ende", then, is the result of Hegel ignoring the warnings of Kant as to the limits of human logic and reason. The latter has its place, being responsible for the immense advances in science and mathematics since ancient Greece, with the resulting material benefits (and drawbacks) for mankind. There is, however, a limit to its domain. Fuhrmans maintains that Schelling, in his last period, saw the main flaw of all modern systems of philosophy as being their logical character. It is easy to see how he would gain this impression from Schelling's polemics against the Hegelian system on the grounds of the latter's purely logical character. But Schelling's earlier works are themselves of a logical nature - his criticism of Hegel is simply that he (Hegel) takes this logical part for the whole of his system. Schelling's works can indeed be divided between the earlier logical works ("die negative Philosophie") and the later empirical works ("die positive Philosophie"), but this does not represent a break, but simply a working-out of the dualist system foreseen from the very outset, or at least from the point where Schelling saw the need to go beyond Fichte.

Robert F. Brown, who describes himself as a disciple of Fuhrmans and Tillich in the matter of Schelling interpretation, makes what appears to be an attempt to explain the different dates given for the break in Schelling's work by Fuhrmans in his two works when he writes: "Although the 'positive philosophy' proper does not begin until about 1827, Schelling's preoccupation with the problems of Christian theism and the doctrine of crea-

tion in the years immediately after 1806 lays the foundation for it."⁹

Now, Fuhrmans had seen the kernel of the matter, in his second book, as being a change in Schelling's ideas concerning God: from being a pantheist in his earlier career, he gradually goes over to a theist position. Theism is a sufficiently vague and indefinite doctrine,¹⁰ but for the purposes of the present discussion (and I trust I do no violence to Fuhrmans' position) one can take it to apply to the belief in a specific separate entity called God who is the first cause of the universe, which emanates from Him, rather than being identical with him as the pantheists hold.

It is easy to see how a reading of Schelling's "positive Philosophie" would lead one to regard him as a theist pure and simple. The revelations contained in art, mythology etc. must emanate from a specific being or entity who reveals their contents. Ordinarily, pantheism does not have room for such a specific and separate entity. Kant is a theist, but his restriction of the "Ich"'s possibilities for knowledge makes a serious study of such matters as revelation a pipe-dream. Fichte rejects Kant's theism, and Hegel's "Geist" is scarcely a theistic concept (it is far nearer, in fact, to pantheism, being exclusively immanent in the universe). Schelling, on the other hand, lays stress on the God in the beginning, the first cause, the moving force. This would seem to imply a desertion of pantheism, as Fuhrmans maintains. Brown puts the change in Schelling's thought down to the influence of Jakob Böhme. In doing so, he claims to be supporting the Fuhrmans account of Schelling's career, with its posited rejection of pantheism (ie. the Spinozan element) and of the dialectics.

With Brown's arguments, however, an added complication arises. So far, we have seen ourselves faced with two clear alternative Schellingian Gods: God as the whole or God as a separate prime mover (the "Gott am Ende" being recog-

nised as fundamentally un-Schellingian, at any stage in his career). The first alternative can easily be demonstrated never to have been the Schellingian doctrine. In the "Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kritikismus" (admittedly published in 1795, before Schelling began his series of Spinozan works on Nature), he gives his views on the deity in some detail. His purpose in writing the work is explained at the very beginning, in the "Vorerinnerung", in these terms:

Mehrere Phänomene haben den Verfasser dieser Briefe überzeugt, daß die Grenzen, welche die Kritik der reinen Vernunft zwischen Dogmatismus und Kritikismus gezogen hat, für viele Freunde dieser Philosophie noch nicht scharf genug bestimmt seyen. Trügt er sich nicht, so ist man im Begriff, aus den Trophäen des Kritikismus ein neues System des Dogmatismus zu erbauen, an dessen Stelle wohl jeder aufrichtige Denker das alte Gebäude zurückwünschen möchte.

Years later, he described his purpose in more precise terms:

Die Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kritikismus enthalten eine lebhafteste Polemik gegen den damals fast allgemeingeltenden und vielfach gemißbrauchten sogenannten moralischen Beweis von der Existenz Gottes, aus dem Gesichtspunkt des damals nicht weniger allgemein herrschenden Gegensatzes von Subjekt und Objekt.

What precisely does Schelling find obnoxious in the thought of a new system of Dogmatism? We need look no further than the beginning of the first letter:

Ich verstehe Sie, theurer Freund! Es dünkt Ihnen größer, gegen eine absolute Macht zu kämpfen und kämpfend unterzugehen, als sich zum voraus gegen alle Gefahr durch einen moralischen Gott zu sichern. Allerdings ist dieser Kampf gegen das Unermeßliche nicht nur das Erhabenste, was der Mensch zu denken vermag, sondern meinem Sinne nach selbst das Princip aller Erhabenheit. Aber ich möchte wissen, wie Sie die Macht selbst, mit der sich der Mensch dem Absoluten entgegenstellt, und das Gefühl, das diesen Kampf begleitet, im Dogmatismus erklärbar fänden. Der consequente Dogmatismus geht nicht auf Kampf, sondern auf Unterwerfung, nicht auf gewaltsamen, sondern auf freiwilligen Untergang, auf stille Hingabe meiner

selbst ans absolute Objekt: jeder Gedanke an Widerstand und kämpfende Selbstmacht had sich aus einem bessern Systeme in den Dogmatismus herübergefunden.¹³

This work, then, is an attempt to defend the claims of the individual "Ich" against those of an omnipotent deity, whether of the traditional Spinozan variety or stemming from Kant's practical postulates.¹⁴ At this period, Schelling was still ostensibly a disciple of Fichte, but he was already showing some very un-Fichtean signs of sympathy for certain aspects of Spinoza's system, a sympathy which was soon to lead him to embark on his study of Nature in a sense completely alien to Fichte's ideas on the subject. When Fuhrmans and Brown talk of Schelling as a pantheist, they are presumably thinking of this attitude towards Nature. But even in the period of his main works on the subject (1797-1800), there is no sense in which Schelling can be described as a simple Spinozan pantheist. He always maintains his post-Kantian concern for the rights of the subject. In fact, his very criticism of Fichte, plus his turning towards the new philosophy of Nature, are not conditioned by his concern to assert the rights of Spinoza's all-powerful or all-embracing 'Deus sive natura' - but, paradoxically, to free the individual subject, which he saw as being threatened by the Fichtean system just as much as by Spinoza's.

Schelling explains clearly his attitude towards Nature at the beginning of his "Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur" (1797):

Wie eine Welt außer uns, wie eine Natur und mit ihr Erfahrung möglich sey, diese Frage verdanken wir der Philosophie, oder vielmehr mit dieser Frage entstand Philosophie. Vorher hatten die Menschen im (philosophischen) Naturstande gelebt. Damals war der Mensch noch einig mit sich selbst und der ihn umgebenden Welt. In dunkeln Rückerinnerungen schwebt dieser Zustand auch dem verirrtesten Denker noch vor. Viele verließen ihn niemals und wären glücklich in sich selbst, wenn sie nicht das leidige Beispiel verführte; denn freiwillig entläßt die Natur keinen aus ihrer Vormund-

schaft, und es gibt keine geborenen Söhne der Freiheit. Es wäre auch nicht zu begreifen, wie der Mensch je jenen Zustand verlassen hätte, wüßten wir nicht, daß sein Geist, dessen Element Freiheit ist, sich selbst frei zu machen strebt, sich den Fesseln der Natur und ihrer Vorsorge entwinden und dem ungewissen Schicksal seiner eigenen Kräfte überlassen mußte, um einst als Sieger und durch eigenes Verdienst in jenen Zustand zurückzukehren, in welchem er, unwissend über sich selbst, die Kindheit seiner Vernunft verlebte.¹⁵

Thus, at the period of his greatest interest in and concentration on Nature, Schelling still sees his main interest, and that of philosophy, as being the freedom of the individual. This is radically different from the determinism of Spinoza's system, where the individual is simply an attribute of an infinite substance, free will and contingency mere illusions. If by pantheism Fuhrmans understands the strictly Spinozan variety, we must conclude that Schelling never supported it.

There is no denying that Schelling admired certain elements in Spinoza's system and appropriated them to incorporate into his own. Later in the same work, he states:

Der erste, der Geist und Materie mit vollem Bewußtsein als Eines, Gedanke und Ausdehnung nur als Modifikationen desselben Princips ansah, war Spinoza. Sein System war der erste kühne Entwurf einer schöpferischen Einbildungskraft, der in der Idee des Unendlichen, rein als solchen, unmittelbar das Endliche begriff und dieses nur in jenem erkannte.¹⁶

Thus the element in Spinoza's system which appealed to Schelling was not its determinism but its attempt to combine and unify the subject and the object split up in the "Ur-Teilung", to use Hölderlin's terminology. This is a reference to Spinoza's theory of the parallel modifications of different attributes of one infinite substance. As Copleston puts it, Spinoza held "that the infinite divine substance is indivisible, unique and eternal and that in God existence and essence are one and the same."¹⁷

This is the positive aspect for Schelling, then:

Spinoza, wie es scheint, sehr frühzeitig bekümmert über den Zusammenhang unsrer Ideen mit den Dingen außer uns, konnte die Trennung nicht ertragen, die man zwischen beiden gestiftet hatte. Er sah ein, daß in unserer Natur Ideale und Reales¹⁸ (Gedanke und Gegenstand) innigst vereinigt sind.

However, at the same time, he never lost sight of the main drawback to Spinoza's solution, the swamping of the individual "Ich":

Anstatt aber in die Tiefen seines Selbstbewußtseins hinabzusteigen und von dort aus dem Entstehen zweier Welten in uns - der idealen und realen - zuzusehen, überflog er sich selbst; anstatt aus unsrer Natur zu erklären, wie Endliches und Unendliches, ursprünglich in uns vereinigt, wechselseitig aus einander hervorgehen, verlor er sich so gleich in der Idee eines Unendlichen außer uns... Denn weil es in seinem System vom Unendlichen zum Endlichen keinen Uebergang gab, so war ihm ein Anfang des Werdens so unbegreiflich, als ein Anfang des Seyns.¹⁹

Thus, to Schelling, the passive "Naturzustand" is something which obtains at the outset of human history. Like Hegel, he approves of the rise of human reason above this primitive condition. The crucial difference lies in the ultimate destination: Hegel likes to see reason rising ever higher and further away from its roots in Nature, whereas Schelling sees reason's destiny as a return to its roots, "als Sieger... zurückzukehren";²⁰

Now, R.F. Brown maintains that this element in Schelling's thought is a direct result of the influence of the mystical doctrines of Jakob Böhme, which he sees as coming into play during "the transitional years of 1804-1808".²¹

There is no doubt that Schelling was interested in the works of Böhme. Nor is there any doubt that Böhme's ideas concerning the self-revelation of the deity bear a striking resemblance to the Schellingian dialectical process as described above. The only point on which doubt might be cast is the question of the extent to which Schelling was directly influenced by Böhme to change his

mind on these matters. It would seem clear to the present writer that this cannot be the case. We have already seen that, far from espousing straightforward pantheism in the 1790's, Schelling had already, in the period of his writings on Nature, adopted a system of dialectics compatible with Böhme's ideas - several years previous to the time Brown sees as the start of the Böhme influence. The dialectical theory of history, the interest in the pronouncements of the active God, the return to the "Ursprung" - all this can be found in Hölderlin's work. Why then look elsewhere for the roots of Schelling's "positive Philosophie"? Of course, Böhme may well have been an inspiration to them both, in the 1790's. But, even if this could be proved,²² it would in no way support Brown's claim that Böhme is the cause for a split in the middle of Schelling's work, and his supposed rejection of Idealism after he had written his "negative Philosophie". It is quite possible (or even probable) that Schelling adopted details from Böhme to fill out the body of his later works, but it seems clear that there is no sense in which Böhme can be said to have changed Schelling's position radically. His interest in Böhme can be explained quite satisfactorily by the fact that he found in the mystic's works ideas very similar to those he and Hölderlin had already worked out in the 1790's. This is not to say, of course, that Schelling never changed his views on anything at any time in his career. In particular, his works before 1797 are immature, in the sense that certain elements had not yet been thought through properly. However, it is nearer to the facts of the case, in my view, to see his subsequent development as organic and necessary, rather than haphazard.

Thus, in conclusion, we can say with some assurance that Schulz's view of Schelling's work is nearer the truth than Fuhrmans', if only for the reason that there would appear to be very little of substance in Schelling's last works which is not foreshadowed in the works Friedrich Hölderlin produced in the 1790's and the early

years of the new century. In particular, the career of Hölderlin's Hyperion in the novel is a direct parallel to Schelling's philosophy of history and his views on the arousal, development and ultimate goal of human consciousness.

Fuhrmans and his followers are, I would maintain, mistaken if they wish to describe Schelling in the late 1790's as a simple pantheist, for the reasons stated above. They are equally mistaken if they see him in his later years as a simple Christian theist, or irrational mystic. The "Philosophy of Revelation" and similar works are not written simply on the basis of some new-found religious faith: they are a logical consequence of his early work. The God who reveals himself is not merely the postulate of religious dogma - he is proved to be necessary by the negative philosophy. Herein lies the ultimate "Verdienst" of the negative philosophy. As Schulz puts it: "Daß man Gott nur als einen denken kann, entspringt also nach Schelling nicht einer bestimmten religionsgeschichtlichen These, sondern ist eine philosophische Einsicht, denn Gott ist der Inbegriff der Möglichkeiten, das Seiende selbst, das nicht zweimal vorkommen kann".²³

This can be termed Theism in the sense outlined above - reason claiming that God must be there as a first cause. Schelling simply accepted the logical consequences of the theistic position, and proceeded^e, in his "positive Philosophie", to an empirical investigation of the activities of this God. Schulz continues: "Aber das ist nur negative Philosophie, denn jener Begriff Gottes, das Seiende zu sein, ist eben nur ein Vorbegriff: 'die Materie der Gottheit, aber nicht die Gottheit selbst' (12,25). Die negative Philosophie bringt es nur zum theistischen Begriff, in dem die Persönlichkeit nicht begriffen werden kann..."²⁴

The difference might be clarified in the following terms: the theistic position achieved by the negative philosophy might be compared with the position of a child

of an unmarried mother who knows he must have had a father, but has never met him and has no knowledge of his physical appearance, character, etc.; the position ultimately achieved by the positive philosophy, however, is the more satisfactory one of the child of a normal family who sees his father every day and knows him intimately. The second child's knowledge is not based on logic or reason, but on empirical contact. This empirical contact is what Schelling believed he had found in the contents of the unconscious (of the poet, of mankind).

CHAPTER SEVEN : "CONCLUSION"

In this final chapter, I should like to draw the threads of my argument together, and in particular sketch out a comparative evaluation of the two major views of man, human history and the universe which were developed in the wake of the revolution in German thought brought about by the works and influence of Kant. In order to achieve this, I shall attempt a comparative study (in brief) of two central works: Hölderlin's "Hyperion" and Hegel's "Phänomenologie des Geistes". The former is Hölderlin's first mature public statement of his philosophical position. We have seen in a previous chapter how he came to develop this position in the pre-Frankfurt period. By the time he moved to that town in the last days of 1795, his ideas had come through their growing pains to something approaching their definitive form. Much has been said in the course of this thesis about "influences" of one type or another. What I hope I have made clear is my conviction that, in the first half of the decade, Hölderlin was searching for a system which would synthesise the best elements in the work of the thinkers he admired most: Empedokles, Plato, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte. In a way, even these thinkers cannot be seen as "influences" in any complete sense, since Hölderlin's philosophical efforts are largely an attempt, in my view, to build a philosophical defence or explanation of his own spontaneous artistic intuition, which he trusted far more than any abstract philosophical construction or dogma. He was interested in philosophers whose ideas were in harmony with this intuition or vision.

When we see him in Frankfurt, he has ceased his search. His system is complete. Any future "influences" will have to fit into his system, rather than him adapting his system to suit them. The same applies with regard to Schelling as of 1797, in my view. Let us now consider Hölderlin's conclusions and his position in 1796. This was the year

not only of the development of his relationship with Diotima, but also of his travels with her and Heinse. The latter had long been an enthusiastic admirer of Spinoza, and I feel it can be safely assumed that the two discussed his work eagerly.

In the first half of the year, Hölderlin may have carried on with what is known as the "vorletzte Fassung" of his novel. This version, begun around August or September of the previous year, is noteworthy for a full philosophical statement, in the "Vorrede", of the theory of the "exzentrische Bahn":

Wir durchlaufen alle eine exzentrische Bahn, und es ist kein anderer Weg möglich von der Kindheit zur Vollendung.

Die selige Einigkeit, das Sein, im einzigen Sinne des Worts, ist für uns verloren und wir mußten es verlieren, wenn wir es erstreben, erringen sollten. Wir reißen uns los vom friedlichen "Εὐ καὶ Τὶς der Welt, um es herzustellen, durch uns Selbst. Wir sind zerfallen mit der Natur, und was einst, wie man glauben kann, Eins war, widerstreitet sich jetzt, und Herrschaft und Knechtschaft wechselt auf beiden Seiten. Oft ist uns, als wäre die Welt Alles und wir Nichts, oft aber auch, als wären wir Alles und die Welt nichts. Auch Hyperion teilte sich unter diese beiden Extreme.

Jenen ewigen Widerstreit zwischen unserem Selbst und der Welt zu endigen, den Frieden alles Friedens, der höher ist, denn alle Vernunft, den wiederzubringen, uns mit der Natur zu vereinigen zu Einem unendlichen Ganzen, das ist das Ziel all unseres Strebens, wir mögen uns darüber verstehen oder nicht.

[Gr.St.A.3,p.236.]

This goal cannot be reached, however, by a process of increasing our knowledge or by our action alone. We would also have no idea of this goal as such, the possibility of its attainment would never occur to us, if it were not already "vorhanden - als Schönheit; es wartet, um mit Hyperion zu reden, ein neues Reich auf uns, wo die Schönheit Königin ist."

[Gr.St.A.3,p.237.]

Hölderlin concludes with his famous apostrophe:

Ich glaube, wir werden am Ende alle sagen:
heiliger Plato, vergib! man hat schwer an dir
gesündigt.

[Gr.St.A.3,p.237.]

If one compares this with the Hegelian situation in the "~~Ph~~enomenology", one finds the following contrasts:

- 1) The lost "selige Einigkeit" does not exist for Hegel, who starts his work with a section on "Bewußtsein", something which is absent from Hölderlin's original "Sein". Even if we look at the "Logic", all we find there is a seed with potential for growth towards an Absolute which, although already present as a possibility/necessity for the future, is in no way comparable to the Hölderlinian lost unity. Hegel's Absolute is there to be deve-
loped not to be re-discovered. Where Hölderlin says "Was einst... Eins war, widerstreitet sich jetzt", Hegel says that the "Streit" is an original problem (original sin) which can only be solved after the whole dialectical procedure has run its course.
- 2) "Herrschaft und Knechtschaft" is one of the most prominent concepts in the "Phenomenology": after going through "Bewußtsein" in the simple form of "sinnliche Gewißheit", Hegel decides that this form of knowledge is turned back on itself and becomes "Selbstbewußtsein", the first form of which is "Begierde". This involves the self attempting to overcome or absorb another self. The basic Idealist tendency, already present in Fichte and Schiller, for the "Ich" to expand at the cost of the "Nicht-Ich" is here seen in terms of different "Ich"'s. The problem remains the same.
- 3) The solution to this problem envisaged by Hölderlin, is very different from that described in the "Phenomenology", where eventually a state of harmony is established whereby the finite subject attains "universal self-consciousness", which involves an awareness of selfhood in oneself and in other (previously hostile) selves, and of the force of the infinite "Geist" which is present in each one and binds them together. At this stage a solution is

also found for the problem of "das unglückliche Bewußtsein", a state of mind which involves awareness of the dichotomy between the self as it is and as it should be - the "Herrschaft/~~Herrschaft~~/Knechtschaft" problem internalised. This solution lies in the supposition that the true or ideal self is latent in the actual self. Nowhere is there any return to the "Ursprung", which, for Hegel, is simply the starting-point. Also, the divided self in "das unglückliche Bewußtsein" is very different from the divisions Hölderlin posited, between Conscious and Unconscious, "Ich" and "Nicht-Ich". Hölderlin's view is nearer to that of modern psychology and psychoanalysis, more particularly to that of C.G. Jung: as for Jung, the Unconscious has for him a metaphysical importance which it does not have for Kant, Fichte, Hegel or Freud. Hölderlin's and Schelling's ideas on the Unconscious are in fact extremely 'modern', if only in the sense that their approach is empirical rather than rationalist.

In brief, then, whereas Hegel sees "Herrschaft" and "Knechtschaft" as a natural state of original sin, alienation and universal mutual animosity which can only be overcome by the advance of Reason, Hölderlin sees it as the condition of man after the fall, after the decline from the original state of harmony or the Rule of Love, which latter state can be restored not by the advance of Reason, but by the re-introduction of Love as the ruling principle, by the bringing together in harmony of previously disparate and hostile elements in the self, in society.

During the second half of 1796, Hölderlin was engaged in preparing the final version of his novel, which definitive version we shall now proceed to examine. For convenience's sake, the two volumes will be considered together. For this, we have the authority of Hölderlin

himself. In a letter to Schiller dated 20th June 1797, he states:

"Ich fühle, daß es unklug war, den ersten Band ohne den zweiten auszustellen, weil jener gar zu wenig selbstständiger Teil des Ganzen ist."

[Gr.St.A.6/1,p.242.]

The delay between the publication of the first volume and that of the second can be put down to the publisher, Cotta.

This final version of "Hyperion" does not retain the explanation of the "exzentrische Bahn" in the "Vorrede". Instead, we find a cursory reference to "die Auflösung der Dissonanzen in einem gewissen Charakter", plus a plea for the reader to employ all his faculties in appreciating the work - neither the mind nor the senses are capable separately of achieving the desired degree of appreciation, but only in consort. Needless to say, within the context of an academic thesis, we must to some extent ignore this admonition, and concentrate (in the present case) on the philosophical content of the work, rather than any purely aesthetic or subjective emotional considerations.

At the start of the first book, Hyperion has returned home: "Der liebe Vaterlandsboden gibt mir wieder Freude und Leid." [Gr.St.A.3,p.7.]

This gives him cause for brief exaltation, until he comes down to earth:

"Aber was soll mir das? Das Geschrei des Jakals, der unter den Steinhäufen des Altertums sein wildes Grablied singt, schröckt ja aus meinen Träumen mich auf."

Wohl dem Manne, dem ein blühend Vaterland das Herz erfreut und stärkt! Mir ist, als würd ich in den Sumpf geworfen, als schlüge man den Sargdeckel über mir zu, wenn einer an das meinige mich mahnt, und wenn mich einer einen Griechen nennt, so wird mir immer, als schnürt' er mit dem Halsband eines Hundes mir die Kehle zu."

[Gr.St.A.3,p.7.]

Thus, we find that it is not his own personal fate which distresses him above all else, but the fate of his

country. He recalls the complacent advice of "die weisen Herren, die unter euch Deutschen so gerne spuken, die Elenden..." to act rather than lament -

O hätt ich doch nie gehandelt! um wie manche Hoffnung wär ich reicher! -

Ja, vergiß nur, daß es Menschen gibt, darbendes, angefochtenes, tausendfach geärgertes Herz! und kehre wieder dahin, wo du ausgingst, in die Arme der Natur, der wandellosen, stillen und schönen.

[Gr.St.A.3, pp. 7-8.]

As we shall learn in the course of the narrative, Hyperion has tried his hand as a revolutionary leader, only to be betrayed by the men he is trying to lead to freedom. Embittered by his experience, he has left the world of men and practical affairs behind. In the second letter, he gives us a fuller description of his new aim or ideal:

Eines zu sein mit Allem, das ist Leben der Gottheit, das ist der Himmel des Menschen. Eines zu sein mit Allem, was lebt, in seliger Selbstvergessenheit wiederzukehren ins All der Natur, das ist der Gipfel der Gedanken und Freuden, das ist die heilige Bergeshöhe, der Ort der ewigen Ruhe, wo der Mittag seine Schwüle und der Donner seine Stimme verliert und das kochende Meer der Woge des Kornfelds gleicht.

Eines zu sein mit Allem, was lebt! Mit diesem Worte legt die Tugend den zürnenden Harnisch, der Geist des Menschen den Zepter weg, und alle Gedanken schwinden vor dem Bilde der ewigeinigen Welt, wie die Regeln des ringenden Künstlers vor seiner Urania, und das eherne Schicksal entsagt der Herrschaft, und aus dem Bunde der Wesen schwindet der Tod, und Unzertrennlichkeit und ewige Jugend beseligt, verschönert die Welt.

Auf dieser Höhe steh ich oft, mein Bellarmin! Aber ein Moment des Besinnens wirft mich herab.

[Gr.St.A.3, p.9.]

There follows a passage reminiscent of Faust's first speech in Goethe's play ("Habe nun, ach! Philosophie..."). His pursuit of "die Wissenschaft" has had the effect that he has attained the following condition:

Ich... habe gründlich mich unterscheiden gelernt von dem, was mich umgibt, bin nur vereinzelt in der schönen Welt, bin so ausgeworfen aus dem Garten der Natur, wo ich wuchs und blühte, und vertrockene an der Mittagssonne. [Gr.St.A.3, p.9.]

When Hyperion posits a situation where virtue lays down its "zürnenden Harnisch", this can be taken as the expression of the desire to free man from the restraints of Kant's Moral Law - restraints made necessary by the Fall. When he envisages "Geist" laying down its sceptre, we can see an acceptance of the Kantian view that reason alone cannot take one to the Absolute. We note the appeal to the Dionysian principle in art as being capable of wider application in human affairs. In this vision of the Absolute, even "das eherne Schicksal" gives up its "Herrschaft" - the same "Schicksal" or *ἀνάγκη* which has destroyed all the heroes from Prometheus and Achilles through Oedipus and Empedokles, Sokrates and Christ, to Shakespeare's tragic heroes and (subsequently) Hölderlin himself.³

One can scarcely imagine a more un-Hegelian sentiment than the one with which Hyperion closes the second letter:

O ein Gott ist der Mensch, wenn er träumt, ein Bettler, wenn er nachdenkt, und wenn die Begeisterung hin ist, steht er da, wie ein mißratener Sohn, den der Vater aus dem Hause stieß, und betrachtet die ärmlichen Pfennige, die ihm das Mitleid auf den Weg gab.

[Gr.St.A.3,p.9.]

However, we must be careful not to identify the thoughts of Hyperion at the beginning of the novel too readily with Hölderlin's own position. There are several layers or levels of development within the novel. Hyperion gains a deeper understanding of what he has experienced as he writes about it for Bellarmin. We follow the development of the action as Hyperion relates it, and also the development of his understanding of the action in his past. Our understanding is thus another level of development, outwith the novel but intimately connected with it.

Hyperion's expressed wish that he had never acted, that he had never occupied himself with "die Wissenschaft", should not be taken at face value. It merely indicates that, like Oedipus, he has found the path to superior

wisdom painful and strewn with suffering. The actual journey on the path became unavoidable once the original separation took place. At the beginning of the third letter, Hyperion expresses nostalgic regret for the state of innocence and harmony peculiar to the child, when "es ist noch mit sich selber nicht zerfallen". It is only by a painful and long procedure that Hyperion (and mankind in general) can recover the benefits of this state, at a higher level of consciousness. Let us follow Hyperion on this journey.

Towards the end of the third letter, the full force of Hölderlin's study of and enthusiasm for Spinoza comes out in the following passage: -

"O du, zu dem ich rief, als wärest du über den Sternen, den ich Schöpfer des Himmels nannte und der Erde, freundlich Idol meiner Kindheit, du wirst nicht zürnen, daß ich deiner vergaß! - Warum ist die Welt nicht dürftig genug, um außer ihr noch Einen zu suchen?

O wenn sie eines Vaters Tochter ist, die herrliche Natur, ist das Herz der Tochter nicht sein Herz? Ihr Innerstes, ist's nicht Er?

[Gr.St.A.3, pp.11-12.]

This is not, however, straightforward pantheism. However closely God and Nature are interrelated, they are not identified one with the other.

Then, in the fourth letter, Hyperion meets his Adamas:

Er hatt' an seinem Stoffe, der sogenannten kultivierten Welt lange genug Geduld und Kunst geübt, aber sein Stoff war Stein und Holz gewesen und geblieben, nahm wohl zur Not die edle Menschenform von außen an, aber um dies wars meinem Adamas nicht zu tun; er wollte Menschen, und, um diese zu schaffen, hatt er seine Kunst zu arm gefunden. Sie waren einmal da gewesen, die er suchte, die zu schaffen seine Kunst zu arm war, das erkannte er deutlich. Wo sie da gewesen, wußt er auch. Da wollt er hin und unter dem Schutt nach ihrem Genius fragen, mit diesem sich die einsamen Tage zu verkürzen. Er kam nach Griechenland. So fand ich ihn.

[Gr.St.A.3, p.13.]

Here we reach what I consider to be the central point of the novel: the lost "Sittlichkeit" of the Greeks and

Hölderlin's hopes and efforts for its re-creation in Germany. Here, too, we have a point of comparison with Hegel's "Phenomenology". If we compare now the "Kunst-religion" section of the latter, which deals specifically with Greek "Sittlichkeit", with equivalent pronouncements in "Hyperion", we shall perhaps reach some more general conclusions regarding the authors of the two works and their theories.

Some readers may have been surprised by my reluctance in a previous chapter to impute any Kantian leanings or intentions to Hegel at the time of his writing "das Leben Jesu". It is widely held⁴ that Hegel's "theologische Jugendschriften" as a whole can be seen as a Kantian enterprise in harmony with the latter's demands, in his book "Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft", that Christianity be brought into line with his own theories concerning "praktische Vernunft". I, on the other hand, tend to agree with scholars such as J.W. Schmidt-Japung⁵ in regarding Hegel's work at this stage as being λ far too rationalist in character to be in any real sense Kantian. However, I see in this phenomenon no sign of sympathy for Fichte or Spinoza on Hegel's part, but rather an overwhelming enthusiasm for Plato, plus an admiration for a quality in ancient Greek life which he thought was lacking in modern Germany. This quality he termed "Sittlichkeit".

In his "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte", Hegel talks of the age of Greek "Sittlichkeit" as the "Jünglingsalter" of mankind. His discussion of the subject in these "Vorlesungen" will serve as a convenient prelude to the more opaque equivalent in the "Phenomenology":

Charakteristisch an [der griechischen Welt] ist, daß hier eine Menge von Staaten sich hervortun. Es ist das Reich der schönen Freiheit; die unmittelbare Sittlichkeit ist es, in der sich hier die Individualität entwickelt. Das Prinzip der Individualität geht hier auf, die subjektive Freiheit, aber eingebettet in die substantielle Einheit. Das Sittliche ist wie in Asien Prinzip, aber es

ist die Sittlichkeit, welche der Individualität eingeprägt ist und somit das freie Wollen der Individuen bedeutet... das Reich der Freiheit ist vorhanden, nicht der ungebundenen, natürlichen, sondern der sittlichen Freiheit, die einen allgemeinen Zweck hat... Aber es ist nur das Reich der schönen Freiheit, die mit dem substantiellen Zweck in natürlicher, unbefangener Einheit ist. Es ist die Vereinigung des Sittlichen und des subjektiven Willens so, daß die Idee mit einer plastischen Gestalt vereinigt ist: sie ist noch nicht abstrakt für sich auf der einen Seite, sondern unmittelbar mit dem Wirklichen verbunden, wie in einem schönen Kunstwerke das Sinnliche das Gepräge und den Ausdruck des Geistigen trägt. Es ist die unbefangene Sittlichkeit, noch nicht Moralität.⁶

Thus, Greek "Sittlichkeit" is an advance over the oriental infancy stage, but too involved with "das Wirkliche" and "das Sinnliche". It is still a stage of immaturity. Hegel does not regard it as desirable to try to recapture it:

Man findet in neuerer Zeit große, tiefe Männer, wie z.B. Rousseau, die das Bessere rückwärts suchen. Das ist aber ein Irrtum. Wir werden uns zwar ewig von Griechenland angezogen fühlen; aber die höchste Befriedigung finden wir da nicht, denn es fehlt dieser Schönheit die Wahrheit.⁷

Here, in direct opposition to the tenets of the "Systemprogramm", Hegel discusses Truth as something higher than Beauty, as something which is free from contamination by any suggestion of sensuality. "Das Schöne" (ie. the direct German translation of τὸ καλόν) is defined as "die Idee nur in sinnlicher Anschauung oder Vorstellung". "Das Wahre", on the other hand, belongs to "eine innerliche, übersinnliche Welt".⁸

Hegel ascribes the break from the stage of naïve "Sittlichkeit" to the (in his view) higher stage to the influence of Sokrates:

In Sokrates dagegen erscheint das Allgemeine, das Denken, als letzter Zweck, daß sich der Mensch als allgemeiner, als denkender zu finden und daß er zu erkennen habe, nicht was der Besonderheit nützlich, sondern was recht und gut sei. Die Griechen wußten wohl, was sittlich war in jeder

Beziehung; aber daß der Mensch dies in sich suchen und aus sich finden müsse, das ist der Standpunkt des Sokrates. Er hat so die freie Unabhängigkeit des Gedankens in sich ausgesprochen.

The split between the sensual world and the higher world of Thought I take to be a reference to the "Ideenlehre" developed in Plato's dialogues and put into the mouth of Sokrates. I tend to share the doubts expressed by Schleiermacher and certain modern scholars¹⁰ in ascribing a belief in or teaching of "die Ideenlehre" to Sokrates. However this may be, it is open to doubt whether:

- a) the "Ideenlehre" necessarily involves a rejection of the "Sinnenwelt" and
- b) any such rejection should be regarded as an intellectual advance, as Hegel suggests.

Paul Natorp, when he wrote his great study of "Platos Ideenlehre" at the turn of the century, was very much aware of this problem, as is shown by the following excerpts from his chapter on the "Phaedo":

Wir werden es gerade aus dem Phaedo vernehmen, daß sogar nur vom Sinnlichen aus, wiewohl nicht aus ihm, die reinen Begriffe zu gewinnen, daß also die Sinne zur Erkenntnis allerdings 'zu Hilfe zu nehmen' sind ...

"In[den] streng dialektischen Partien... verrät sich so wenig eine Verachtung der Sinnenwelt, daß vielmehr eben in ihnen das erste logische Fundament gelegt wird zu einer Wissenschaft vom Werden, die es im Phaedrus und Theaetet noch gar nicht gab; daß das Veränderliche als zweite Art des Seins neben dem Unwandelbaren¹² (den Ideen) seine gesicherte Stelle findet.

So ist nun zwischen den beiden 'äußersten Enden' der Erkenntnis (wie Kant sagt), Sinnlichkeit und Verstand, eine Verbindung, ein positiver Zusammenhang wenigstens angebahnt. Die strenge Verschiedenheit beider wird festgehalten: Der Begriff ist 'neben' oder 'außer' dem Sinnlichen, als ein Anderes (74A); aber 'aus' aller Verwirrung des Sinnlichen heraus, nur aus ihr, erkennen wir das reine, gedankliche Sein...¹³

This aspect of Plato's work escaped Hegel's attention. It is, however, (I would maintain) precisely the aspect which appealed to Hölderlin. In fact, the difference between the systems of Hölderlin and Hegel can be related to and perhaps even adequately explained by their differences in understanding Plato's work, plus their different estimates of the worth of the two main parts of his work; the (earlier) period when Plato was attempting, much in the manner of Empedokles, to achieve a balance and harmony between the various faculties or parts of man, and the (later) period when he was concerned with establishing the supremacy of Reason over the others. To Hölderlin, Reason or the *διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη* was a means to an end, not an end in itself. It takes the philosopher to the *δόξα*, which is not some logical "Begriff" in a super-sensual rational vacuum, but a truth or body of truths buried in the unconscious of mankind and recoverable by virtue of *ἀνάμνησις*. The unconscious is the immortal part of man, the part which contains the ultimate truths the philosophers seek - NOT the Reason. Without the Reason, there would be no way for man to gain conscious knowledge of these truths, but without the Unconscious there would be no object worthy of Reason's strivings.

This is all very far from Hegel's conception of things in the "Kunstreligion" section of the "Phenomenology", which starts with the following paragraph:

Der Geist hat seine Gestalt, in welcher er für sein Bewußtsein ist, in die Form des Bewußtseins selbst erhoben, und bringt eine solche sich hervor. Der Werkmeister hat das synthetische Arbeiten, das Vermischen der fremdartigen Formen des Gedankens und des Natürlichen aufgegeben; indem die Gestalt die Form der selbstbewußten Tätigkeit¹⁴ gewonnen, ist er geistiger Arbeiter geworden.

Thus, the giving up of the synthesising effort is here seen as an advance.¹⁵ The concept of the "Werkmeister" requires explanation. In the section of the "Phenomenology" immediately preceding this, Hegel had

dealt with the levels of human consciousness which he saw as being lower than and anterior to Greek "Sittlichkeit". He starts by dealing with "die natürliche Religion", the lowest type, which is subdivided into three parts: "das Lichtwesen", "die Pflanze und das Tier", "der Werkmeister". The criteria for division is the object of worship, as follows:

- a) "Das Lichtwesen", the object of worship in Zoroastrian religion, is a formless spirit, worshipped at the level of sense-certainty (fitting in with Hegel's account of "Bewußtsein" at the beginning of the "Phenomenology"). According to Hegel, consciousness cannot rest content with an object so formless, but must go on to particularise.
- b) "Die Pflanze und das Tier" refers to Indian religion, as Hegel understood it.¹⁶ Here the religious objects are mainly aggressive animals, symbolising national spirits. The warring variety of this type of religious expression is also inadequate.
- c) "Der Werkmeister" refers to Egyptian religion. Here, Spirit becomes an Artificer, constructing the pyramids in an instinctive manner. Its instinctive nature is its flaw.

This brings us to the "Kunstreligion" section. Here, in Greek religion and art, man for the first time reaches full consciousness of his superior position in the scheme of things:

Fragen wir danach, welches der wirkliche Geist ist, der in der Kunstreligion das Bewußtsein seines absoluten Wissens hat, so ergibt sich, daß es der sittliche oder der wahre Geist ist... Er ist das freie Volk, worin die Sitte die Substanz aller ausmacht, deren Wirklichkeit und Dasein alle und jeder Einzelne als seinen Willen und Tat weiß.

Here, art comes into its own. The gods are seen in human form, for the first time. They are represented in sculpture, where, again for the first time, a unity of

form and content is achieved (also a unity of the divine and the human). This is, in Hegel's view, an advance of the highest importance in the history of human consciousness.

Classical art is, according to Hegel, the ultimate or highest art form, because of this unity of form and content. During this peak, while the unity lasts, three varieties or subspecies are discerned by Hegel:

- a) "Das abstrakte Kunstwerk", largely concerned with the Oracle and the Hymn.
- b) "Das lebendige Kunstwerk", which deals with the worship of heroes.
- c) "Das geistige Kunstwerk", which deals with Epic, Tragedy and Comedy.

Of these three, "das geistige Kunstwerk" is the highest type, because it is more coherent than the oracle, less emotional and narrow than the Hymn, and sees the heroes from a higher, objective intellectual position.

We have dealt with Hegel's theory of tragedy in our chapter on Sophokles, so I shall simply note here that the Comic starts at the level of consciousness which obtains at the end of the tragic phase. In Bernard Bosanquet's words: "Comedy starts from the absolute reconciliation which is the close of tragedy, the absolute self-certainty and cheerfulness which nothing can disturb."¹⁸

It is at this point that we see the beginnings of what Hegel describes as the "Verderben" of Greek "Sittlichkeit", involving the activities of the Sophists, Sokrates and Plato:

Ein neues Tribunal für das, was recht sei, ist hiermit aufgestellt; man zog die Gegenstände vor ein inneres Tribunal. Jetzt hat Plato, der Schüler von Sokrates, den Homer und Hesiod, die Urheber der religiösen Vorstellungsart der Griechen, aus seinem Staate verbannt wissen wollen; denn er verlangte eine höhere, dem Gedanken zusagende Vorstellung von dem, was als Gott verehrt werden soll.¹⁹

Once this new advance has destroyed the naïve harmony of Greek "Sittlichkeit", it cannot be reintegrated. "Geist" moves on, ever higher, and leaves behind the shattered pieces.

It was, however, precisely such a reintegration which was Hyperion's aim in Hölderlin's novel. In the fifteenth letter of Volume One, Book Two, Hyperion expresses these hopes (after discussing the friendship of Harmodius and Aristogiton) in the following terms:

Das ist auch meine Hoffnung, meine Lust in einsamen Stunden, daß solche große Töne und größere einst wiederkehren müssen in der Symphonie des Weltlaufs. Die Liebe gebar Jahrtausende voll lebendiger Menschen; die Freundschaft wird sie wiedergebären. Von Kinderharmonie sind einst die Völker ausgegangen, die Harmonie der Geister wird der Anfang einer neuen Weltgeschichte sein. Von Pflanzenglück begannen die Menschen und wuchsen auf, und wuchsen bis sie reiften; von nun an gärten sie unaufhörlich fort, von innen und außen, bis jetzt das Menschengeschlecht, unendlich aufgelöst, wie ein Chaos daliegt, daß alle, die noch fühlen und sehen, Schwindel ergreift; aber die Schönheit flüchtet aus dem Leben der Menschen sich herauf in den Geist; Ideal wird, was Natur war, und wenn von unten gleich der Baum verdorrt ist und verwittert, ein frischer Gipfel ist noch hervorgegangen aus ihm, und grünt im Sonnenglanze, wie einst der Stamm in den Tagen der Jugend; Ideal ist, was Natur war.

[Gr.St.A.3,p.63.]

This is the essence of Hyperion's tragic position, as Diotima points out to him in the next letter:

Du wolltest keine Menschen, glaube mir, du wolltest eine Welt. Den Verlust von allen goldenen Jahrhunderten... den Geist von allen Geistern beßrer Zeit, die Kraft von allen Kräften der Heroen, die sollte dir ein Einzelner, ein Mensch ersetzen!...

Darum, weil du alles hast und nichts, weil das Phantom der goldenen Tage, die da kommen sollen, dein gehört, und doch nicht da ist, weil du ein Bürger bist in den Regionen der Gerechtigkeit und Schönheit, ein Gott bist unter Göttern in den schönen Träumen, die am Tage dich beschleichen, und wenn du aufwachst, auf neugriechischem Boden stehst...

Ich fürchte für dich, du hältst das Schicksal dieser Zeiten schwerlich aus...

[Gr.St.A.3,p.67.]

Volume One closes with the description of the visit to Athens, and of the thoughts this visit provokes in the hero. He explains the great flowering of Athenian culture in the following fashion:

Ungestörter in jedem Betracht, von gewaltsamem Einfluß freier, als irgend ein Volk der Erde, erwuchs das Volk der Athener. Kein Eroberer schwächt sie, kein Kriegsglück berauscht sie, kein fremder Götterdienst betäubt sie, keine eilfertige Weisheit treibt sie zu unzeitiger Reife.

[Gr.St.A.3, pp.77-8.]

This last letter develops into the equivalent of Hegel's "Kunstreligion" section:

So war der Athener ein Mensch... Schön kam er aus den Händen der Natur, schön, an Leib und Seele, wie man zu sagen pflegt.

Das erste Kind der menschlichen, der göttlichen Schönheit ist die Kunst. In ihr verjüngt und wiederholt der göttliche Mensch sich selbst. Er will sich selber fühlen, darum stellt er seine Schönheit gegenüber sich. So gab der Mensch sich seine Götter. Denn im Anfang war der Mensch und seine Götter Eins, da, sich selber unbekannt, die ewige Schönheit war. - Ich spreche Mysterien, aber sie sind. -

Das erste Kind der göttlichen Schönheit ist die Kunst. So war es bei den Athenern. Der Schönheit zweite Tochter ist Religion. Religion ist Liebe der Schönheit. Der Weise liebt sie selbst, die Unendliche, die Allumfassende; das Volk liebt ihre Kinder, die Götter, die in mannigfaltigen Gestalten ihm erscheinen. Auch so wars bei den Athenern.

[Gr.St.A.3, pp.79-80.]

A discussion of the Egyptian mentality brings the comparison with the "Phenomenology" nearer. Precisely how different this version of the principles of Greek "Sittlichkeit" is from Hegel's, becomes clear in the following passage:

Sie wären sogar... ohne Dichtung nie ein philosophisch Volk gewesen!

Was hat die Philosophie, erwidert' er, was hat die kalte Erhabenheit dieser Wissenschaft mit Dichtung zu tun?

Die Dichtung, sagt ich, meiner Sache gewiß, ist der Anfang und das Ende dieser Wissenschaft. Wie Minerva aus Jupiters Haupt, entspringt sie

aus der Dichtung eines unendlichen göttlichen Seins. Und so läuft am End auch wieder in ihr das Unvereinbare in der geheimnisvollen Quelle der Dichtung zusammen.

[Gr.St.A.3,p.81.]

To Hölderlin, then, the great flowering of Greek culture is explained in terms of the ^{Greeks'} sense of freedom and of the fact that, unlike the Egyptians, they were allowed to develop and mature in a natural, free fashion. This is very different from Hegel's view of the Greeks separating themselves from Nature - here, their culture is the natural flowering of Nature.

The Greek artist sees the essence of beauty in Nature and in man, and objectifies it.²⁰

Das große Wort, das ἐν διαφέρειν ἑαυτῷ ...
des Heraklit, das konnte nur ein Grieche finden,
denn es ist das Wesen der Schönheit, und ehe das
gefunden war, gabs keine Philosophie.

Nun konnte man bestimmen, das Ganze war da.
Die Blume war gereift; man konnte nun zergliedern.

Der Moment der Schönheit war nun kund geworden
unter den Menschen, war da im Leben und Geiste,
das Unendlicheinige war.

[Gr.St.A.3,p.82.]

The essence of beauty is to bind together. In Plato's (earlier) works, beauty is a quality of which men and objects partake in varying degrees, rather than something outside and above them. The Greek "Gipfel der Zeit" saw Nature reaching its peak, the peak it was teleologically programmed to reach:

... es war ein göttlich Leben und der Mensch
war da der Mittelpunkt der Natur... Die Natur
war Priesterin und der Mensch ihr Gott..

[Gr.St.A.3,p.84.]

This relationship between man and Nature is in complete contrast to that described by Hegel in the "Phenomenology". Hegel's ideal of the philosopher rejecting beauty, das "Sinnliche" and Nature in favour of a higher, a-sensual "Begriff" is, I would maintain, incompatible with Hyperion's vision:

Aus bloßem Verstande kömmt keine Philosophie, denn Philosophie ist mehr, denn nur die beschränkte Erkenntnis des Vorhandnen.

Aus bloßer Vernunft kömmt keine Philosophie, denn Philosophie ist mehr, denn blinde Forderung eines nie zu endigenden Fortschritts in Vereinigung und Unterscheidung eines möglichen Stoffs.

Leuchtet aber das göttliche ἐν διαφερῶν ἑαυτῷ, das Ideal der Schönheit der strebenden Vernunft, so fodert sie nicht blind, und weiß, wozu sie fodert.

[Gr.St.A.3,p.83.]

This "Ideal" can be provided for philosophy only by the artist.

The first volume of "Hyperion" ends on an optimistic note of hope for the renewal of this lost state of harmony:

Es wird nur Eine Schönheit sein; und Menschheit und Natur wird sich vereinen in Eine allumfassende Gottheit.

[Gr.St.A.3,p.90.]

In the second volume, with the plunder of Misistra, all Hyperion's hopes come to nought. Alabanda and he eventually part. He receives a last letter from the dying Diotima:

Entsetze dich nicht! Es läutert sich alles Natürliche, und überall windet die Blüte des Lebens freier und freier vom gröbern Stoffe sich los.

[Gr.St.A.3,p.144.]

The letter ends^s with this optimistic prophecy:

Trauernder Jüngling! bald, bald wirst du glücklicher sein. Dir ist dein Lorbeer nicht gereift und deine Myrten verblühten, denn Priester sollst du sein der göttlichen Natur, und die dichterischen Tage keimen dir schon.

[Gr.St.A.3,p.149.]

One notes the parallel and contrast: in ancient Greece, Nature had been the "Priesterin", man the god she worshipped; now the poet Hyperion is to be the priest, Nature the goddess he worships. The "exzentrische Bahn" has run its course.

At this point of desperation in his life, the figure

of Empedokles occurs to him:

Und nun sage mir, wo ist noch eine Zuflucht?
- Gestern war ich auf dem Aetna droben. Da fiel
der große Sizilianer mir ein, der einst... sich
da hinabwarf in die herrlichen Flammen...

[Gr.St.A.3,p.151.]

The thought comes to him that he might follow the
Sicilian's example and kill himself, but:

... man muß sich höher achten, denn ich mich
achte, um so ungerufen der Natur ans Herz zu
fliegen...

[Gr.St.A.3,pp.151-2.]

There follows his tirade against the Germans because
they are not "Menschen", lacking the wholeness which
would make them worthy of the name. Each individual has
his τέχνη which makes him unique and divides him off
from his fellows:

... ist das nicht, wie ein Schlachtfeld, wo
Hände und Arme und alle Glieder zerstückelt
untereinander liegen, indessen das vergoßne
Lebensblut im Sande zerrinnt?

[Gr.St.A.3,p.153.]

But this tragic work, this tale of lost hopes, does
not end on a tragic note. In his despair he tried to gain
consolation by coming closer to Nature, to a child-like
state, until one day:

Diotima, rief ich, wo bist du, o wo bist du?
Und mir war, als hört ich Diotimas Stimme, die
Stimme, die mich einst erheitert in den Tagen der
Freude -

Bei den Meinen, rief sie, bin ich, bei den
Deinen, die der irre Menschengeist mißkennt!

[Gr.St.A.3,p.158.]

This provokes a great revelation in Hyperion, a vision
of the oneness of everything:

... denn alle wuchsen wir aus dem goldenen Samkorn
herauf!

[Gr.St.A.3,p.159.]

In this final vision, all the dissonances are recon-
ciled:

„Geschiehet doch alles aus Lust, und endet doch alles mit Frieden.

Wie der Zwist der Liebenden, sind die Dissonanzen der Welt. Versöhnung ist mitten im Streit und alles Getrennte findet sich wieder.

Es scheiden und kehren im Herzen die Adern und einiges, ewiges, glühendes Leben ist Alles.

[Gr.St.A.3, pp.159-60.]

This mystic vision is the conclusion of the work, the *Σόξα* which is the end product of the dialectical progress of events.²¹ It is a vision to which Hölderlin remained true for the rest of his career. His mission he saw as one of making people, in particular the Germans, aware of the state of harmony from which they had fallen, and of the possibility of recapturing it. This possibility lay not in the slavish obedience to any Moral Law, but in an ecstatic acceptance of and re-union with the "Seele" of the world, with beauty. The "Ideal der Schönheit", presented to us by the poet, represents the end and purpose of all human striving and all human existence. This "Ideal" grew out of Nature with Greece. It grew naturally by virtue of the teleological structure of Nature and the "bonté naturelle" of man. It died when the wholeness of this vision, its harmony and naturalness were destroyed by the division of man's faculties we have seen in works such as Plato's "Republic", where faith is lost in the "bonté naturelle" which made all this possible, where Reason enthrones itself above τὸ κελόρ, forgetting its humble rôle as a τέχνη and putting itself forward as an end in itself. In religious terms, this can be equated with the Fall. The result is the state of alienation described by Hölderlin in the seventh stanza of "Brot und Wein":

"Aber Freund! wir kommen zu spät! Zwar leben die
Götter,

Aber über dem Haupt droben in anderer Welt,
Endlos wirken sie da und scheinen wenig zu
achten,

Ob wir leben, so sehr schonen die Himmlischen
uns.

Denn nicht immer vermag ein schwaches Gefäß sie
zu fassen,

Nur zu Zeiten erträgt göttliche Fülle der Mensch.

[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.93.]

Thus, we can summarise the difference between Hölderlin's view of Greek "Sittlichkeit" and Hegel's in the following terms:

- a) Hölderlin saw the flowering of Greek culture as a natural outgrowth of Nature, made possible by the freedom allowed to the Greeks to develop naturally. Hegel saw this flowering as the result of a split or separation from the original, natural state.
- b) Hölderlin saw the "Gipfel" of this period as a consummation or peak of Nature, a state of unconscious harmony. Hegel saw it as an advance over the natural state, and as an immature level of consciousness in which the divine spark of reason had not yet freed itself from the shackles of "das Sinnliche".
- c) Hölderlin saw the end of this period as an almost entirely negative, if necessary, destruction of the harmonic state, to be followed after the death of Christ by "das tausendjährige Wetter". Hegel saw its end as the entirely laudable maturing of Reason in its consciousness of its own superiority and independence.

These differences, or related and similar ones, occur again in the two thinkers' respective attitudes towards the cultural flowering of their own time, the German "Gipfel der Zeit". Hölderlin (and Schelling) saw the Absolute as something which had to be experienced by man as a whole being (as "Mensch", in the Hölderlinian sense); Hegel saw it as a "Begriff".

That Hegel was well aware of this difference of position is clear from several utterances in the introduction to the "Phenomenology" and in the body of the work itself, in particular in the "schöne Seele" section. In the "Vorrede", we have the following statements:

Indem die wahre Gestalt der Wahrheit in die Wissenschaftlichkeit gesetzt wird, - oder was dasselbe ist, indem die Wahrheit behauptet wird, an dem Begriffe allein das Element ihrer Existenz zu haben, - so weiß ich, daß dies im Widerspruch mit einer Vorstellung und deren Folgen zu stehen scheint, welche eine so große Anmaßung als Ausbreitung in der Überzeugung des Zeitalters hat... Das Absolute soll nicht begriffen, sonder gefühlt and angeschaut, nicht sein Begriff, sondern sein Gefühl und Anschauung sollen das Wort führen und ausgesprochen werden.²²

... nicht der Begriff, sondern die Ekstase, nicht die kalt fortschreitende Notwendigkeit der Sache, sondern die gärende Begeisterung soll die Haltung und fortleitende Ausbreitung des Reichtums der Substanz sein.²³

Whether Hegel at any one point is thinking in particular of Jacobi's intuitionism, Schiller, Hölderlin, Schelling, the Schlegels or any of the other leading thinkers of his day, the general tone is clear: his advantage over them lies in the cold progress of his logical process, which leads him to the following cold, logical conclusion:

Das Wahre ist das Ganze. Das Ganze aber ist nur das durch seine Entwicklung sich vollendende Wesen. Es ist von dem Absoluten zu sagen, daß es wesentlich Resultat, daß es erst am Ende das ist, was es in Wahrheit ist, und hierin eben besteht seine Natur, Wirkliches, Subjekt, oder sich selbst Werden zu seyn.²⁴

Thus, we have Hegel's great act of faith in the idea of human progress. In this system, all change must be progress, because it involves movement towards the end, and the end is the Absolute. What place human freedom, so prized by Kant, can have in this apotheosis of *Зрелый* is obscure, to say the least. The Absolute involves a solution to the "Herrschaft"/"Knechtschaft" problem, to be sure, but the solution does not really deserve the name of freedom. As Nicholas Berdyaev points out:

When Hegel says that the truth of necessity is freedom he denies the primary nature of freedom and entirely subordinates it to necessity. And in no degree does it help when Hegel asserts that the finite condition of the world is consciousness of

freedom of the spirit, and the ultimate aim is the actualization of freedom. Freedom is represented as the outcome of a necessary world process - as a gift of necessity. But then, it has to be said that in Hegel even God is an outcome of the world process; he becomes within the world-order.²⁵

In other words, Hegel had reverted to something suspiciously similar to the dogmatic rationalism of pre-Kantian days. Like Fichte, he objected to the limits imposed upon human knowledge by Kant; like Fichte, he had little regard for Nature or anything outside the human "Ich"; unlike Fichte, he found himself able to ignore Nature or the "Nicht-Ich" once it had served its original purpose as a base for his pyramid. Inside the human psyche, this "Nicht-Ich" may be equated with the Unconscious. Hegel's general attitude towards the "Nicht-Ich" (in Nature, in man) led him to reject the work of the Romantics, whose discovery and investigation of the Unconscious was of no interest to him, being empirical rather than rationalist in approach. Emanuel Hirsch has shown convincingly²⁶ that the section of the Phenomenology entitled "Der seiner selbst gewisse Geist, die Moralität" is best understood as an attack by Hegel on that section of his contemporaries who can be grouped together loosely under the heading "Kant and the Romantics".²⁷ Hirsch sees the subsections "die moralische Weltanschauung" and "die Verstellung" as a discussion of Kant's "praktische Philosophie". Hegel himself pointed out a parallel between this section and that on "Stoizismus, Skeptizismus und das unglückliche Bewußtsein", the precise parallels being:

- a) Stoicism/Kant
- b) Scepticism/"Gewissen"
- c) "das unglückliche Bewußtsein"/"die schöne Seele"

As the section on "das unglückliche Bewußtsein" deals with the Middle Ages, Hirsch argues,²⁸ Hegel is thereby stressing the correspondence between the Middle Ages and Romanticism.

Hirsch goes on to draw attention to references he finds in Hegel's text to Jacobi, Fichte, Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel, before coming to Friedrich Hölderlin.²⁹ Hirsch sees a reference to the latter in the section on the "schöne Seele, die ein hartes Herz ist und durch ihre Unversöhntheit der Zerrüttung anheim fällt".³⁰ He argues:

Man kann [Novalis] schwerlich vorwerfen, daß er einen Gegensatz unversöhnt, Gemeinschaft versagend, festgehalten habe. Dagegen ist solche Beurteilung nicht völlig undenkbar gegenüber Hölderlin. Hölderlin hat die Art der zarten, wirklichkeitslosen schönen Seele und die eines die Welt im Bewußtsein eigener Hoheit und Göttlichkeit zurückstoßenden Geistes zugleich an sich getragen. Wem etwa am Hyperion trotz seines Urteils über die Deutschen und trotz seiner stolzen Einsamkeit der zweite Zug nicht deutlich genug ausgeprägt ist, der mag an den Empedokles sich erinnern. Man kann wohl sagen, daß diese Art mit an seinem Schicksal gewoben hat. So bleibt mir nicht andres übrig, als in der Verrücktheit, die nur noch die geistlose Einheit des Seins hervorbringt, eine Anspielung auf Hölderlins Untergang zu sehen.³¹

Hirsch contents himself with a simple description of what he sees as Hegel's point, and an attempt to use this interpretation to cast light on Hegel's development from the Frankfurt fragments towards the "Phenomenology". He makes no attempt to discuss Hegel's views on their own merit,³² even if his tone (in the above passage, for example) seems to imply approval of Hegel's position.

If one accepts Hirsch's interpretation of Hegel's intentions, the following points would seem apposite:

- a) To suggest that Hölderlin rejected the world in the consciousness of his own "Hoheit" is to ignore the fact that he saw it as his life's task to mediate between the gods or τὸ κελύος and the world and hold them together.
- b) Hyperion's judgment on the Germans is only a judgment of them at one specific point in time. He rebukes them for not espousing the "whole-man" principle, for being separate "Ich"'s with their

separate specialities - not for being inherently inferior. His hope is that they may change.

- c) Hyperion's "stolze Einsamkeit" is not of his own choosing. He wanted and tried to involve himself in the world and its affairs. The world rejected him.
- d) It is out of harmony with all we know of Hölderlin's biography to suggest that his ultimate madness was due to any self-imposed isolation. The latter was perhaps a result of his refusal to compromise in the matter of what he saw as his life's mission. However, it can scarcely be regarded as his fault if other people, such as Hegel, did not understand what he was trying to achieve. The neglect of men he respected, the death of Diotima - these and other factors have to be taken into account when one discusses the causes of Hölderlin's madness. We have also seen in a previous chapter how probable it is that his madness had, in his own eyes at least, a symbolic significance. The correspondence of madness with such concepts as death, original chaos and self-sacrifice deserves attention. To Hölderlin, as to any man of a predominantly religious world view, death did not mean annihilation, but union with God, an entry into paradise. I feel it is probably the case that he saw his madness in a similar light: it had the negative aspect that, like death, it shut him off from his fellows and put an end to his active participation in the world's affairs, and also to the workings of one of the finest philosophical minds of the age; however, it was also a merciful release for him from all his troubles and the strains of his work, and an ultimate return to his "Ursprung".

The great difference between the "Weltanschauungen" of Hölderlin and Hegel is seen most clearly perhaps in

their respective attitudes towards the beginning and the end. Quite apart from any reference to "bonté naturelle" and original sin, there is a vast difference between the two men's attitudes towards the beginning of the universe and of man. With Hegel, we simply have a seed which contains within itself the possibilities (or rather necessity) of future development and flowering. There is no theistic concept of a Prime Cause - of the two, Hegel is the pantheist, not Hölderlin. The process simply begins. There is nothing outside of "das Ganze" that might cause its coming-into-being or that might influence it once it is there. Similarly, a human being, for Hegel, comes into being, blossoms and dies. There is nothing before birth or after death. Hegel's Absolute is a peak of consciousness. Death ends this. With Hölderlin, on the other hand, death is seen in a more religious light. For him, the death of the body is not the end, but a glorious beginning:

... bis in den Tod
Kann aber ein Mensch auch
Im Gedächtnis doch das Beste behalten,
Und dann erlebt er das Höchste.

[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.148.]

In this respect, his theism and his belief in a "Jenseits", Hölderlin is in harmony with Plato and Kant, while Hegel seems nearer to a pantheistic materialism such as the "Linkshegelianer" were indeed to develop out of his system.

The ideas of Hölderlin and Schelling, then, are best seen, in my view, as the logical final outcome of the philosophical movement founded by Kant. Like Kant, they rejected dogmatic rationalism in favour of an assertion of human freedom and of a theistic belief in God. As we have seen, this belief was based on religious experience or artistic intuition in Hölderlin's case, more than on Kant's moral argument or Plato's cosmological argument (cf. "Phaedrus" 145 c-e; "Laws", Book 10), whereas Schelling devoted himself to a more strictly philosophical work-

ing out of the theme in the negative philosophy. Much of their philosophical efforts were directed towards solving the perennial philosophical problem of balancing Freedom and Necessity. I would maintain that Jacobi's³³ accusation that Schelling's system involved an acceptance of Spinozan determinism is unjustified, because there is no suggestion in it that God (far less Nature) is omnipotent - the theodicy problem likewise does not exist for the same reason. Hölderlin's and Schelling's system preserves a place for contingency, which is the proper sphere of action for human freedom. Such questions become an acute embarrassment only for theists who base their beliefs on some form of the teleological or ontological argument.³⁴

In conclusion, I should like to suggest that a philosophical system which combines freedom and religious belief, a belief in man with a belief in God, plus admirable explanations of and solutions for such matters as the problem of evil and man's relationship to Nature, is deserving of far more serious attention than it has received as yet in the philosophical world.

APPENDIX A : Footnotes

Chapter One

¹The spelling of all quotations from Hölderlin has been modernised in accordance with the practice of the "Kleine Stuttgarter Ausgabe", in the hope that non-Germanists (in particular English-speaking philosophers) will find it easier to understand them.

²For further, more detailed orientation, see the relevant entries in Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon and Ebeling's Lexicon Homericum.

³cf. Chapter Two, where the "Teiresias element" is dealt with at length.

⁴For a general discussion of the Stoics' ideas on the "summum bonum", see F.H. Sandbach, The Stoics (London, 1975); Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa - Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung, 4th edtn., 2 vols. (Göttingen, 1970).

⁵The Odes of Pindar (Harmondsworth, 1969), xii.

⁶Munich, 1962; see, in particular, the two sections: 'Aus Pindars Gedankenwelt' and 'Die "Mächte" bei Pindar', pp. 537-57.

⁷op. cit., xvi-xvii.

⁸That wealth in itself is a qualification for Pindar in this regard need not be seen as an indication that he supported any concept of plutocracy. Although a political conservative, his concern with ethical values would most assuredly not have allowed him to support any exploitation of the poor by the rich. Wealth is a positive attribute, in the sense that it is patently preferable to poverty, and in that it enables a man to be active as a "Mäzen". Any negative tendencies to abuse the power that wealth brings could be countered by "the power of the word", as wielded by the poet. This is a situation (and a power complex) which was operative in Celtic society well into the modern age. It is interesting to note that Hölderlin stresses the ethical element in Pindar's approach when he translates πλοῦτος εὐπορος (literally: 'luxuriant wealth') as 'edle Vielheit' [Gr.St.A.5, 82.] . He probably feared that a modern German reader would misunderstand Pindar's attitude towards wealth.

⁹Ethics, V, 42.

¹⁰The Isthmian Odes of Pindar (London, 1892), ix.

¹¹K. Rosenkranz, G.W.F. Hegels Leben, 459.

¹²op. cit., 538-39.

¹³H. Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 5th edtn., vol. I (Berlin, 1934), 169.

¹⁴Diels, op. cit., 162.

¹⁵Diels, op. cit., 149.

¹⁶op. cit., 539-40.

¹⁷cf. pp. 60-61 below.

Chapter Two

¹A survey of the work on Sophokles published between 1939 and 1962 is given by H. Friis Johansen in Lustrum 7, 94ff.. This includes comments in English on 844 works. An interesting anthology of articles on Sophokles in German, with original publication dates ranging from 1946 to 1967, is published by the 'wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft', Darmstadt, under the editorship of Hans Diller.

²This view is expressed in the Poetics. It might be argued that ἁμαρτία refers simply to an error of judgment (cf. Sir David Ross, Aristotle, 287). However, Aristotle specifically states (Poetics, 1452/34) that, in tragedy, "a good man must not be seen passing from happiness to misery". Therefore, the hero of a tragedy (the character who suffers) must have some defect of character, if the play is to meet Aristotle's requirements. It will be convenient in the present context to use the traditional term for this defect: ἁμαρτία.

³A good example is provided by J. Dover Wilson's introduction to his edition of Hamlet (Cambridge, 1934):

The traditional view, coming down from the middle ages, and held by most unthinking persons, was that ghosts were the spirits of the departed who were permitted to return from Purgatory to communicate with living men and women. But Protestants had ceased to believe in Purgatory, and they could hardly suppose that souls in bliss in Heaven would willingly return to earth or that souls might be released from Hell to do so. Many of them, therefore, came to the conclusion that ghosts could not possibly be dead, and must be spirits of another sort. They might conceivably be angels, but in most instances they were undoubtedly devils who 'assumed'...the forms of the departed for their own evil purposes.... Hamlet, the student of Wittenberg, is chiefly swayed by Protestant prepossessions.... A little history, of the right kind, throws a flood of new light over the events of the first act and, moreover, greatly assists the working of the plot, since it makes it natural for Hamlet to hesitate and assume his 'antic disposition', while it explains his need for the Gonzago play to test the Ghost's story.

[1971 edtn., 1-liii]

⁴The references to lines in Oedipus Tyrannos and Antigone are to the Jebb edition of the original Greek - not to Hölderlin's translation.

⁵ Another 'flaw' one might feel tempted to attribute to Oedipus is that he is an upstart destroying the traditional order and a 'tyrant' in the modern English sense. This interpretation has its difficulties, in that:

1) Oedipus does not set out consciously to attack the royal house of Thebes and usurp power.

2) Once in power, he strives in a determined manner to benefit his people and lift the curse from the city.

3) The ancient Greek term τύραννος did not have the exclusively negative connotations of the modern English 'tyrant'. It simply meant that the person concerned was an absolute ruler, not fettered by a constitution, and had probably taken power by force.

4) The Greek word did not apply to hereditary monarchs, so, in the technical sense, Oedipus was not in fact a τύραννος, since he was the rightful successor to his father, even if he himself was unaware of this! The title of the play could thus be taken as being ironic.

For the various meanings of τύραννος, see the relevant entry in Liddell and Scott.

⁶ Tragedy and Philosophy (New York, 1969), 129-30.

⁷ op. cit., 135.

⁸ cf. p.38 below.

⁹ Gottheit und Mensch in der Tragödie des Sophokles (Darmstadt, 1963), 46ff.. Schadewaldt's article (one of three, the others being written by Hans Diller and Albin Lesky) is entitled 'Sophokles und das Leid'.

¹⁰ This evaluation of Euripides was by no means unknown in Hölderlin's day, as Ernst Behler points out in his introduction to Friedrich Schlegel's 'Studium-Aufsatz':

Im Bereich der Literatur, Philosophie und auch im politischen Denken führt die Frage, wann die Moderne dann begonnen habe, zu einem erstaunlich frühen Datum. Schlegel ist dieser Frage nicht ausgewichen und hat bei der griechischen Tragödie, wie später Nietzsche, in Euripides den Ansatz zur Moderne und die Auflösung des Mythos durch Rationalismus und Skepsis erblickt.

- Fr. Schlegel, Über das Studium der griechischen Poesie (Paderborn, 1982), 106.

¹¹ op. cit., 52.

¹² op. cit., 48.

¹³ cf. Chapter One above.

¹⁴ Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums, 452-53.

¹⁵ Diels, op. cit., vol. I, 173.

¹⁶ Diels, op. cit., vol. I, 168.

¹⁷ Diels, op. cit., vol. I, 172.

¹⁸ Diels, op. cit., vol. I, 170.

¹⁹It is interesting to note that Hölderlin gives this Herakleitan idea an extra Fichtean dimension by changing the original Passive form of the verb (*διαφερονερον*) in Plato's "Symposium" (187a) into an Active form (cf. C. Jamme, *Ein ungelehrtes Buch*, 153).

²⁰Diels, op.cit., vol. I, 153.

²¹Whether this echo is a direct influence or not is largely irrelevant. It is true to say that the "Einswerden"/"Scheiden" dualism was a popular idea in the "Goethezeit"; Goethe's 'diastole' and 'systole', Schelling's notion of the unification of freedom and necessity in the Absolute, etc... However, it is significant that Hölderlin applies this idea specifically to Sophokles, thereby (perhaps unconsciously) supporting the theory that Sophokles was a disciple of Herakleitos: it can hardly be coincidence that Hölderlin, the Presocratic scholar, saw this Herakleitan doctrine exemplified in Sophokles' work.

²²op.cit., 48.

²³This phrase is one of the dubious elements in his translation: "Mit nichten kommt es!" would translate *οὐκ οὐν* well enough, but Sophokles more probably intended *οὐκοῦν*, which would give an almost exactly opposite sense: "Then, seeing that they (εἰ - 'those things') will come..." (cf. Jebb edtn., 45)

²⁴G.W.F. Hegel, *Phil. der Religion* II/1, 155.

²⁵G.W.F. Hegel, *ibidem*.

²⁶G.W.F. Hegel, *ibidem*.

²⁷G.W.F. Hegel, op.cit., 155-56.

²⁸G.W.F. Hegel, op.cit., 156.

²⁹G.W.F. Hegel, *ibidem*.

³⁰Hegel's translation would seem to be nearer the Greek sense. Hölderlin's "Selbsterkennen" appears to be the result of him taking *αὐτόγνωτος* ("self-resolved, self-chosen") in a Passive sense, parallel to the famous Delphic exhortation: *γνῶθι σεαυτόν*. His unorthodox rendering is not of central importance here, however, since it is Hegel, not Hölderlin, who seems to base his interpretation of the play on this passage.

³¹G.W.F. Hegel, op.cit., 155.

³²G.W.F. Hegel, *ibidem*.

³³The use of the terms 'win' and 'lose' is further evidence that Hölderlin saw Kreon as the only guilty party. Kreon 'loses', Antigone (ironic as this may seem) 'wins'.

³⁴G.W.F. Hegel, op.cit., 156.

³⁵cf. the discussion below, in Chapter Six.

³⁶op.cit., 234-48.

³⁷op.cit., 246-47.

³⁸This is expressed well in the poem "One Foot in Eden" by Edwin Muir, the Orcadian poet who had a great interest in and admiration for Hölderlin:

"What had Eden ever to say
Of hope and faith and pity and love
Until was buried all its day
And memory found its treasure trove?"

Collected Poems, London, 1963, 227.

³⁹Schriften von 1794-1798, 262.

Chapter Three

¹"Floruit" is used here in the customary ancient manner, to mean that the man concerned was approximately forty years old.

²See J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, 198, where he concludes: "All, therefore, we can be said to know is, that his grandfather was still alive in 496 B.C.; that he himself was active at Akragas after 472, the date of Theron's death; and that he died later than 444."

³Empedokles and Hölderlin, Frankfurt a. M., 1965, 5-17.

⁴Brucker, in particular, was a standard undergraduates' textbook of the day. The main value of these volumes to Hölderlin would be to give him access to the fragments. Needless to say, as a major European philosopher in his own right, he would not be dependent on Brucker (or anyone else) for his interpretation of the Presocratics. For a discussion of Cudworth and Brucker in particular, see U. Hölscher, op.cit., 13-14. In general, the value of Hölscher's book lies in the fact that it shows clearly how much of the Presocratic texts Hölderlin was in a position to know and study. His study is marred, however, by its uncritical acceptance of the theory that Empedokles' two "Lehrgedichte" are incompatible (see, especially, p.24), by its excessive scepticism regarding Hölderlin's understanding of the Greek texts (p.16) and its related assumption that the biographical element is what interested Hölderlin above all else (p.15). It is to be hoped that the present chapter of this thesis will go some way towards countering this general scepticism.

⁵Kirk and Raven describe the scholars' dilemma thus:

"While some scholars, including both Zeller and Burnet, are content to conclude that Empedokles

held simultaneously beliefs that are not only incompatible but actually contradictory, others have argued that the two poems must belong to separate stages of Empedokles' life!"

The Presocratic Philosophers, 322-23.

⁶"Empedokles is in fact drawing, and literally believing in, the analogy between the universe as a whole and man. Love and Strife are not, therefore, mere mechanical forces disguised under mythical or allegorical names. Empedokles believes, as the analogy shows, that sexual love and cosmic love are one and the same self-existent external force which acts upon the person or thing that loves." - op.cit., 330.

⁷op.cit., 348.

⁸Kirk and Raven make an interesting point here: "at the same time, apparently, this did not preclude the particular fall of the individual soul". -op.cit., 351. In other words, the individual can be independent of his epoch.

⁹U. Hölscher (op.cit., 28-29) argues that the "Periodenlehre" must be restricted to the individual organism. This would seem to ignore or implicitly reject the relevance of the microcosm/macrocosm element. Since Hölscher produces no arguments to support this rejection, one must approach his ideas on the subject with extreme caution.

¹⁰cf. Kirk and Raven, 331-32.

¹¹The question of what happens to the individual soul when this ultimate end occurs is an interesting one in the thought of both Empedokles and Hölderlin. Presumably it will be subsumed in the divine soul or mind and lose its individuality.

¹²cf. D. Henrich, Hegel im Kontext, Frankfurt a. M., 1967, Chapter One ("Hegel und Hölderlin").

¹³Darmstadt reprint, 210-11.

¹⁴Diels, op.cit., Vol. I, 350.

¹⁵It is to be noted that Spinoza also rejected the idea of the survival of the mind - cf. F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 4, New York, 1963, 251.

¹⁶The Greeks and the Irrational, Berkeley, 1951, 153.

¹⁷Kirk and Raven refer to the interesting possibility of a Homeric influence on Empedokles' ideas on the subject, referring to Homer's distinction between the $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}s$ or conscious soul and the $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ or life-soul - cf. op.cit., 360.

¹⁸Diels, op.cit., Vol. I, 313.

¹⁹Diels, op.cit., Vol. I, 313-14.

²⁰This is what W.B. Yeats was thinking of when he wrote the first stanza of his poem "The Gyres":

"The Gyres! the Gyres! Old Rocky Face, look forth:
Things thought too long can be no longer thought,
For beauty dies of beauty, worth of worth,
And ancient lineaments are blotted out.
Irrational streams of blood are staining earth;
Empedokles has thrown all things about;
Hector is dead and there is a light in Troy;
We that look on but laugh in tragic joy."
Collected Poems, London, 2nd edn.,
1950, 337.

See also A Vision, London, 1937, 67 ff.: "the Great Wheel". Here, Yeats makes the astute point: "I had never put the conflict of the dialectical life-process in logical form, never thought with Hegel that the two ends of the see-saw are one another's negation, nor that the spring vegetables were refuted when over" (pp. 72-73).

Aristotle also saw Love and Strife as having moral implications in Empedokles - cf. Kirk and Raven, *op.cit.*, 330-31.

²¹Aetius II, 6, 3 (Diels, *op.cit.*, Vol. I, 292).

²²Although Hölderlin will have come across "aither" or "Äther" elsewhere (eg. in Pindar, Goethe's "Ganymed", Heinse's Ardinghello) it is most prominent in the work of Empedokles.

²³cf. "Katha Upanishad", Part Four: "Who sees the many and not the ONE, wanders on from death to death". (tr. J. Mascaro; The Upanishads, Harmondsworth, 1965, 63).

²⁴This same point of view is expressed in the "Katha Upanishad" in these terms: "Know the Atman as lord of a chariot; and the body as the chariot itself. Know that reason is the charioteer; and the mind indeed is the reins.

The horses, they say, are the senses; and their paths are the objects of sense. When the soul becomes one with the mind and the senses he is called "one who has joys and sorrows".

(tr. J. Mascaro, *op.cit.*, 60)

It is remarkable to what a great extent the Indian tradition on the one hand and the dualistic European tradition (Judaean-Christian and Greek strands coalescing in Romanticism) on the other concur with one another on the great Truths. This became clear to Fr. Schlegel in 1802 when he began learning Sanskrit from Alexander Hamilton in Paris. He and his brother (who translated the Bhagavad Gita into Latin) subsequently did much to spread enthusiasm for ancient Indian culture and religion in Germany. The Sanskrit classics were very much in

harmony with the Romantic "Weltanschauung". As Juan Mascaro points out in his introduction to the Bhagavad Gita (Harmondsworth, 1962, 10):

Sanskrit literature is, on the whole, a romantic literature interwoven with idealism and practical wisdom, and with a passionate longing for spiritual vision.

²⁵The chronological gap between the death of Sokrates and the appearance of these ideas in the "Republic" can be explained by the fact that Plato did not approach the theme of political philosophy in a serious way until this later date. When he did turn his thoughts seriously to the subject, he would be confronted with the problems for the first time. He then found it impossible to bring together in harmony his earlier "democratic" ideas and his newly elaborated political theories.

²⁶Diels, op.cit., Vol. I, 311-12.

²⁷cf. Kirk and Raven, op.cit., 324.

²⁸In his study De Baudelaire au Surréalisme (Paris, 1969) Marcel Raymond describes this procedure (as Baudelaire saw it) in the following terms:

"Et voici comment cette liberté (de poète) se donnera carrière: c'est le rôle de l'imagination... d'attribuer aux images et aux symboles une place et une valeur relatives - relatives à l'esprit humain, relatives à l'oeuvre... (Le) poète va créer un ordre qui sera... l'expression infaillible de son âme. Et cette expression - bien que les éléments dont elle se compose paraissent se rapporter aux choses de la nature - n'en sera moins essentiellement surnaturelle. Car l'âme, de par son origine et sa destinée, ne trouve sa vraie patrie que dans l'au-delà spirituel où plonge la nature. La mission de la poésie est d'ouvrir une fenêtre sur cet autre monde..." (pp. 22-23)

The symbols receive their values from the imagination, which is consciously employed by the poet, in that he consciously decides to sit down and write a poem, but the result is not within the conscious control of the poet, because the imagination does its work and supplies the poem's contents and significance from the Collective Unconscious, in Jungian terminology - ie. through anamnesis.

²⁹Early Greek Philosophy, 202-03.

³⁰cf. Burnet, op.cit., 199.

³¹The last three lines are of particular interest in that they indicate the ἐν καὶ πάλιν element in Hölderlin's view of poetic creation. The "Geist" of the poet produces its revelations through its contact with "der Geist der Welt" - cf. Baudelaire's view, note 28 above.

³²Hölderlin's discussion of the subject in his philosophical persona in the "Grund zum Empedokles", with his stress on the elements of "Opfer", "Versöhnung" and the reconciling of extremes, is of direct interest and value here. However, in consideration of the role ascribed to the unconscious in his aesthetics and metaphysics, it is possible and legitimate in my view to search for deeper meanings and symbols in his work. It is precisely in this area that the advances in the empirical study of the contents of the unconscious since Hölderlin's day can further our knowledge and understanding of his works.

³³cf. the discussion of the subject in Rudolf Unger, Herder, Novalis und Kleist. Studien über die Entwicklung des Todesproblems in Denken und Dichten vom Sturm und Drang zur Romantik, Frankfurt a. M., 1922; also Walter Rehm, Orpheus. Der Dichter und die Toten. Selbstdeutung und Totenkult bei Novalis - Hölderlin - Rilke, Düsseldorf, 1950.

³⁴C. Brentano, Werke, Vol. 1, 46.

³⁵Kurt Leonhard, a German Dante scholar, has suggested that Dante's concept of "amore", which stands in the tradition stretching from Empedokles' *φιλία* and Plato's *ἔρως* to Hölderlin's "Metaprinzip", is of a similar Freudian nature:

Am auffallendsten ist natürlich die Einheit des Liebestriebes im Guten wie im Bösen, als nährnde und tragende Wurzel aller anderen Triebe: in den Ordnungssystemen der drei Jenseitsreiche Dantes sind alle Tugenden und Laster nichts anderes als Erscheinungsformen der Liebe, des Amor, des Eros oder, um Freuds durchaus hierher passendes Wort zu gebrauchen: *Libido* in ihren vielfältigen Brechungen, Verirrungen, Verdrängungen, Auswüchsen und Abschwächungen zwischen Selbsttäuschung und Selbsterkenntnis... (Dante, Reinbek, 1970, 116).

³⁶Within the context of Hölderlin's poems and the political situation of his day, the anticipation of the end of hostilities between France and the rest of Europe was the great hope for a "Gipfel der Zeit" in political terms. The Treaty of Lunéville in particular plays a large role in his poems of the period. At least, this event (which occurred early in 1801) is adduced by many commentators as the motive force, or at least partly so, behind "Friedensfeier" and the reference to "des heiligen Friedens Bogen" in the fifth stanza of "Heimkunft". For an interesting detailed discussion of "Friedensfeier" and the various interpretations of the poem, see G. Schneider-Herrmann, Hölderlins "Friedensfeier" und der griechische Genius, Zürich, 1959.

³⁷The question of the desirability of the intoxicating effects of works of art, especially on naive spirits, is

central to the whole issue of Romantic art. It is an obvious fact that art has this effect on people, perhaps especially music. Beethoven's famous words: "Von Herten - Möge es wieder zu Herten gehen", referring to his "Missa Solemnis", are typical of the Romantic view. This view is based on the belief in the therapeutic effect of the release or "Erschütterung" occasioned by the work. The intention is of central importance, just as it is in oratory: in terms of emotional power, there is not much to choose between a Martin Luther King and an Adolf Hitler, which shows perfectly how neutral "das Dämonische" is.

³⁸cf. Burnet, op.cit., 179, for a description of Parmenides' ideas.

³⁹cf. Hölscher, op.cit., 9, where the figure of the Egyptian is traced to a textbook Hölderlin used for his "Magisterarbeit".

⁴⁰This is the one major point which dissuades me from accepting a straight Manes/Hegel correspondence. Hegel had at no point been Hölderlin's teacher - the opposite was the case for a long time. If Hölderlin once had a teacher whom he had outgrown, only two possibilities strike me as being likely: Schiller or Fichte. There is also a third, anachronistic possibility: that Manes is in fact Empedokles, whose works and life had been an example for Hölderlin.

⁴¹He has left Frankfurt and Diotima behind, and brought his philosophical studies to their final culmination in the "Homburger Aufsätze". His state of mind during this period is clear from the following sentiments extracted from a letter to Susette Gontard from the summer of 1799:

"Täglich muß ich die verschwundene Gottheit wieder rufen. Wenn ich an große Männer denke..., wie sie, ein heilig Feuer, um sich griffen, und alles Todte, Hölzerne, das Stroh der Welt in Flamme verwandelten, die mit ihnen aufflog zum Himmel, und dann an mich, wie ich oft, ein glimmend Lämpchen, umhergehe, und betteln möchte um einen Tropfen Öl, um eine Weile noch die Nacht hindurch zu scheinen - siehe! da geht ein wunderbarer Schauer mir durch alle Glieder, und leise ruf' ich mir das Schreckenswort zu: lebendig Todter!"

[Gr.St.A.6/1, pp.336-37.]

In many ways, Hölderlin's Homburg period was one of transition between Hölderlin the bold young innovator full of hope for the future and Hölderlin the mature poet creating masterpieces for eternity, tottering on the brink of madness and cut off from all but one or two of his contemporaries. I would suggest that the play he wrote during this transitional period shows that he was aware, however dimly, of what lay ahead of him. For a more detailed discussion of this period, see Werner Kirchner,

Hölderlin. Aufsätze zu seiner Homburger Zeit, Göttingen, 1967; G. Jamme and O. Pöggeler (eds.), Homburg vor der Höhe in der deutschen Geistesgeschichte: Studien zum Freundeskreis um Hegel und Hölderlin, Stuttgart, 1981.

Chapter Four

45. ¹The Philosophy of Plato, 2nd edtn., Oxford, 1969.

²Plato, Meno 86a.

³Platon, Darmstadt, 1966, 184.

⁴cf. Platons Ideenlehre, Darmstadt, 1975, 466.

⁵op.cit., 187.

⁶cf. J. Kemp, The Philosophy of Kant, 60.

⁷The attitude of the rationalist is seen from the following passage from U. Schultz:

"Kant hat sich nicht gescheut, zuzugestehen, daß er durch Rousseau von der Arroganz der Vernunft, die fast alle zeitgenössischen Philosophen befallen hatte, befreit worden war..."

Damit tritt für ihn, wie für Rousseau, der Mensch in seiner natürlichen Haltung, bar aller spitzfindigen Verstandestätigkeiten, in den Mittelpunkt des Interesses. Er wird zum Maßstab, an den sich das Leben wie das philosophische Lehren zu halten hat..."

⁸F.M. Cornford makes this clear in his edition of the Theaitetus as follows: "Knowledge is produced by instruction, always accompanied by a true account of its grounds ($\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\eta\varsigma \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$), unshakeable by persuasion, and possessed by gods and only a few among men. True belief is produced by persuasion, not based on rational grounds ($\alpha\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$), can be changed by persuasion, and is possessed by all mankind." - Plato's Theory of Knowledge, London, 1970, 141. Hölderlin, of course, saw himself as one of the "few among men".

⁹The fact that I begin this quotation with the line:

"Des gemeinsamen Geistes Gedanken sind..."

is in no way intended as an implicit rejection of the parallel structure of the passage: the most satisfactory reading of the stanza would seem to result from reading a comma after "...unter den Völkern", and the "Wettern, die..." as in apposition to "Gedanken".

¹⁰op.cit., 190.

¹¹The "Sehnsucht ins Ungebundene" is far from being a negative characteristic in itself. It only becomes

dangerous when hemmed in by excessive repression. The mind, as the conscious, directing element in the psyche, must take account of these aspirations of the unconscious elements, and direct or channel them towards good rather than evil.

¹²Kants Erkenntnispsychologie, 64. The various "Arten des Unbewußten" which are dealt with by Kant are enumerated on pp. 55-64 of Satura's study. He lists them as: "die Gedächtnislatenz", "die unterschwelligen Empfindungen", "die unbewußte psychische Tätigkeit", "die metaphysisch-moralischen Grundbegriffe", "die unbewußten Handlungsmotive".

¹³op.cit., 52.

¹⁴"Das Gesetz dieses Gesanges ist, daß die zwei ersten Partien der Form nach durch Progreß und Regreß entgegengesetzt, aber dem Stoff nach gleich, die zwei folgenden der Form nach gleich, dem Stoff nach entgegengesetzt sind, die letzte aber mit durchgängiger Metapher alles ausgleicht." [Gr.St.A.2/2, p.722.]

¹⁵op.cit., 63.

¹⁶F.W.J.v. Schelling, Schriften von 1799-1801, 628.

¹⁷As we have seen, Ottomar Wichmann sees the origins of Plato's theory of anamnesis as lying in the Pythagorean doctrines of the transmigration of souls and "p r ä - s t a b i l i e r t e H a r m o n i e".

¹⁸In the last analysis, we may have to understand the "Wechsel der Töne" as a very personal method developed by Hölderlin to induce his visions, rather than as a dogmatic principle or 'sine qua non' for all poets. Hölderlin can be counted among the poets mentioned by Kurt Leonhard, "die durch genaue Kenntnis der Schriften und Predigten eben jener 'echten' Mystiker sowie durch ihr Talent und Handwerk dazu imstande sind, mystische Erlebnisse nicht etwa nur zu imitieren, vorzutäuschen, nachzuahmen, sondern sie mit Hilfe 'sprachlicher Fiktionen' bei sich selbst und bei ihren Lesern hervorzurufen, zu erzeugen, durch suggestive Darstellung herzustellen". - Dante, 160.

¹⁹That Hölderlin also took inspiration from the Pre-socratics, in particular from Herakleitos and Pindar, cannot be excluded. However, the dialectical process as described in Plato's dialogues is the most obvious and the most carefully elaborated precedent.

²⁰Beissner [Gr.St.A.2/2, 860.] explains this line simply as a reference to Philoktetes 'living in the memory' because of his services to Hercules. It is difficult to see, however, how 'memory' could have the deeper, metaphysical meaning for the Platonist Hölderlin elsewhere in his work and only here be used in the prosaic, everyday sense. The connection with Herkules (which is admittedly supported by the reference to him in the stanza preceding this line) need not exclude the possibility of a deeper

meaning for 'Gedächtnis': Philoktetes' act in helping Herkules can just as easily be taken as an example of him following 'Gedächtnis' in the moral sphere.

²¹op.cit., 60.

²²cf. Dieter Henrich's essay: "Der Begriff der Schönheit in Schillers Ästhetik" in Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, Vol. XI, 527 ff.. Here Henrich makes the following point: "...Schiller fand schon bei der ersten Lektüre (der Kritik der Urteilskraft) nur die Ausführungen Kants bemerkenswert..., von denen es ihm schien, daß sie eine Verbindung des Ästhetischen mit dem Sittlichen enthalten oder möglich machen" (p.534). Where Kant himself (and Fichte after him) connected morality with practical reason, Schiller (and Hölderlin after him) tried to connect it more with aesthetics. This is a more Platonist attitude, in that Plato saw a close affinity between moral good and beauty. Physical beauty in the world, by this view, is a reminder from God of what we have to aim for in our actions. The artist distils this beauty and accentuates it, thereby intensifying the effect. The moral force of the work of art is something which concerned many artists of the period, from Goethe and Schiller to Hölderlin and Beethoven.

²³I. Kant, Schriften, 6, 44-46.

²⁴I. Kant, Schriften, 5, 326.

²⁵Hannelore Hegel makes an interesting point in this connection: "Sinclairs Kritik an Fichte ist deshalb beachtenswert, weil er sie - mit Ausnahme der Hölderlins - früher und in engerer Beziehung zu dessen Philosophie als die aller übrigen Kritiker entwickelt hat. Außerdem ist sie bedeutsam, weil sie sich unter anderem auf einen Punkt richtet, in dem Fichte selbst später unabhängig von Sinclair zu der gleichen Einsicht wie dieser kam, daß nämlich die Absolutheit des Ich aufgegeben werden müsse und es nur aus einem ihm vorausgesetzten, aber durch Reflexion nicht begreifbaren Grund zu verstehen sei." - Isaak von Sinclair zwischen Fichte, Hölderlin und Hegel, Frankfurt a. M., 1971, 239.

For an interesting discussion of Fichte's ideas on God, see F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy 7/1, 100-20. Also: E. Hirsch, Fichtes Religionsphilosophie und Christentum und Geschichte in Fichtes Philosophie; F. Gogarten, Fichte als religiöser Denker; W. Ritzel, Fichtes Religionsphilosophie; W. Schulz, Fichte. Kierkegaard.

Chapter Five

¹cf. John Kemp, The Philosophy of Kant, 68:

Just as the problem presented by the place of the concept of morality in that of the highest

good could be solved only by postulating immortality, so, Kant thinks, that presented by the requirement that happiness should be attained in proportion to virtue can be solved only by postulating the existence of God. A man is not the cause of nature and his will is therefore unable to ensure that nature metes out the happiness which through his virtue he deserves, or the unhappiness which he might deserve through vice. But the existence of a connexion between virtue and deserved happiness is postulated as necessary by the moral law and its requirement that we should seek to further the highest good; it follows that the moral law also postulates the existence of a supreme cause of nature which can bring about the required correspondence of virtue and morality, which would otherwise not exist, ie. it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God.

²Here I purposely put Kant's ideas on the subject in the worst possible light, since this is (I believe) the light in which many of his contemporaries saw them. Whether they attacked Kant from a religious point of view (Jacobi, Jean Paul) or supported Kant's general system without taking his Moral Argument or his theism seriously (Fichte in his early period, Schelling in his Fichtean period), the most prominent of his contemporaries and successors had this in common: they did not see Kant's ideas on God as being either central to his system or in general very convincing. Indeed, one is tempted to see the basic driving force in Kant's early philosophising as being a reaction against an element he had in common with Hölderlin: his Pietist upbringing (in Franz Albert Schulz' school in Königsberg). His two-pronged attack, in such early works as Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes (1764) and Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik (1766), against Swedenborgian "Schwärmerei" (very similar to Schelling's attack on Schleiermacher and Novalis in Widerporsten) and metaphysical rationalism (which, after all, had as its aim a defence of the religious world view), could be seen as a typical Enlightenment attack on religion per se, combined as it was with a Rousseauan affirmation of life and "Diesseitigkeit" reminiscent of Nietzsche's philosophy. This is not to say, of course, that Kant was an atheist, any more than Rousseau was - Copleston makes the controversial point that "in the long run Rousseau's sentimental deism perhaps worked more in favour of the restoration of Catholicism than against it" (A History of Philosophy 6/1, 96). And Kant's Moral Argument is altogether sterner and more rigorous than Rousseau's 'sentiment intérieur'. However, the fact remains that the Moral Argument is not an a priori proof (unlike the Ontological Argument). God is, for Kant, a Postulate of Practical Reason - a presupposition or assumption. This aspect of his thought was developed in what one might regard as a consequential manner by the

Neo-Kantian Hans Vaihinger, in his Philosophie des Als-Ob (1911), in which he treats Kant's Postulates simply as useful fictions.

³Jean Paul, Werke, Vol.2, 266-67.

⁴F. Nietzsche, Werke 6/2, 19.

⁵Hans-Georg Gadamer gives the following definition:

"Synthetische Urteile (im Unterschied zu den analytischen Urteilen): Urteile, in denen im Prädikat gedacht wird, was im Subjekt noch nicht enthalten ist. So erweitern die synthetischen Urteile die Erkenntnis. Alle empirische Erkenntnis ist synthetisch, indem in ihr ein Mannigfaltiges von Wahrnehmungen oder Vorstellungen zu einer Einheit verbunden wird. Synthetische Urteile a priori sind solche erweiternden Erkenntnisse, die aller Erfahrung als eine notwendige Bedingung vorangehen und die dadurch zustandekommen, daß das in ihnen zu Verbindende ein a priori Gegebenes ist."

(Immanuel Kant, Frankfurt a. M., 1960, 215)

The novel aspect of Kant's enterprise is well brought out by Uwe Schultz in the following passage: "Methodisch kann das Verfahren des Dogmatikers so präzisiert werden: analytische Urteile a priori; das des Skeptikers: synthetische Urteile a posteriori zu vollziehen. Kants Bemühen wendet sich nun einer Unmöglichkeit - so mußte es seiner Zeit erscheinen - zu, nämlich synthetische Urteile a priori zu leisten... A priori sollen seine Urteile sein, um als wirkliche Erkenntnis Allgemeingültigkeit und Notwendigkeit beanspruchen zu können; synthetisch aber, um über das analytische Glasperlenspiel mit reinen Begriffen hinauszugelangen." (Immanuel Kant, 94)

⁶F. Nietzsche, Werke 6/2, 18.

⁷See A History of Philosophy 7/1, 132: "...both the philosophy of Spinoza and the transcendental idealism of Fichte are one-sided exaggerations. For Spinoza is depicted as absolutizing the object and Fichte as absolutizing the subject. And the implication is that the Absolute must transcend the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity and be subject and object in identity."

⁸"Das Ich setzt sich als bestimmt durch das Nicht-
heißt demnach, das Ich weiß sich als begrenzt durch das Ich
Gewußte... Es ist einmal das absolute Ich, welches es
seinem Wesen nach ist, zum anderen ist es bestimmt, d.h.
begrenzt und bedingt, also gerade nicht absolut." - Wil-
helm G. Jacobs, in his introduction to the Grundriß des
Eigentümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre, p.XIII.

⁹G.W.F. Hegel, Vorl. ü. die Gesch. d. Phil., III, 399.

¹⁰I. Kant, Schriften, 5, 168.

¹¹Copleston, Vol. 7/1, 21.

¹²ibidem.

¹³ibidem.

¹⁴ibidem.

¹⁵cf. J. Kemp, op.cit., 109: "As to serious works of art, Kant's point seems to be that, however impressed we may be by them it is in principle less remarkable that the product of the mental processes of one man should appeal to the minds of other men than that the products of nature (whose origin, whatever it may be, is not human) should have this affinity and appeal. The suggestion is that, if nature has not been created, in part at least, for our aesthetic delight, we may at least regard it as if it had been so created; and this is remarkable, whereas the production by a man of a poem or a symphony for our pleasure is not. We expect to see order and purposiveness in a work of art, as in many other products of human agency; but to discover them in a non-human aspect of the world is far more impressive and wonderful."

¹⁶Dieter Henrich, 'Der Begriff der Schönheit in Schillers Ästhetik', Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung XI, 1957 (This quotation from p.528). As a detailed examination of Schiller's reading of and additions to Kant this article is of considerable interest.

¹⁷cf. D. Henrich, Hegel im Kontext, 15. The Theosophie was, of course, an early 'pre-Kantian' work by Schiller. It nevertheless played an important part in the development of the 'Liebe'/'Selbstheit' thematics, as Henrich points out.

¹⁸D. Henrich: "Anders als Hemsterhuis deutete er Liebe als ein Sichausdehnen des endlichen Selbst, das nach aller Vollkommenheit strebt, über die ganze Welt." (Hegel im Kontext, 15).

¹⁹Jenenser Realphilosophie I+II, ed. J. Hoffmeister, Leipzig, 1931-32.

²⁰Needless to say, in the case of unpublished works, the dates are approximate. This applies particularly to Hegel's Theologische Jugendschriften.

²¹There is evidence enough that Hölderlin was a keen student of Kantian philosophy at the Stift, inspired by Kantian lecturers like Diez and Flatt, and was reportedly more enthusiastic about Kant at this stage than was Hegel. However, this is reflected in his letters only indirectly. For details of the friends' studies and interests at Tübingen, see Harris, Hegel's Development, Section II; C. Jamme, 'Ein ungelehrtes Buch', 33-54.

²²The significance of Hölderlin's early enthusiasm for Schiller's work lies, of course, in the fact that it would lead him to read Schiller's first Kantian publications as soon as they appeared, and they would then lead him on to a closer personal study of Kant's work.

²³Über die Möglichkeit einer Form der Philosophie überhaupt. (Schriften von 1794-1798, 1-28.)

²⁴This characteristic of the artistic temperament is stressed by J.W.N. Sullivan in his study Beethoven - His Spiritual Development: "In this sketch of Beethoven's spiritual development we have regarded him chiefly as an explorer. What we may call his emotional nature was sensitive, discriminating, and profound, and his circumstances brought him an intimate acquaintance with the chief characteristics of life... There was nothing in this man, either natural or acquired, to blunt his perceptions. And he was not merely sensitive, he was not merely a reflecting mirror. His experiences took root and grew. An inner life of quite extraordinary intensity was in process of development till the very end. Other artists, of those few whose spirits were both sensitive and free, seem to have passed through similar stages of development..." (pp.125-26).

This can be compared and contrasted with Kant's pre-occupations as he wrote the first 'Kritik': "Methodisch wird demonstriert, wie es nicht die Gegenstände der Anschauung oder des Verstandes sind, nach denen sich die Erkenntnis richtet, sondern daß die Erkenntnis als Tätigkeit der Verbindung von Anschauung und Begriff in der Reihe der Bedingungen vor den wahrgenommenen und erkannten Gegenständen liegt. Durch diese kopernikanische Wende wird erreicht, daß die Struktur des erkennenden Subjekts a priori die Struktur der erkannten Gegenstände bestimmt." - U. Schultz, Immanuel Kant, 99. To be sure, Kant has room in his system for the concept of 'Rezeptivität', which H.-G. Gadamer defines as the "Beschaffenheit des menschlichen Gemüts, sich gegen gegebene Objekte leidend zu verhalten, bzw. eine Empfänglichkeit gegen jene zu zeigen." (Immanuel Kant, 215). However, his main concern is with the ordering of the given data. He stresses the thought element in sense-experience.

²⁵cf. H.S. Harris's discussion of Schelling's correspondence with Hegel (op.cit., 186 ff.).

²⁶"Seine Auseinandersetzung der Wechselbestimmung des Ich und Nicht-Ich (nach seiner Sprache) ist gewiß merkwürdig, auch die Idee des Strebens..." [Gr.St.A.6/1, p.156].

²⁷I. Kant, Schriften, 5, 344-45.

²⁸I. Kant, Schriften, 5, 409.

²⁹In his Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung (1792), Fichte had defended the primacy of Kant's autonomy of the practical reason over any system of ethics based on the authority of divine revelation (after the manner of Moses' Ten Commandments). He did not reject the concept of revelation altogether, but his criterion for judging whether any specific revelation was genuine and valid or not was whether it was in harmony with the

Kantian Moral Law.

C. Jamme ('Ein ungelehrtes Buch', 288) states that Hölderlin at this time rejected the concept of revelation altogether (unlike Fichte). However, it is difficult to see how Hölderlin, with his intellectual roots in Pietism, Kantian anti-rationalism and Platonism, would be likely to take up this extreme position at any point in his career, especially when one considers how important revelation was to become for him in his later work:

Ein Weiser mag mir manches erhellen; wo aber
Ein Gott noch auch erscheint,
Das ist doch andere Klarheit.

[Gr.St.A.3, p.533.]

³⁰cf. Gerhard Schulz, Novalis, p. 54. How much Hölderlin und Novalis would have had in common and agreed upon in this discussion becomes plain when one considers the following (in my view accurate) description of Novalis' attitude towards Fichte's system:

Es ist das allzu abstrakte in Kants und Fichtes Philosophie, das Hardenberg entgegen ist, die Negierung der Natur, die Irrealität des Nicht-Ichs. Er sucht das Nicht-Ich weiter zu fassen und fragt nach seiner 'unabhängigen Sphäre' und: 'hat Fichte nicht zu willkürlich alles ins Ich hineingelegt?' 'Der Mensch ist so gut Nicht-Ich, als Ich'... Das gleichzeitige Studium Spinozas ermöglicht ihm ein anderes Verhältnis zur Natur. Er sucht beider Wege zugleich zu gehen und zu einem dritten höheren zu verbinden. Über dem Problem des Ichs und dem der Natur erhebt sich das Problem Gottes als der höheren Einheit. 'Spinoza stieg bis zur Natur - Fichte bis zum Ich, ich bis zur These Gott'. Idealismus und Realismus sollen sich nicht ausschließen, sondern vereinigt werden.

Paul Kluckhohn in his introduction to Novalis' Schriften, Band I. (Quotation from p.11).

³¹The fact that Hölderlin was preoccupied with this question as early as 1795 casts severe doubt on the proposition put forward by Charles Taylor: "Hegel seems to have been slower in taking this point, that separation was essential for freedom, than other thinkers of his generation. This is perhaps because he did not feel the impact of Fichte and the 'Wissenschaftslehre' in the middle 1790's with anything like the force that Schelling, or the Romantic thinkers, or even Hölderlin did; perhaps because he was far from its epicentre, serving as a preceptor in Berne. But having got the point, Hegel thought it through more consistently, rigorously and thoroughly than anyone else in his generation, and this...is what ultimately separated him from the Romantics." (Hegel, 68)

It is difficult to understand the force of the "even" before Hölderlin's name. It is also difficult to understand how Taylor could read Hyperion without seeing in it

a statement that "the realization of man as a spiritual being, hence a free rational being, requires that he break out of the original unity of the tribe" (ibidem). Has he read Über Religion?

The actual difference between Hegel and the Romantics does not lie in their respective depths of realization of the problem, but in their respective solutions to this problem.

³²cf. Harris, op.cit., 515.

³³I. Kant, Schriften, 5, 402.

³⁴Novalis, Schriften, 1, 11.

³⁵F.W.J.v. Schelling, Schriften von 1794-1798, 246.

³⁶Hölderlin-Jahrbuch 1978-9, 83.

³⁷From the first section of Volksreligion und Christentum, probably written in July and August 1793, and known as "the Tübingen Fragment" [This quotation from H. Nohl, Hegels theologische Jugendschriften, 5.]

³⁸The first two paragraphs of Das Leben Jesu, written 1795, therefore contemporary with Hölderlin's Über Urtheil und Seyn and Schelling's Philosophische Briefe. [Nohl, op.cit., 75.]

³⁹I. Kant, Schriften, 4, 19.

⁴⁰G.W.F. Hegel, Vorl. ü. die Geschichte d. Phil. II, 39-40.

⁴¹Both of them seem to have taken the second part of Plato's writings for the whole. For them, Plato was the arch-rationalist.

⁴²Nohl, op.cit., 77.

⁴³Harris, op.cit., 253.

⁴⁴Plato's Symposium, 202a ff..

Chapter Six

¹Tübingen, 1978.

²op.cit., 2.

³Hölderlin-Jahrbuch 1975-77, 324.

⁴ibidem.

⁵op.cit., 33-99.

⁶op.cit., 56.

⁷op.cit., 58.

⁸op.cit., 60.

²¹op.cit., 61.

²²op.cit., 64.

²³ibidem.

²⁴ibidem.

²⁵op.cit., 65.

²⁶ibidem.

²⁷ibidem.

²⁸The centaur is, of course, also 'zweiggestalt'. However, in the context of 'changing days' and 'no-one knowing the best (= the Absolute)', the stanza must surely be taken as a reference to Hölderlin's philosophy of history. The close connection between 'lieblich und böse' in line 2 and 'zweiggestalt' in line 3 makes it unlikely that they refer to two different entities. A day which is 'zweiggestalt' is one which is in transit between the two states: 'lieblich' and 'böse'. The only possibility of referring 'zweiggestalt' here to Chiron would be to take it as a secondary meaning, and relate the epithet to both the day and Chiron.

²⁹Hölderlin-Jahrbuch 1975-77, 318-24.

³⁰op.cit., 318.

³¹op.cit., 321.

³²op.cit., 318.

³³Schmidt, op.cit., 88ff.

³⁴op.cit., 91-2.

³⁵Nimm nun ein Roß, und harnische dich und nimm
Den leichten Speer, o Knabe! Die Wahrsagung
Zerreißt nicht, und umsonst nicht wartet,
Bis sie erscheint, Herakles Rückkehr.
[Gr.St.A.2/1, p.57]

³⁶One can compare William Blake's anecdote in his Notes on Spurzheim's 'Observations on the Deranged Manifestations of the Mind, or Insanity':

Cowper came to me and said: 'O that I were insane always. I will never rest. Can you not make me truly insane? I will never rest till I am so. O that in the bosom of God I was hid. You retain health and yet are as mad as any of us all - over us all - mad as a refuge from unbelief - from Bacon, Newton and Locke.' (Complete Writings, ed. Sir Geoffrey Keynes, 772.)

Thus, we see a connection between the divine fury of the poet and insanity, which can be seen as a permanent version of the "Ekstase" of the creative process. Death would then be seen as an even more permanent version of the same, in line with W.B. Yeats's statement: "And all dead men are drunk." (Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats, 360.)

- ³⁷The Extentialist Tradition, ed. N. Langiulli, 377.
³⁸G.W.F. Hegel, Phil. der Religion 2/1, 132.
³⁹G.W.F. Hegel, *ibidem*.
⁴⁰G.W.F. Hegel, *op.cit.*, 133.

b) Schelling

- ¹cf. Chapter 5, Note 7.
²Schelling-Forschung seit 1954, 74.
³Here, Zeltner is paraphrasing a contention of Fuhrmans, which I would be inclined to accept.
⁴*op.cit.*, 72-73.
⁵*op.cit.*, 72.
⁶F.W.J.v. Schelling, Schriften von 1794-1798, 210-11.
⁷F.W.J.v. Schelling, *op.cit.*, 220.
⁸Die Vollendung des Deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings, 57.
⁹The Later Philosophy of Schelling, 17.
¹⁰W.R. Matthews tries to define it as closely as possible in the following terms: "The central question of constructive philosophy does not present itself to (the post-Kantian Theist) in the form: given the idea of God as a belief, to find some rational proof of His existence. Rather the problem presents itself as analogous to the scientific problem: given the universe as disclosed in experience, to find the most reasonable account of it. Several hypotheses present themselves for consideration, among them theism. The question before the mind of the philosopher, therefore, is to decide which of the possible hypotheses squares most adequately with the whole experience of the universe which is open to us. The Theist maintains that his hypothesis is the most rational in this sense." - 'Theism', Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1962, Vol.22, 50.
¹¹F.W.J.v. Schelling, *op.cit.*, 163.
¹²F.W.J.v. Schelling, *ibidem*.
¹³F.W.J.v. Schelling, *op.cit.*, 164.
¹⁴Copleston summarises the matter concisely:
... both dogmatism and criticism point to the theoretical annihilation of the finite self or subject: Spinoza reduces the finite self to the absolute Object: Fichte reduces it to the absolute Subject, or, more precisely (since the absolute ego

is not properly a subject), to infinite activity or striving. In both cases the self is swamped, so to speak, in the Absolute." - op.cit., 130.

¹⁵F.W.J.v. Schelling, op.cit., 336-37.

¹⁶F.W.J.v. Schelling, op.cit., 344.

¹⁷A History of Philosophy, Vol.4, 222.

¹⁸F.W.J.v. Schelling, op.cit., 359.

¹⁹F.W.J.v. Schelling, op.cit., 360.

²⁰F.W.J.v. Schelling, op.cit., 337.

²¹op.cit., 18.

²²A mediation of Böhme's ideas through the works of Friedrich Christoph Oetinger would be the most likely possibility here [cf. W.A. Schulze, 'Der Einfluß Böhmes und Oetingers auf Schelling', Blätter für Württembergische Kirchengeschichte (1957), 171-80; K. Leese, Von Jakob Böhme zu Schelling. Zur Metaphysik des Gottesproblems (Erfurt, 1927).]

²³op.cit., 244-45.

²⁴ibidem.

Chapter Seven

¹G.A. Kelly makes an interesting point in this connection:

Die Probleme der griechischen Antike stehen immer im Hintergrund und treten oft an die Oberfläche: Hegel arbeitet an ihnen und sucht sie ebenso zu überwinden wie unter einem fremden Himmelsstrich zu verewigen. Die platonische Parallele zwischen den Kämpfen im Staat und den Kämpfen in der Seele ist nie weit entfernt. Ich wage zu behaupten, daß die großen Gestalten des Aristoteles, Platon und Sophokles jeweil über den Abschnitt zum Bewußtsein, Selbstbewußtsein und Geist stehen. Das Problem von Herrschaft und Knechtschaft ist in seiner Anlage wesentlich platonisch, weil es dabei um die ursprüngliche Kluft in der Geschichte der Gesellschaft sowohl als der Geschichte des Ich geht. Die zwei anfänglichen Ich, deren Kampf zu Herrschaft und Knechtschaft führt, sind auch in einen Kampf mit sich selbst verstrickt. (Materialien zu Hegels 'Phänomenologie des Geistes', ed. H.F. Fulda and D. Henrich, 197.)

The last sentence reminds us that the original sin upon which Hegel bases his system not only involves the positing of an endemic mutual animosity between men in the natural state (reminiscent of the situation posited in

Plato's Republic), but also implies an original split in the individual self, much in the manner envisaged by Siegmund Freud.

²This is Venus Urania, who appears here and elsewhere in Hölderlin's work as a Muse figure who helps the struggling man or artist out of his state of darkness and confusion.

³Here we may have an indication of the reason for Hölderlin's dissatisfaction with the first version of his own tragedy Empedokles: "das eherne Schicksal" plays too prominent a rôle, and Empedokles' suicide is more an attempt to redeem himself rather than the more general self-sacrifice for the good of mankind.

⁴For an extreme statement of the "Kantian" position, see Hans-Otto Rebstock, Hegels Auffassung des Mythos in seinen Frühschriften. Lack of space prevents me from going into this question more closely. For a general discussion, see Bernhard Dinkel, Der junge Hegel und die Aufhebung des subjektiven Idealismus, 153-59.

⁵Die Bedeutung der Person Jesu im Denken des jungen Hegel, Diss. (Göttingen, 1924).

⁶G.W.F. Hegel, Vorl. ü. die Phil. der Weltgeschichte I, 249.

⁷G.W.F. Hegel, op.cit., II-IV, 640.

⁸G.W.F. Hegel, ibidem.

⁹G.W.F. Hegel, op.cit., II-IV, 643-44.

¹⁰eg. Gottfried Martin: "Es ist unbestreitbar, daß in den frühen Platonischen Dialogen, die als Berichte über sokratische Gespräche verstanden werden können, wie im 'Laches', 'Lysis' oder 'Charmides', die Ideenlehre nicht vorkommt. In anderen Dialogen, wie etwa dem 'Menon', sind gewisse Vorahnungen der Ideenlehre anzutreffen. Voll ausgestaltet aber ist sie erst im 'Phaidon' und in der 'Politeia', also in Dialogen, die nach der Gründung der Akademie, etwa von 387 bis 380, entstanden sind. Damit käme man zu einem merkwürdigen Ergebnis. Platon wäre als ungefähr Zwanzigjähriger (407) zu Sokrates gekommen, hätte bei ihm die Ideenlehre kennengelernt, um sie dann 20 Jahre lang zu verschweigen. Ein solcher Verlauf scheint mir undenkbar." - Platon, 62.

¹¹op.cit., 141.

¹²op.cit., 141-42.

¹³op.cit., 146.

¹⁴G.W.F. Hegel, Phän. des Geistes, 376.

¹⁵At this point, Hegel is discussing the "Trennung" of mankind from nature, rather than that of man's reason from his other faculties at the end of the Greek period. However, for our present purposes, these may be regarded as parallel situations: the mind is to the rest of man

what man is to the rest of nature.

¹⁶In actual fact, his account would seem to apply only to the very oldest Vedas or to South Indian religion - most definitely not to the Upanishads or the Bhagavad Gita.

¹⁷G.W.F. Hegel, Phän. des Geistes, 376.

¹⁸A History of Aesthetic, 360.

¹⁹G.W.F. Hegel, Vorl. ü. die Phil. der Weltgesch. II-IV, 644-45.

²⁰cf. Chapter One, concerning Pindar's attitude towards "Werte".

²¹This evaluation of the final vision is sometimes denied. For example, Christoph Jamme maintains: "Durch die Methode der Rückschau ergibt sich der Eindruck universaler Vermitteltheit statt Unmittelbarkeit.... Die Kreisstruktur unterstreicht diesen Eindruck: die ersten Briefe können als Fortsetzung der letzten verstanden werden." ('Ein ungelehrtes Buch', 324-25). Jamme overlooks the temporal/temporary nature of the "Ekstase" - the meeting between man and the Absolute occurs, as an event, and then the vision (necessarily) disappears. A permanent "Ekstase" is only possible in madness or death.

²²G.W.F. Hegel, Phän. des Geistes, 12.

²³G.W.F. Hegel, op.cit., 13.

²⁴G.W.F. Hegel, op.cit., 19.

²⁵Langiulli, op.cit., 372.

²⁶In his article 'Die Beisetzung der Romantiker in Hegel's Phänomenologie' (in Materialien zu Hegels 'Phänomenologie des Geistes', ed. H.F. Fulda and D. Henrich, 245-75.).

²⁷As I have tried to show in this thesis, Kant's philosophical system and that of Hölderlin and Schelling have far more in common with each other than either of them has with that of Hegel. In his Essay on Eschatological Metaphysics (translated by R.M. French as The Beginning and the End, New York, 1952), Nicholas Berdyaev shows that Jakob Böhme was a fundamental influence on Kant. Ernst Cassirer saw the productive imagination, relating all thinking to intuition, as central to Kant's work, as his means of breaking through to the 'mundus intelligibilis'. Unlike many Kant scholars who have tended and still tend to see the third "Kritik" as an almost superfluous late appendage within the context of Kant's work, Cassirer lays particular stress on this work.

²⁸op.cit., 250.

²⁹op.cit., 261.

³⁰ibidem.

³¹ibidem.

³²"Dabei mag die verlockende Frage, wieweit Hegel der Romantik als Gesamterscheinung gerecht geworden sei, ruhig ausgeschaltet bleiben" (op.cit., 263).

³³One must be careful to differentiate between the system of Hölderlin and Schelling on the one hand and the "Sturm und Drang" anti-rationalism of men like Hamann, Herder and Jacobi on the other. Hamann (in his Metakritik of Kant's first Kritik) and Herder (in his Kalligone, a criticism of the third Kritik) saw themselves as direct opponents of Kant on many points. Jacobi objected to the postulates of practical reason, the categorical imperative and other elements in Kant's system. Hamann, interestingly enough, attacked Kant on the grounds that his separation of the various human faculties was an abstract dividing up of what was and should remain one whole. Hölderlin, on the other hand, saw it necessary to make distinctions between man's various faculties in order to determine each one's role in the smooth running of the whole. Kant's determining of the limits of reason was a necessary preliminary to the Romantics' concentration on the other faculties. The parts could then be welded together. Hölderlin and Schelling saw themselves as supplementing Kant, not as opposing him. Indeed, it has been argued (by Kurt Schilling, in his book Natur und Wahrheit) that Schelling stays within the framework of Kant's Kritik der Urteilkraft up to 1800.

³⁴The attention Kant paid to the teleological structure of nature should not be taken as evidence that he based his theism on any form of the teleological argument. Once he was convinced by the moral argument, he showed an empirical interest in such matters as a logical consequence. Similarly, Schelling, once he was convinced by the "negative Philosophie", showed an empirical interest in such matters as revelation.

APPENDIX B: Bibliography

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